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## PERSONNEL SECURITY RESEARCH — PRESCREENING AND BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS

by  
Eli S. Flyer

June 1986

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<p>This report provides a description of two major components of Defense's personnel security program-- prescreening procedures and background investigations. It also provides information on a number of studies performed in the two areas and identifies a number of research initiatives that could lead to an improved knowledge base and a more effective program. <i>Keywords:</i></p>					
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## PERSONNEL SECURITY RESEARCH — PRESCREENING AND BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS

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Personnel Security Research -  
Prescreening and Background Investigations

INTRODUCTION

The effectiveness of Defense's personnel security program has long been questioned by those involved most closely with personnel security matters. Well before the recent surge in espionage cases receiving national attention, concerns with the adequacy of Defense personnel security policies and procedures were raised by a number of special task forces charged with evaluating the program and making recommendations for its improvement. The Select Panel Review of the Department of Defense Personnel Security Program (6) during 1982, for example, pointed to the "scant value and lack of quality of initial personnel security investigations, and the inordinate delays in awaiting the results of an increasingly shallow product."

A more recent evaluation of personnel security was made by the Stilwell Commission during 1985 (30), and a large number of specific recommendations were again made to improve the program. One recommendation took into account the growing recognition that behavioral science techniques would be useful to the personnel security program, and that a DoD-wide research effort should be initiated. This has led to the activation of the Defense Personnel Security Research and Education Center (PERSEREC) at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.

The PERSEREC charter, DoD Directive 5210.79, identifies a large number of functions to be performed in evaluating and improving Defense's personnel security program. The charter also recognizes the need for a coordinated Defense-wide research effort that would include personnel security research projects initiated by the Military Services. The large amount of diverse research needed in this area can probably best be accomplished by such joint projects.



Little behavioral science research has been conducted in the personnel security area. Most personnel research psychologists in Defense have very little knowledge of the workings of Defense's personnel security program, and therefore lack an appreciation of the potential contribution their discipline can make to the program. It therefore appeared worthwhile to provide a description of some major components of Defense's personnel security program, to describe some completed relevant research studies, and to identify a number of research initiatives that could lead to an improved knowledge base and a more effective program.

In some respects this report is a follow-on to two recent presentations by the writer on the need for personnel security research and the special contribution that could be made by behavioral scientists. Appendix A provides a copy of a report made to the Military Testing Association in November, 1984, coauthored with Mr. Peter Nelson of the Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (28). The writer also gave verbal and written testimony during hearings on personnel security before the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs during April, 1985 (10). This testimony is provided in Appendix B.

## PROGRAM OBJECTIVES, ASSUMPTIONS, AND LIMITATIONS

Objectives. A major objective of Defense's personnel security program is to select highly reliable and trustworthy people for sensitive positions and to assure that their integrity is maintained while they continue in these positions. The focus of this report will be on some of the key personnel selection procedures used for individuals being assigned to highly sensitive positions, those positions requiring clearance at the Top Secret (TS) and Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) levels. Highly sensitive positions, as defined by Defense, are those in which incumbents could take actions leading to a materially adverse effect on the national security, and operationally include such job specialties as communications, intelligence, and nuclear weapons duties.

Defense tries to meet its personnel security objectives primarily through a number of operational procedures involving personnel selection (prescreening, background investigations, and adjudication) and personnel monitoring (periodic reinvestigation and continuing evaluation). Personnel security procedures vary somewhat for the three major populations involved--military, civil service, and contractor personnel. Since the writer has worked more closely with military enlisted personnel programs than programs with other populations, and is therefore more familiar with the personnel security process as it affects this group, this report will tend to focus on new recruits and enlisted personnel. Many of the procedures, concepts, and research described here, however, are considered relevant to other types of Defense personnel assigned to highly sensitive duties.

The basic elements of the Defense Personnel Security Program are described in DoD Regulation 5200.2-R issued in December, 1979 (5). This regulation establishes Defense personnel security policies and procedures, identifies standards and guidelines for personnel security determinations, and prescribes the types of

investigation needed to satisfy security clearance requirements for sensitive positions. Personnel security investigations develop the personal information needed for clearance decisions. In general, the higher the sensitivity of the position in which an individual serves, the more intensive the personnel security investigation for clearance purposes. Background or full field investigations are required for TS and SCI clearances, and include personal interviews with references as well as record checks. For one type of investigation, an "Interview-Oriented Background Investigation," a personal interview with the subject is required.

Although the stated purpose of the program is to identify individuals with favorable characteristics, personnel security procedures are not structured to identify positive behavioral information useful in selecting people into sensitive positions. Instead, negative or derogatory information is sought to deny people clearances. Under these circumstances, rejection for a security clearance as a result of a background investigation has serious negative implications. By definition, the disqualified are being labeled as security risks. As one apparent consequence, relatively few military people (less than three percent) are denied clearance based on a background investigation, and for contractor personnel, less than one percent are denied clearance (30).

Most of the derogatory information obtained through personnel security investigations consists of suitability information, and "almost all unfavorable personnel security actions taken by Defense authorities are based on derogatory suitability information"(5). DoD Regulation 5200.2-R, which also establishes basic adjudication policy, provides the following examples of derogatory suitability information:

Arrests, charges, citations

Suspicion or allegations of illegal use or abuse of drugs or alcohol

Theft or dishonesty

Unreliability, irresponsibility, immaturity, instability, recklessness

Moral turpitude

Incidents reflecting adversely on honesty, reliability, trustworthiness, stability

Mental, nervous, psychological, psychiatric, or character disorders/behavior

Excessive indebtedness, bad checks, financial difficulties or irresponsibility, unexplained affluence, bankruptcy, or evidence of living beyond the individual's means.

Assumptions and Limitations. One major assumption underlying the program is that individuals who have shown signs of unsuitability or untrustworthiness are more likely than others to commit espionage or other destructive acts. Anecdotal evidence, developed after the fact gives some support to this assumption. Many of the people who have been identified as having committed espionage have had a history of alcoholism, drug use, sexual perversion, financial difficulty, etc. The number of people in sensitive positions, however, who can be similarly categorized but have not committed espionage, while undetermined, is undoubtedly sizable. Under these circumstances, effective individual prediction of security failure before the fact cannot be accomplished accurately. The best that can be done at this time is to identify groups of individuals who are at somewhat higher risk than others.

There are serious problems faced in developing adequate criteria for program evaluation and research in the personnel security area. First of all, no estimate can be made of the number or characteristics of individuals committing espionage who successfully avoid detection. Secondly, and particularly important, known security failures comprise only a miniscule portion of the population with security clearances. Given these conditions, accurate estimates of the validity and effectiveness of personnel security procedures in reducing security failures will probably always be extremely difficult to determine.

It still makes very good sense, however, to try to insure that highly sensitive positions are filled to the maximum extent possible by people who are highly reliable and free from serious behavior problems. Although personnel security failures would still be expected to occur, it is reasonable to believe that the actual security failure rate would be markedly lower than it is now. It is in this area, improving the quality of personnel in highly sensitive positions, that behavioral science research techniques should be particularly useful.

Investigative Data. During the past few years, the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) has been conducting personnel security research studies for the Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. A major source of automated investigative data, the Defense Central Index of Investigations (DCII) file, has been made available to the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) on a continuing basis. Through linkage with individual personnel data in DMDC files, it has become possible to identify military and civilian personnel who have received background investigations and to determine their clearance levels. This data source has very important implications for behavioral scientists in identifying special subgroups of individuals for personnel security research studies, including longitudinal or follow-up investigations for those assigned to highly sensitive duties.

Research Areas. There are four major personnel security areas that can be identified where behavioral science techniques and procedures appear highly appropriate for program evaluation and improvement. The first area involves the prescreening activities used to initially qualify people prior to the initiation of a background investigation. The second area is the background investigation itself and the procedures and techniques used to collect behavioral information. The third area is the adjudication process used to evaluate findings from background investigations and related information for clearance purposes, and the fourth

area involves monitoring or continuing evaluation procedures to determine whether or not a clearance should be retained or revoked.

The first two areas--prescreening and background investigations--will be discussed in turn to describe briefly the operational procedures involved, to identify some of the personnel security and related research studies that have been performed, and to describe a number of research studies that could be conducted to help evaluate and improve the personnel security program. The availability of hard-copy and automated data sources for research and evaluative studies will also be discussed. The two remaining areas--adjudication and continuing evaluation programs--will be the subject of another report at a later date.

## PERSONNEL SECURITY PRESCREENING

Background. The Defense Investigative Service (DIS) has major responsibility for the conduct of background investigations for Defense personnel. The procedure is both formal and standardized. This is not the case with the prescreening procedures applied by the Services prior to the initiation of a request for a background investigation. Considerable variance is found among the Services in their prescreening activities, and particularly so for new recruits.

Valid prescreening procedures are extremely important in conducting an effective personnel security program. Results from background investigations are normally not available for months after their initiation. Denial of clearance for personnel in or after technical training for a sensitive skill results in lost training costs, additional training and investigative costs for replacements, and has a serious impact on the well-being and career potential of those disqualified. Rejection for appropriate reasons during a prescreening phase is highly cost effective for Defense and has much less of a negative impact on the individual concerned.

There are a large number of military occupations which have a basic requirement for TS and SCI clearance, and all personnel assigned to these skills will require a background investigation. Each of the Services employs prescreening procedures for new recruits being considered for assignment to these highly sensitive occupations. Since these assignments include communications, intelligence, nuclear weapons, and certain electronic specialties, a considerable number of new recruits go through the prescreening process. Table 1 provides information on the number of recruits for whom background investigations were known to have been requested for these positions within the first year of military service.

Table 1

Background Investigations Conducted During the First Year  
of Active Duty for Enlisted Accessions FY 1973-FY1984  
by Type of Investigation and Service<sup>a</sup>

	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Total</u>
BI-IBI	13,555	42,420	55,792	3,053	114,820
SBI	37,688	17,743	41,698	4,566	101,695
Total	51,243	60,163	97,491	7,619	216,516

<sup>a</sup>The numbers shown here do not include a number of enlistees who later received "bring-up" investigations and whose initial investigation dates cannot be determined from available automated records.

Defense policy calls for a prescreening interview to be conducted for those individuals being considered for SCI clearance for intelligence-related duties, and for TS clearance under the Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) for nuclear-related positions. These interviews are not performed by DIS investigators, but generally by representatives of the current or using organization for the individual being evaluated. Although the structure and content of the prescreening interview probably varies considerably among Defense organizations, a common source of biographical information is available to interviewers through either the DoD Statement of Personal History or the newer Personnel Security Questionnaire (PSQ). One of these two forms is accomplished by all candidates for SCI and TS clearance.

In other respects, prescreening procedures vary from Service to Service both in content and time of application. The various prescreening forms used by the Services for new recruits, including the PSQ, are shown in Appendix C. Among the Services, the Army has a far more intensive prescreening procedure for applicants at the Military Entrance Processing Stations (MEPS), while the



Air Force has a concentrated prescreening effort during basic military training. Table 2 provides this writer's judgments of the level of Service prescreening applied prior to enlistment and during basic military training.

Table 2

Intensity of Prescreening Procedures Applied in Selecting  
Recruits for Assignment to Highly Sensitive Positions

<u>Service</u>	<u>Preenlistment Screening at Military Enlistment Processing Stations</u>	<u>Prescreening During Basic Training</u>
Army	Intensive <sup>a</sup>	Intensive <sup>a</sup>
Navy	Minimal	Moderate
Air Force	Minimal	Intensive <sup>b</sup>
Marine Corps	Minimal	Moderate

<sup>a</sup>Includes special questionnaire and intensive interview.

<sup>b</sup>In addition to intensive interviews, includes personality measures, basic training behavior and performance evaluations, and a variety of reference and record checks.

In respect to content differences in recruit prescreening, the Air Force makes extensive use of personality test items, while the Army has tried similar items and then discarded this approach. The Air Force alone uses a combination of subject interview and reference and record checks, while the Army relies on an intensive interview based on a detailed biographical questionnaire. At least one Defense agency, and a number of other organizations within and outside the federal government, are known to use a combination of personality testing, psychologist interview, and polygraph in screening for highly sensitive positions.

Current prescreening procedures have not been validated by the Services' personnel researchers. There is little question,

however, that early disqualification through prescreening has reduced appreciably the number of recruits whose background investigations would have revealed serious derogatory information. Selecting out many of these recruits prior to the initiation of a background investigation has certainly had this effect. It is estimated by the writer, based on Service information, that about one-third of Army and Air Force recruits going through the prescreening process are disqualified before background investigations are initiated. Applicants for enlistment and recruits who are disqualified are normally still acceptable for enlistment as well as assignment to less sensitive but oftentimes equally attractive occupations.

There is evidence that recruits are often disqualified during prescreening for past behavior that, if revealed during a background investigation, would not result in denial of clearance. This difference between prescreening and later adjudicative practices has a reasonable explanation. As discussed earlier, the impact of prescreening disqualification on the individual and the military is much less than clearance denial after completion of a background investigation. Those who are responsible for prescreening and later adjudication decisions appear to be taking this factor into account.

It is unfortunate that empirical evidence is largely lacking that would validate recruit prescreening procedures in current use or permit comparisons of their relative usefulness. There is, however, ample face validity for many of the prescreening procedures now being employed operationally, and their use appears quite appropriate in selecting recruits for highly sensitive positions. The recruit manpower pool appears large enough at this time to maintain current disqualification rates, and there is minimal injury to the disqualified. It is difficult, however, to rationalize the large differences in prescreening procedures

among the Services. Their validation, improvement, and standardization would appear to be long overdue.

Previous Military Research. Current recruit prescreening procedures stem in large part from the Air Force personnel security research effort conducted at Lackland Air Force Base during the early 1960s. This research led to the activation of an assessment unit at Lackland to screen recruits for highly sensitive positions. The Army modeled its prescreening procedures on the Air Force program, and the Navy also took into account Air Force experience in developing its own programs. Although the Air Force assessment program has changed significantly over time, it still carries a number of procedures which, in the earlier program, showed validity for behavior and performance data obtained during later military service (23). Similar validation studies have not been performed by the other Services.

The most usable criterion for validating recruit prescreening procedures as predictors of subsequent behavior has been, and will probably continue to be, unsuitability attrition from military service. Enlisted attrition rates have been quite high over the past fifteen years. More than one in three non-high school graduate recruits and about one in five high school graduates are discharged for unsuitability during initial tours of active duty.

Since a major objective of the Defense personnel security program is to identify people who are suitable for assignment to highly sensitive positions, later unsuitability discharge among those selected for these positions could be viewed in part as failure of the screening process. Also, and critically important, personnel discharged from highly sensitive positions for unsuitability pose a special security problem. A number of those discharged are likely to be quite bitter as a result of their experiences during military service, many would be knowledgeable of sensitive equipment and procedures, and almost all would be facing some degree of financial uncertainty on their return to civilian

life. It is therefore extremely important from a national security standpoint to reduce as much as possible the number of potentially unsuitable personnel entering highly sensitive positions. The problem is serious--over 27,000 enlisted personnel who received background investigations for assignment to highly sensitive work were discharged for unsuitability over a recent five year period. Table 3 provides information on the reasons for their discharge.

Early Air Force research efforts in the personnel security area still provide about the only direct evidence that prescreening measures are predictive of later unsuitability in highly sensitive occupations. In one study, the usual predictors of unsuitability attrition in general (educational level, age, and Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) score were also found, as expected, to be equally valid within one highly sensitive occupation--munitions and special weapons (25). In a much broader study of potential predictors, basic training peer evaluation and high school reference information showed validity for later military performance and behavior criteria (23), and helped provide the basis for the current Air Force recruit prescreening program at Lackland.

While unsuitability attrition research studies involving recruits assigned to highly sensitive positions are rare, there have been numerous research studies involving the general recruit population. Findings from these studies are highly relevant to the personnel security area. It is to be expected that factors predictive of unsuitability for the total recruit population should also be predictive of unsuitability for recruits assigned to highly sensitive duties.

Unsuitability attrition research has led to the identification of a number of important factors predictive of this type of behavior. In psychological research, it is generally known that the most accurate predictors of future behavior are usually derived from past behavior. Military unsuitability research

Table 3

ENLISTED PERSONNEL, ALL SERVICES, WHO RECEIVED  
BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS: DISCHARGES FOR FAILURE TO  
MEET MINIMUM BEHAVIORAL STANDARDS DURING THE PERIOD  
FY 1980 THROUGH FY 1984

REASONS FOR DISCHARGE	NUMBER	PERCENT OF TOTAL
<u>Unsuitability</u>	<u>12,639</u>	<u>46.4</u>
Expedition Discharge	4,360	16.0
Trainee Discharge	2,983	10.9
Motivational Problems	2,691	9.9
Unsuitability	2,605	9.6
<u>Character or Behavior Disorders</u>	<u>7,922</u>	<u>29.1</u>
Drugs	4,127	15.2
Character or Behavior Disorders	1,908	7.0
Homosexuality	1,151	4.2
Alcoholism	642	2.4
Sexual Perversion	94	.3
<u>Offenses</u>	<u>5,978</u>	<u>21.9</u>
Discreditable Incidents	2,755	10.1
Misconduct, Disciplinary		
Infractions	1,632	6.0
Court Martial	1,146	4.2
Civil Court Conviction	389	1.4
AWOL, Desertion	56	.2
<u>Other</u>	<u>595</u>	<u>2.6</u>
Fraudulent Entry	430	1.6
Financial Irresponsibility	196	.7
Inaptitude	45	.2
Security	24	.1
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>27,234</u>	<u>100.0</u>

certainly supports this generalization. For example, failure in high school (high school dropout) has consistently been linked with failure in military service (unsuitability discharge). [Put another way, truancy tends to be predictive of absence without leave (AWOL).]

Other biographic information, such as police offenses, have been moderately predictive of unsuitability discharge from military service (14). Preservice activities and interests have also shown validity for this criterion (21). After entry into military service, basic training peer evaluations of behavior, performance, and motivation have been found to be relatively good predictors of subsequent military performance and behavior (23) and are relatively independent of other predictive measures. Self-report "personality" measures also show validity when obtained during basic training (12).

Preservice educational level, i.e., high school graduate status, has been used operationally for recruit selection purposes since the early 1960s (27) and still shows high validity (9). The most recent research to reduce recruit unsuitability by improved initial selection procedures continues to examine the potential of preservice behavior and other biographic and performance information. The latest efforts have been sponsored by the Directorate for Accession Policy in the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Personnel and Force Management. A description and comparison of biographical inventories for military selection has been reported recently by HumRRO (31).

The Navy Personnel Research and Development Center (NPRDC) has been given responsibility within Defense for the development of a measure of military adaptability that can be used Defense-wide for recruit selection purposes. NPRDC has selected valid items from Service adaptability screening measures and has

incorporated them in a single device--the Armed Services Adaptability Profile (ASAP). The test has been administered to about 200,000 applicants for service, and validation efforts are being performed as criteria mature.

Validation of these types of measures for recruits assigned to highly sensitive positions is relatively straightforward and easily accomplished, since automated data for these measures are generally available at DMDC. Separate linkages of these files with the DCII and personnel data bases at DMDC provide the information needed to identify the recruits receiving background investigation for highly sensitive positions, as well as those discharged at a later date for unsuitability. Since the predictor data have been collected under operational conditions during applicant selection and recruit screening, positive findings from validity studies could lead to their immediate use for prescreening purposes.

There are a number of psychological tests that are used primarily by non-Defense organizations in screening for security purposes. These include personality tests such as the Minnesota Multi Phasic Inventory (MMPI) and the California Personality Inventory (CPI), and relatively new measures that are claimed to measure "honesty." These types of tests have not been administered to recruits. Personality tests such as the MMPI have generally been considered controversial by military personnel researchers and there has been little interest in the past in measuring recruit "honesty." In general, military researchers tend to discount the value in selection of tests that are easy to fake. This may be an unnecessary constraint, however. Many recruits respond truthfully under these conditions and report negative information on themselves, and this information can be accepted at face value, particularly during a period when enlistment is voluntary.

Considerable research has been conducted outside Defense on assessment procedures relating to personal adjustment. The fact that those studies have not been reported here is not to be considered a commentary on their potential worth. Their inclusion, however, would be well beyond the scope of this report. It is quite probable that a review of these measures would identify a number that would be useful for Defense prescreening purposes. A relevant report, "Behavioral Reliability," has recently been published, and provides some of the more important academic literature in this area (1).

Research Requirements. Prescreening research for highly sensitive jobs lends itself as an area to the more traditional predictor-criterion type of investigation employed by personnel selection researchers. This approach usually includes the following steps: (1) determining the objectives of the selection procedure to be developed and the criteria to be employed, (2) identifying relevant selection (predictor) variables, (3) collecting predictor data under selection conditions, and (4) validating this information as criteria mature. In addition to prospective research studies, this area also lends itself to retrospective studies, where predictor data collected in the past, and very often for other reasons, are applied to matured criteria for validation purposes.

In examining the prescreening procedures for highly sensitive positions now used by the Services, two objectives can be identified. The first objective is to identify, as early and as accurately as possible, the kinds of information sought in a background investigation. Used for immediate adjudication purposes prior to a background investigation, this information permits an early decision whether or not it is worth proceeding with a background investigation. Then, since the current background investigation doesn't address all suitability issues, an additional objective is to identify early those individuals with the most likelihood



of becoming unsuitable, unreliable, or untrustworthy after assignment to highly sensitive positions. While the two objectives have much in common, there are sufficient differences between the two to discuss them separately.

Recruit prescreening programs of the Services are generally more oriented toward accomplishing the first objective, identifying information useful for early adjudication, although they differ markedly in the techniques applied. The Air Force, in addition, tries to address the second objective, screening for suitability. Since the effectiveness of the Services' programs has not been subject to evaluation or validation, research in the prescreening area is needed to identify current unproductive assessment measures and to develop, where possible, more effective procedures.

As described earlier, recruit prescreening for the type of information developed through background investigation is based largely on the DoD Personal History Statement or Personnel Security Questionnaire form, and, varying by Service, additional information obtained through other questionnaires, interviews, and reference/record checks. It is not known how productive these procedures are in identifying significant behavioral history prior to the initiation of a background investigation, although ample data are available that could be used to help address this question.

There are many research designs that could be developed for studies in this area. One plan with considerable potential would involve comparing the results from prescreening and background investigation procedures for the same individuals. While the sample studied here would be restricted to those recruits whose prescreening was favorable enough to lead to a background investigation, an important limitation, the research would be useful in identifying which screening procedure of the Services had the highest success rate. This could be done, after appropriate controls, by determining which Service had the lowest percentage

of serious derogatory background investigation information for those recruits passing the prescreening phase.

Automated data are currently available for the above analysis. DMDC could link automated personnel records for recruits entering the Services with their DCII records. Through this linkage of individual records, it would be possible to identify recruits who received prescreening and background investigations soon after entering military service. It would also be possible to determine from the automated records those recruits whose background investigations resulted in "issue cases"--the identification of serious suitability information in the recruit's background--and comparisons could then be made among the Services.

A more intensive study could be performed along these lines for the Air Force and Army. Research investigators at the Naval Postgraduate School have been collecting certain prescreening hard copy records for both of these Services for a number of years. By automating identification information from these hard-copy records, linkages could be made to the DCII. In this way, a recruit population could be identified whose background investigations became issue cases. Copies of the derogatory background investigations could then be obtained from DIS and comparisons made with the hard-copy prescreening records. Analysis of both these records would help determine if prescreening "misses" were a result of the incompleteness of the prescreening procedure, a result of falsification of life history information by the recruit during prescreening, or, more probably, the result of the operation of both factors.

Research to help meet the second objective, reducing through prescreening the number of recruits who are later discharged from highly sensitive positions for unsuitability, requires a broader program. This would include validation of existing data already collected for prescreening purposes, as well as available data collected by the Services for general unsuitability prediction.

New data collection would be required for promising measures not previously administered to the recruit population.

A wide variety of existing data are available for validation purposes. As indicated earlier, prescreening records are available at the Naval Postgraduate School for Air Force and Army recruits, starting with 1983 accessions. In addition to the study described above, to determine the utility of prescreening in identifying suitability information, the prescreening records could be examined for their usefulness in predicting later unsuitability discharge. Since the prescreening data are only in hard-copy form, automating these records would be required for analysis purposes.

There are other predictor data that have been automated down to the item response level and available for very large numbers of recruits. The History Opinion Inventory (HOI), for example, has been administered to all Air Force recruits at Lackland since 1975. The Educational and Biographical Information Survey (EBIS) was administered to about 35,000 applicants for service and about 40,000 recruits during 1983. Finally, the Armed Services Adaptability Profile (ASAP) was administered recently to about 200,000 applicants for military service.

Linkages between the above data files and DMDC attrition information permit validation studies to be readily accomplished, and a determination made of the potential of these predictive devices for general enlistment adaptability screening. Since additional linkages with the DCII allow the identification of those recruits who are processed for assignment to highly sensitive positions, validation studies can be performed separately for this group as well. As has been stated previously, the likelihood is excellent that predictors of suitability for the total recruit population (after taking into account high school graduate status) would work equally well for those recruits assigned to positions requiring TS and SCI clearance.

There are certain types of assessment data that are best obtained during basic training for prescreening purposes. Researchers should look particularly carefully at peer ratings for adjustment, responsibility, judgment, etc., that can be reliably obtained after two to three weeks of basic training. Validities found in past studies using measures of this type have been excellent in predicting subsequent behavior and performance (23). The Air Force collects and automates these data routinely at Lackland AFB, but does not retain the information for follow-up purposes. Arrangements should be made to retrieve these data before their destruction so that validation for prescreening purposes can be accomplished at a later date.

It is axiomatic that prescreening procedures for highly sensitive positions be developed that allow integration with current recruiting, processing, and assignment practices. Many recruits are now given guaranteed assignments during MEPS processing with minimal prescreening for highly sensitive positions, while others receive their assignments during basic training. For the most effective prescreening program, it would probably be best to have assignments to these specialties made exclusively during basic training. This would permit the use of (1) military performance and behavior information, (2) results from record and reference checks, (3) findings from personal interviews (psychological and investigative), and (4) assessment data from other evaluative procedures.

The Military Services, however, are likely to be very much concerned with any reduced capability to offer guaranteed assignments at the MEPS, and the impact this change would have on Delayed Entry Program (DEP) assignments. For this reason it may be necessary for the Services to offer, at the MEPS, provisional assignments for those recruits who would not enter the military without a guarantee for a highly sensitive position. It would be

essential, however, for as much prescreening as possible to be accomplished for these provisional assignments.

Through the use of psychological and investigative procedures, such as self-report techniques, peer-evaluation, subject and reference interviews, record checks, etc., it should be possible to develop a standard assessment battery that would be a marked improvement over current prescreening procedures. The goal should be to select recruits with very favorable background histories who are also high in social adjustment, emotional control, reliability, and judgment, who are also capable of performing well, and who are highly motivated to do so. The techniques are either available for measurement in these areas or can be developed.

The value of an effective prescreening program to "screen in" the best candidates for highly sensitive positions cannot be overestimated. In a somewhat analogous situation, the Services rely on aptitude tests to screen in recruits with very high aptitude for assignments requiring special ability. Prescreening for highly sensitive positions should follow this model by helping to select those recruits with the highest suitability potential. Even now a number of prescreening measures are available that have as much validity in predicting unsuitability discharge as is found for aptitude tests in predicting training and on the job performance. What is not known is how best to integrate various prescreening measures for maximal effectiveness, and whether or not there is a sufficient supply of high aptitude and highly suitable recruits for assignment to highly sensitive positions. An important policy question for the future is determining which of these two factors should get the highest weight in case fully qualified recruits are not available in sufficient numbers to meet assignment needs.

## BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS

Background. A background investigation is considered the minimum investigative requirement for assignment to highly sensitive positions. The investigation consists of a National Agency check (NAC), which is largely a search of records held by various federal agencies, local checks of police records, a credit check, educational and employment checks, interviews of references, and, for certain investigations, a subject interview as well. Since the early 1970s, the Defense Investigative Service (DIS) has had general responsibility within Defense for performing background investigations. These investigations were conducted previously by the Military Departments. The DIS Manual for Personnel Security Investigations (2) describes the current investigative program in considerable detail, and provides the basis for much of the program description furnished in this report.

Background investigations come in various forms: the traditional background investigation, interview-oriented background investigation (IBI), and special background investigation (SBI). The coverage of each type of investigation is shown in Appendix D, with a brief description of each provided here.

The traditional BI is a combination of record checks and reference interviews. The subject of this type of investigation is normally interviewed only when an issue is raised that requires additional information for adjudication purposes. During 1981, Interview Oriented Background Investigations (IBIs) were introduced which relied very heavily on developing information from an interview of the subject. The interview substituted for the traditional record checks and interviews obtained previously from former employers and schools. One important reason for this change was the need to help reduce the heavy BI backlog at that time, and the high productivity and cost-effectiveness of the subject interview had already been shown. There was considerable

concern, however, with relying too heavily on the subject for information, and, during July, 1983, the IBI was broadened to include character and employment references.

The IBI is now the principal type of investigation conducted for a Top Secret (TS) clearance. BIs continue to be used for this level of clearance when an interview of the subject by a DIS investigator is impractical, i.e., aboard ship. The period of investigation generally covers the last five years of the subject's life. For young subjects, at least the last two years are covered, with no investigation conducted prior to the 16th birthday. In addition to a personal interview of the subject (IBI), which is not limited to a particular period in time, birth, citizenship, education, employment, credit, and police records are checked in varying detail. Employment and character references are interviewed, and, under special circumstances, educational references as well.

As the central component of the IBI, the subject interview is expected to be thorough and in-depth, covering important aspects of the subject's background. The interviewer reviews the Personnel Security Questionnaire with the subject and directly questions the subject on suitability and other topics. The questions are expected to be relevant to a suitability inquiry, brief, and direct. Appendix E provides an extract of the instructions DIS furnishes its agents in conducting an IBI interview.

A Special Background Investigation (SBI) is the minimum investigative requirement for access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI clearance), and to participate in certain other sensitive programs. SBIs are designed to meet the investigative requirements of the Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 1/14 (7). The SBI includes all BI components, and also has additional investigative requirements. Coverage of the subject's life is expanded to the last fifteen years, with restric-

tions for younger subjects similar to BIs and IBIs. NAC coverage is increased, and neighborhood checks are made, including interviews of knowledgeable neighbors when these can be identified. While subject interviews are not now required for an SBI, it appears likely that Defense will move in this direction when investigative resources permit.

The proper scope or coverage of a background investigation has been subject to considerable discussion within the personnel security community. Particularly subject to question have been the value of neighborhood and educational reference interviews and the period of coverage (five to fifteen years). The value of a personal interview with the subject of the investigation, once considered controversial, now appears to have won general acceptance as a key component of the background investigation procedure.

There also appears to be a convergence of opinion that BIs, IBIs, and SBIs should be folded into one single-scope investigation. There is little doubt that resource availability has contributed to the current differences in type of investigation accorded personnel for high level security clearances. The IBI was introduced largely in response to a shortage of investigators, and the SBI currently lacks an interview component probably for the same reason. Planned increases in DIS investigator strength might well lead in time to a single scope background investigation.

Regardless of the type or scope of background investigations currently performed, all are initiated by the completion of a Statement of Personal History or a Personnel Security Questionnaire (PSQ). The PSQ serves a number of extremely important purposes. One objective of the questionnaire is to have the subject of the investigation provide suitability information directly, and in a number of different areas: police offenses, indebtedness, psychiatric hospitalization, etc. Another key objective is to provide information needed by investigators to conduct a background



investigation, i.e.: names, places, and dates relating to education and employment history, reference sources, etc.

It is not known how well the PSQ serves each of the above objectives. While the PSQ should maximize the extent to which suitability information is obtained directly from the subject of the investigation, this hardly appears to be the case. Many important suitability factors are not covered by the PSQ, and some which are covered lack sufficient depth. As indicated earlier, the Army and Air Force have each had to design their own prescreening questionnaires to supplement the PSQ for prescreening purposes. This in turn raises questions concerning the types of linkage needed between prescreening instruments and the PSQ so that relevant prescreening information can be made available to DIS and used directly during a background investigation.

The effectiveness of the PSQ in helping to scope and conduct background investigations should also stand inquiry. Since the specific scoping (coverage) of a background investigation relies so heavily on the information furnished in the PSQ, it is crucial that this instrument perform its function well. It should effectively identify the key reference and record sources needed to obtain credible information on the subject's performance, behavior, physical and mental health, and values as well as other pertinent factors. It is open to question whether or not the current PSQ is complete enough or properly structured so as to meet scoping and investigative needs.

Other components of the background investigation are also subject to question: Does it cover all information needs for a sound clearance decision? Which data sources are most productive? Which data collection techniques should be used? How long a period of life history needs to be covered? The accuracy and cost-effectiveness of key components of the investigation process are largely unknown, and the most important question--the relationship

between background investigation information and later behavior, nexus, has not yet been answered.

Previous Related Research. Relatively little research has been performed involving background investigation procedures either by the personnel security community or by personnel researchers. So far as can be determined, it would appear that personnel security research involving background investigations, as with prescreening, originated with the Air Force research program at Lackland during the 1960s. It was during this period at Lackland that the writer, with the full assistance of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI), was able to conduct a number of background investigation studies.

Much of the personnel security research at Lackland remains unpublished. One major study tested the accuracy of background investigations in developing significant behavioral information. A number of new recruits were identified with a history of serious behavioral problems: police offenses, psychiatric treatment, poor school and job adjustment, etc. Background investigations were completed for each case under operational conditions, but with no derogatory information entered on the subject's Personal History Statement. Results from the completed background investigations showed that for half of these cases the serious derogatory information was not identified. These "misses" were attributed, primarily, to the field investigator not contacting the most knowledgeable references, and/or not asking the most pertinent questions.

There were other research studies conducted at Lackland which examined the productivity of various background information sources. Most important of all the Lackland findings was identifying the unique and considerable value of the subject interview. Used primarily for prescreening purposes, the subject interview proved extremely valuable in providing suitability information.

Other useful information gathering techniques were also identified, such as education, employment, and reference checks, which were rapidly and cost-effectively accomplished by mail and phone. Special appeals were also developed that proved very useful in leading references to provide more truthful information concerning the subject of the investigation. Lead information from these various sources was then sent on to the agents conducting the background investigations.

In another major research study accomplished at Lackland, the predictive validity of background investigative information was evaluated (20). Data were available for about twelve-thousand Air Force enlistees whose background investigations revealed derogatory information. These data were categorized and then related to later discharge for unsuitability. Comparisons with control group data showed significant relationships between the derogatory information and subsequent attrition from service. Additional analyses showed that the more serious the derogatory information, the greater the probability of being discharged at a later date for unsuitability. It is believed that these data provide the first, and perhaps only, empirical evidence of the validity of background investigation information in predicting subsequent behavior.

Some years later, a number of research studies were performed by members of the personnel security community. A "Personnel Security Investigations Major Issue Study" was conducted during 1970 whose purpose was to examine and evaluate a number of investigative procedures and issues. This was followed in 1974 by a comprehensive review of the Defense personnel security program (4) that was performed by the DoD Personnel Security Working Group (PISWIG). Results from analysis of data available to PISWIG from the two inquiries led the PISWIG to conclude that such investigative elements as listed references, neighborhood checks, and educational interviews were not only very costly, but also non-

productive. In contrast, the Local Agency Check, subject interview, and Personal History Statement (later replaced by the PSQ) were all found highly productive, with credit and employment checks also of some value. The PISWIG also questioned the utility of life history checks beyond the most recent five-year period if no derogatory information was found for the last five years.

Analyses performed in 1973 by the General Accounting Office (GAO) resulted in similar findings. Based on its review of data from the major federal agencies conducting background investigations, it was concluded that educational checks, neighborhood investigations, and listed references were less productive than other investigative sources. The highest percentage of derogatory information, considered separately by source, was obtained from developed references. Subject interviews were not evaluated in this study.

The PISWIG was considerably impressed with the value of the subject interview procedure used for prescreening at Lackland, as well as its value to the Navy Security Group, which had also adopted an interview for prescreening purposes. To follow up and determine the potential of the subject interview in personnel security investigations, two joint Air Force-PISWIG pilot studies were initiated at Lackland during 1974. The first study examined results from background investigations for Air Force recruits who had previously been screened favorably for highly sensitive positions after prescreening interviews. In the second study, comparisons were made between investigative summaries based on prescreening interviews and those based on completed background investigations. Findings from these studies indicated that subject interviewing was very effective in identifying derogatory information and held considerable potential for personnel security investigations.

The costs associated with various components of the background investigation became an important issue during the early 1970s. The PISWIG used a number of cost figures developed during the Major Issue Study to compare the cost effectiveness of various types of background investigation. Based on this analysis, a revised form of background investigation was recommended with reduced scope and cost that would intensify investigations for the most recent five-year period, make use of letter and telephone inquiries, reduce the number and type of references, and expand credit checks. It was estimated by PISWIG that a savings close to two million dollars could be made (1974 dollars) in one year alone with these changes. PISWIG also believed that even further savings could be attained by combining a subject interview, NAC, and letters of inquiry to serve as a substitute for the conventional background investigation. This combination was expected to produce as much derogatory information as found in the more conventional scoping of a background investigation.

During 1980, the Director of Central Intelligence Investigative Standards Working Group reported on a "Personnel Security Survey" that examined the investigative scope and adjudicative procedures practiced by various intelligence agencies (8). It was concluded that personal interviews should be part of a background investigation, that the NAC was a useful information source (but should not substitute for a local police check), and that neighborhood and education checks were duplicative of other information sources. It was also concluded that at least the last ten years of a person's life history should be covered so that significant information not be lost.

During 1981, results were reported from a new pilot study conducted by a Defense interservice group to compare a subject-interview-oriented background investigation with the traditional version. Close to five hundred cases were identified for study, including military and civilian personnel as well as contractor

employees. Findings from this study indicated that the subject interview approach was far more effective than the traditional background investigation in developing significant behavioral information.

In reviewing the various studies performed to determine the productivity and cost-effectiveness of various reference sources, there appears to have been little consideration given to the possibility that the value of these sources may vary for different population subgroups. Instead of looking at the utility of educational references for all individuals receiving background investigations, for example, it would seem more reasonable to look at the productivity of this information source for young adults recently out of school. Similarly, the value of a neighborhood reference would be expected to tie closely to the length of time in residence, type of residence, etc. It is quite possible that the current standardization of background investigation procedures across all ages and all life experiences, while producing uniformity, has had an undesirable impact on both productivity and cost.

Research Requirements. The purposes of a background investigation are quite clearcut--to provide accurate information on an individual's past and current behavior, values, and other pertinent information needed for assessment purposes, and to obtain this information cost-effectively. As has been indicated, however, very little is known about the accuracy of background investigation procedures in developing this type of information. While there has been considerable concern within the investigative community about the "shallowness" of the product, and the productivity of various data sources, information is generally lacking that would help evaluate the accuracy of the personnel security process.

Whether or not findings from a background investigation are accurate will depend on the quality of the scoping of the investigation, thoroughness of the subject interview, knowledgeability and cooperation of the references contacted, access to and completeness of various record sources, and the quality or sensitivity of the information-gathering techniques that are employed. Background investigation research, in contrast with the predictor-criterion validation studies called for in prescreening research, lends itself more to an experimental approach. Experimental manipulation of information sources and data collection techniques in various research designs would appear to have considerable potential in evaluating the accuracy and productivity of various background investigation procedures.

It would be quite useful, at the start of a research program designed to improve background investigation procedures, to determine the accuracy of the current process in identifying important behavioral information. One method of particular value here would be to identify a number of individuals with known behavioral problems, and then to determine the accuracy of background investigation procedures in identifying these problems. This research method, used many years ago at Lackland by the writer, still appear highly appropriate for evaluation purposes. By way of example, new recruits with serious preservice suitability problems (drugs, behavior disorder, police offenses, financial, etc) would be identified during basic training, and background investigations initiated under operational conditions without DIS knowledge that the cases were specially selected. In addition to establishing accuracy rates under these conditions, the study could be designed to provide information on the reasons why important behavioral information was not obtained.

The same general approach could be used to determine the potential productivity of various information sources and information gathering techniques. Having identified recruits with

suitability problems, it should be possible to determine through interviews with these recruits the reference sources most knowledgeable of these problems. Further, having identified knowledgeable references, it should be possible to determine the most cost-effective ways to obtain the information: collection media (phone, mail, in person), conditions (confidentiality versus nonconfidentiality) and appeals (why the information was needed and how it would be used).

Retrospective studies using existing data could also be performed. Completed background investigations are identifiable that became "issue" cases (investigations where serious derogatory information was developed). Based on a recent data analysis, about eight to ten percent of background investigations for enlisted personnel are so categorized. Random samples of issue cases and appropriate control groups could be drawn, by type of background investigation, and background investigation data analyzed to identify the most productive information sources for this particular population.

Probably the most important of the studies that could be performed in the background investigation area, however, would be a demonstration project to examine more fully the potential of the subject interview in the investigative process. Over twenty years ago, the writer proposed that the subject interview be made the cornerstone of the background investigation procedure. In addition to the productivity of the subject interview as an information source, the interview also appeared extremely useful for scoping purposes. Key reference and record sources could be more readily identified--information sources that could be used to help confirm or deny the behavioral history reported by the subject. Further, inconsistencies and possible evasions in the subjects' behavioral history could be flagged for special attention when the field component of the investigation took place.



Since the proposal was made, the subject interview has become accepted as an important component of the background investigation process, but not in the role originally recommended. Rather, the interview is treated as one of a number of "leads," an important lead, but structurally very different from the nuclear role originally proposed. There are indications, however, that some members of the personnel security community may be ready to consider a more fundamental role for the subject interview. The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Investigative Standards Working Group concluded in 1980 that the subject interview should be part of every background investigation and recommended that "a study be made to determine the amount and type of field investigation needed to complement or to maintain the integrity of the personal interview"(8).

There are a number of research designs that would be useful in evaluating the potential of an intensive interview-oriented background investigation. One less complex design would consist of a field test involving initial and "bring-up" background investigations. Study subjects could be drawn randomly from the large pool of individuals for whom background investigations are requested--and in large enough samples to permit later analysis by type of population. Findings from completed background investigations performed under both existing and field test conditions could then be compared for information yield, cost, and completion time.

Since it is expected that the enhanced interview approach would prove far more effective than that in current use, follow-on research studies could later be designed to help realize the full potential of this procedure. These studies could include (1) the development and tryout of special biographical self-report forms and interview approaches to broaden the information obtained directly from the subject of the investigation, (2) evaluation of methods for improved scoping and identification of

productive reference and record sources, and (3) comparisons among inquiry media, methods, and techniques.

There is little question that behavioral science techniques offer considerable promise in helping personnel security officials and investigators evaluate and improve background investigation procedures. Many of the early studies in this area have suffered from poor design, insufficient numbers of cases, and lack of control for many important factors. Findings from relatively few of the studies that have been performed can be viewed as definitive. There are, however, data that are currently available or capable of development that would help answer many of the key questions that have been raised by the personnel security community.

## INFORMATION SOURCES FOR PERSONNEL SECURITY RESEARCH

Automated and hard-copy individual records needed for personnel security research are available from a number of sources. Hard-copy background investigation records are maintained in microfiche files by DIS, and records for selected cases can be copied for research purposes. Automated individual personnel records for military and DoD civilian employees are maintained by DMDC. The Defense Central Index of Investigations (DCII) file, an automated extract of investigative records, has been a recent addition to the DMDC data bases. Linkages between the DCII file and the automated personnel records have provided Defense with a new and critically-needed capability for studies and analyses in the personnel security area. Descriptions of relevant files, including the DCII, are shown in Appendix F.

Examination of the automated files maintained by DMDC, even if thorough, may not reveal the full implications for personnel security research of the individual records now available for study. Since DMDC maintains historic military personnel records going back as far as the early 1970s, it has become possible to reconstruct the entry populations to military service from that period on and to follow these populations through their active duty. Through linkage of these records with the DCII, it has now become possible to track most of the individuals receiving background investigations for highly sensitive duties through their military history, to determine who was evaluated, when the evaluation took place, what occupations they served in, whether or not the background investigations became issue cases, whether or not they were granted clearances, and if they served out their military service satisfactorily. This is a new capability for Defense, and has just begun to be exercised.

Initial analyses of the DMDC DCII and personnel data bases have provided personnel security policy officials with a variety of information useful for program evaluation and planning purposes. Dr. John Goral of DMDC has produced a number of reports based on these files (19), and titles from a few of these reports are listed below to give some indication of the range of studies that are possible:

Investigation and Clearance Status of Those in Army Personnel Security Screening Program Occupations

Personnel Security Investigations: Service Differences for Similar Occupations

Continued Top Secret and SCI Status of Former Army and Air Force Personnel with Unsuitability Discharges

Cleaning Up the Periodic Review Backlog: Estimates of the Numbers and Location of Military Subjects

SUMMARY OF RESEARCH EXAMPLES  
PROPOSED IN THIS REPORT

Recruit Prescreening

Evaluation

- o Compare results from prescreening and background investigations for the same recruits.
  - oo Determine which Service has the lowest percentage of background investigation "issue" cases for recruits passing the prescreening phase.
  - oo Determine the extent to which prescreening "misses" result from incompleteness of the prescreening procedures or from falsification of life history information by the recruit during prescreening.

Validation

- o Validate existing prescreening and other assessment data for their potential in reducing unsuitability discharge among recruits assigned to highly sensitive positions.
  - oo Air Force Assessment Center records, peer evaluations, and History Opinion Inventory data.
  - oo Army prescreening questionnaire
  - oo DoD Educational and Biographical Information Survey (EBIS)
  - oo Armed Services Adaptability Profile (ASAP)
- o Validate new prescreening measures.
  - oo Honesty tests and other measures of values
  - oo Personality measures

Development

- o Develop a standardized DoD assessment battery, based on empirical and face-validity information, to select recruits for highly sensitive positions who have very favorable background histories, and who are also high in social adjustment, emotional control, reliability, and judgment.

- oo Identify the best measures for this purpose.
- oo Determine how best to integrate these measures in a single selection composite score.

### Background Investigation

#### Accuracy

- o Determine the accuracy of background investigations in identifying known behavioral problems.

#### Information Sources

- o Determine and compare the knowledgeability of various types of reference sources for individuals with known behavioral problems.
- o Try out and establish the most cost-effective ways to obtain information from these sources.

#### Demonstration Project

- o Design and perform a demonstration project to evaluate the subject interview as the nucleus or core of the background investigation process.
  - oo Obtain life history information from an objective questionnaire and subject interview.
  - oo Scope and identify the field information needed to confirm or deny subject interview information.
  - oo Conduct record checks and field investigation on a real-time basis.
  - oo Compare results with currently-used investigative procedures.

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## APPENDIX A

## **SCREENING FOR HIGH RISK JOBS**

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The purpose of this report is to describe in very general terms current assessment procedures used in screening U.S. Defense personnel for high risk jobs, some of the research previously performed in this area, ongoing studies, and the potential contribution personnel researchers can make in evaluating and improving the process.

High risk jobs are defined here as those that require access to highly classified or extremely sensitive information. Personnel assigned to intelligence, communications, and nuclear-related occupations are examples of those requiring this level of access, as do many individuals in other sensitive specialties. It is estimated that over fifty percent of present officer strength and more than fifteen percent of current enlisted strength have gone through some form of personnel security screening process to qualify for assignment to a high risk job.

The personnel security screening procedure employs a background investigation as its principal instrument in determining trustworthiness for high risk jobs. Since the early 1970s these investigations have been conducted for Defense personnel--military, civilian, and contractor --by the Defense Investigative Service (DIS). There are four major components to a background investigation: a self-report personal history questionnaire, interviews, reference checks and record searches. A detailed personal interview of the subject is a recent addition to the process and has proven quite productive of significant information.

The information obtained through a background investigation is reviewed and adjudicated by experienced security personnel from each of the Defense components. It is important to note that most of the adverse information developed through background investigations relates to an individual's behavioral problems rather than loyalty. Offense data from FBI files and critical reference comments are major sources of derogatory information. However, when a subject interview is employed, it is often the single most productive source of significant information.

The Armed Services prescreen recruits for personnel security, and many individuals with a history of serious problems are identified prior to the initiation of a background investigation and diverted to occupations with lower personnel security requirements or not enlisted at all. The Air Force has the most centralized prescreening program, administered at Lackland Air Force Base. Interviews are conducted during initial classification and followed by reference, police, and credit checks. The Army and Navy both conduct a detailed prescreening interview at basic training centers. Additionally, the Army first interviews potential recruits at the Military Entrance Processing Stations (MEPS) before processing them further for high risk jobs. The Army has found, apparently, that in repeated interviews over time, additional adverse information is frequently developed.

The personnel security screening program has much in common with a good preemployment evaluation procedure. For this reason it is surprising that relatively little work has been performed by the Service research laboratories in developing, validating and improving these assessment procedures. This is in contrast to the large scale efforts of the Services to improve personnel selection and classification processes overall.

A major personnel security research project was conducted by the Air Force Personnel Research Laboratory in the early 1960s at Lackland Air Force Base. Airmen being assigned to nuclear-related duties and intelligence occupations were evaluated by psychologists from the Air Force's Personnel Research Laboratory. Self report questionnaires, interviews, reference checks, and experimental background investigations were initiated. Findings from this project indicated that the various assessment procedures employed generally provided a certain amount of common information, but that each provided unique information as well. Overall, self-report questionnaires and interviews furnished the largest amount of unique negative behavioral information. In another study, background investigations were initiated for a group of basic airmen who had previously revealed significant derogatory behavioral information through a self-report questionnaire. For a significant number of these airmen, completed background investigations did not identify the derogatory information.

In yet another Air Force sponsored study, an empirical validation was performed of derogatory information from background investigations. There were seventeen thousand enlistees whose background investigations completed during FY 1965 revealed suitability information. These suitability data were categorized and then related to later discharges for unsuitability. Comparisons with control group data showed sizeable relationships between derogatory background investigation information and later attrition. So far as is known, this is the only large-scale validation study that has been performed for this type of information.

During FY 1982 a select panel was formed at the direction of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) to review the DOD Personnel Security Program. In its report published in April 1982 the panel made a number of recommendations for actions to strengthen the program. One key recommendation was that an evaluation be made of the full potential of psychological tests as a supplement to the personnel investigation process in screening individuals for high risk jobs.

This recommendation led to discussions with the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) on the use of psychological tests for assessment purposes, and then to the initiation by NPS of a large scale research project to evaluate and improve the DOD Personnel Security Program.

One of the first steps taken by the NPS was to couple the automated Defense Central Index of Investigations file (DCII) maintained by DIS with personnel data bases available through the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC). The DCII identified all Defense personnel who had received background investigations, and the DMDC files provided information on their later performance and behavior in service. For accessions to military service from FY 1973 on, it was now possible to identify all those who were considered for high risk jobs and received background investigations, and to identify within this group those enlistees later discharged for behavioral reasons--such as unsuitability.

With investigative and personnel data bases combined for the same population, a large number of personnel security research studies became feasible. Over the years, many data sets have been developed by the Services containing biographical and other psychological test information to be used for recruit selection purposes. Through linkage with the investigative and personnel data bases now available at DMDC, it now became possible to evaluate the potential of these assessment instruments in screening personnel for high risk jobs. Some of the studies currently underway are described here:

Lackland Assessment Records. There is an operational unit at Lackland Air Force Base whose sole function is to prescreen basic trainees for high risk jobs in the Air Force. The prescreen is accomplished prior to the initiation of a background investigation and includes an interview, a sentence completion, an adjustment check list, basic training performance data and other variables. These data will be analyzed for over fifteen thousand recruits entering the Air Force during FY 1982 who were prescreened. In combination with background investigation information, these data will be related to subsequent military performance and behavioral criteria.

History Opinion Inventory (HOI). A biographical inventory accomplished during the second day of basic training is also available for about 500,000 Air Force recruits entering service between FY 1976 and FY 1982. The fifty items comprising this

questionnaire have been automated and validated against first-term attrition for the earlier accession years. Two separate scales have been identified with validities in the .20s for this criterion. The validity of these scales is now being determined for those recruits who were entered into high risk jobs.

Navy Preservice Drug and Offense History Information.  
During the first week of Navy basic training, each recruit is interviewed to identify preservice drug usage and traffic and non-traffic offenses. These data are available for about 60,000 FY 1981 Navy enlistees, and are presently being automated. The data will be validated against attrition for the total population and separately for those being considered for high risk jobs. It is a unique and an extremely rich data base.

Educational and Biographical Information Survey (EBIS).  
This survey was administered to about 50,000 recruits DOD-wide during FY 83, and has been validated against early attrition. The subset of this population considered for high risk jobs will be identified and EBIS items validated specially for this group.

In addition to the studies described above, the Navy Personnel Research and Development Center (NPRDC) has been developing a test to be used DOD-wide in recruit selection to reduce attrition for unsuitability. This test is based on biographic and related information found to be valid by one or more of the Services as predictors of attrition, and selected items have been combined to form an instrument usable by all the Services. While the test was developed to screen out applicants for service who get low scores, it is expected that scores at the upper end will be useful in screening recruits for high risk jobs also.

Developing and validating psychological tests useful in screening for high risk jobs is important but not sufficient. Broader studies are needed to gain an understanding of the effectiveness of current assessment procedures and how to improve them. One basic study that is particularly needed is to carefully examine assessment "failures"--individuals who are screened favorably for high risk jobs but who later give evidence of unreliability, instability or other behavioral problems. Was there anything missed in their original assessments, and if so, why? While this type of study has been done with confirmed espionage agents, the numbers have been small and findings inconclusive. A study of other types of "misses" is required.

Systems analyses of current assessment procedures are needed to provide baseline and trend information on the numbers and characteristics of personnel requiring clearance actions, the positions involved, when clearance actions are obtained, and how the people perform who are assessed for high risk jobs. Studies to determine the reliability and validity of prescreening and background investigation procedures are essential. This includes not only the investigation itself, but also the adjudicative

decision that is made on the information obtained. There is need to evaluate self-report and interview procedures, and to standardize the more effective approaches so that these can be applied universally.

The need for research to evaluate and improve personnel security screening procedures for high risk jobs is evident, and personnel researchers can make a significant contribution in this area. It is hoped that the brief description of the personnel security program presented here will stimulate interest, concern and action within the Defense behavioral science community so that the assessment process can be improved.

APPENDIX B



STATEMENT OF

ELI S. FLYER  
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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL  
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BEFORE THE

U. S. SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS

APRIL 1985

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I would like to thank members of the Subcommittee for providing me with the opportunity to appear today and to present my views on personnel security matters. I will be making a number of observations and recommendations to improve the personnel security process. Since these are in large part based upon my experiences as a personnel researcher, I would like to describe some of the projects and findings that have helped shape these views.

In performing research for the Department of Defense over the past thirty years, I have had the opportunity to work on many important manpower projects and issues. One of the most important was an Air Force project in the early 1960s to improve screening procedures used in assigning personnel to high-risk jobs. After a twenty-year interval, I am again deeply involved in a personnel security research effort, this time under the auspices of the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.

My interest in improving selection procedures for high-risk jobs goes back to the late 1950s and early 1960s when I was with the Air Force Personnel Research Laboratory at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas. The Air Force had introduced a major quality control program designed to discharge enlisted personnel not able to meet Air Force behavior standards, and I initiated research to reduce the problem by improved screening prior to enlistment. A wide variety of personnel assessment data were collected for a very large number of recruits, and follow-up studies were conducted to determine the validity of the information in predicting unsuitability discharge. It was through this research that high school graduate status, age at enlistment, and Armed Forces Qualification Test scores were first identified as predictors of first-term attrition for unsuitability.

Many of the research studies performed during this period were massive in scope. For example, one study involved over two-hundred-thousand Air Force recruits who were followed during their first four years of service. Aptitude, biographical, interest and attitude data were collected for assignment purposes shortly after service entry. These data were related at a later date to behavioral criteria obtained during initial enlistments. The study demonstrated that it was possible to combine many of the biographic, interest and attitude items into scales that would differentiate between enlistees with normal separations and those experiencing behavioral and adjustment problems during military service.

During the early 1960s, I also became involved in research to develop suitability screening procedures for assignment to high-risk jobs—positions such as nuclear weapons and intelligence duties where destructive acts and espionage activities would have the most serious consequences. These were jobs requiring Top Secret and other high-level clearances based on background investigations. Using Air Force records, I was able to identify and follow-up about two-thousand recruits assigned to munitions and weapons duties after their enlistment. Ten percent of this group was discharged for unsuitability during the first two-and-a-half years of service. Personnel records were obtained and examined to see if there were preservice indicators of an individual's later behavioral problems during military service, and to obtain more detailed reasons for the unsuitability discharge.

Analysis of the data showed that it was possible to improve the selection criteria then employed for assignment to nuclear-related occupations. It also showed the necessity for on-the-job monitoring activities to identify and remove airmen with behavioral problems from sensitive duties. The final report of the study recommended the use of special procedures in selecting recruits for high-risk jobs. For example, it was recommended that recruits be high school graduates, have an acceptable level of general intelligence, and have received favorable peer evaluations during basic training. It was also recommended that enlisted personnel assigned to special weapons duties be screened more thoroughly through a continuous program for suitability evaluation on the job. This research effort led ultimately to the development and implementation of the Air Force's Human Reliability Program, later subsumed by the Department of Defense (DOD) Personnel Reliability Program.

The screening procedures introduced at Lackland for recruits being considered for assignment to high-risk jobs (intelligence as well as nuclear-related) were quite elaborate. The evaluation consisted of a questionnaire completed by the recruit to identify preservice behavior problems, a personal interview, peer ratings for responsibility and emotional stability, and educational and employment reference checks to provide some of the information usually obtained during a background investigation. Based on a review of this information, recruits with a history of serious behavior problems were diverted to less sensitive occupations.

Much of the research performed at Lackland during the early 1960s to improve screening for high-risk jobs remains unpublished. A number of these studies are worth highlighting here. One study was designed to test the accuracy of background investigations in developing significant behavioral information. A special survey administered to over twenty thousand basic trainees at Lackland was used to identify a group of fifty airmen with serious behavioral problems such as police offenses, psychiatric treatment, and poor educational and employment history. With the cooperation of the recruits involved and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations, (which conducted background investigations in that period), background investigations were initiated for the fifty airmen. The size of the group was kept to fifty in order to keep investigation costs to a minimum. Results from the completed investigations showed that no derogatory information was found in about half of the cases. These "misses" can probably be attributed, in part, to the field investigators not contacting the most knowledgeable references and not asking the most pertinent questions.

Another study was designed to examine the predictive validity of information obtained through background investigations. Data were available for about twelve-thousand Air Force enlistees whose background investigations revealed derogatory information. These data were categorized and then related to later discharge for unsuitability. Comparisons with control group data showed significant relationships between the derogatory information and subsequent attrition from service. Additional analyses showed that the more serious the derogatory information, the greater the probability of being discharged at a later date for unsuitability. It is believed that these data provided the first empirical evidence of the validity of background investigation information in predicting subsequent behavior.

Another unpublished but important study involved a review of investigative records for a large number of Air Force officer and enlisted personnel who had committed suicide. Of specific interest here was whether or not the self-destructive acts were preceded by behavioral indicators—a matter of considerable importance for the Personnel Reliability Program. Intensive interviewing conducted by the Air Force's Office of Special Investigations with relatives and coworkers showed that about half of the suicides that occurred were not foreshadowed by observable behavioral signs. This finding indicated that it would not be possible to rely exclusively on the recognition of behavioral indicators by family, supervisors or coworkers in identifying those individuals about to commit this type of self-destructive act.

Favorable findings from the prescreening research project at Lackland led to the operational implementation of the program during 1965. There had to be resolution first whether or not prescreening for high-risk jobs was part of the personnel classification process for recruit assignment or part of the personnel security investigation process. It was finally concluded that the prescreening program would be less controversial if carried out as part of the personnel classification process. This assessment program still exists at Lackland with a number of modifications.

Today, in looking once again at the Defense Department's Personnel Security Program, and more particularly at the investigative process used in assessing people for high-risk jobs, I find that a number of important and useful changes have been made. Background investigations are now conducted by a single agency, the Defense Investigative Service, rather than by the Military Departments, and centralized adjudication of background investigation information has become the norm. Some of the effects of our earlier research efforts can also be seen: the Personnel Reliability Program, recruit prescreening for high-risk jobs, and the use of subject interviews as part of the background investigation process.

Much more still needs to be done to improve the personnel security process. During Fiscal 1982, a select panel was formed at the direction of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Policy) to review the DOD Personnel Security Program. In its report, published in April 1982, the panel made a number of important recommendations for improving the program. In addition, the panel took note of the lack of information available for program evaluation purposes, and the

need for research studies and analyses in several areas, including psychological testing to supplement background investigations.

This led to discussions with the Naval Postgraduate School and the initiation of a number of research projects centering on prescreening and psychological testing for high-risk jobs. An important element for the research effort, automated individual personnel records for all Defense components, were available through the Defense Manpower Data Center files maintained at the Naval Postgraduate School.

One of the first steps taken by the Naval Postgraduate School was to bring in a copy of the computerized Defense Central Index of Investigations file (DCII) maintained by the Defense Investigative Service, and to merge it with Defense Manpower Data Center personnel data bases. The DCII would identify Defense personnel receiving background investigations, and the Defense Manpower Data Center files would provide information on their characteristics, performance, and behavior during military service. It would now be possible to identify the kinds of people receiving background investigations, when they received them, what occupations they were in, and how they made out while on active duty. Further, since the Defense Manpower Data Center maintains personnel data bases historically, it would be possible to perform retrospective studies--to recreate the populations entering the military over the last ten years and more, and to examine the relationships between personnel and investigative actions during that time frame.

The value of combining investigative and personnel data bases for research, program analysis, and auditing purposes can be illustrated by one of the ongoing studies at the Naval Postgraduate School. During the past five years, over 27,000 enlistees receiving background investigations for assignment to sensitive positions were later discharged for reasons of unsuitability, unfitness, or other behavior problems. The 27,000 enlistees represent approximately twenty percent of those servicemen who were discharged in that period of time who had background investigations. The specific reasons for their discharge are shown in attachment 1.

Many of the 27,000 enlistees discharged had received Top Secret and Sensitive Compartmented Information clearances for high risk jobs. To better understand the high failure rate for this group, background investigation and discharge records will be examined by the Naval Postgraduate School for samples drawn from this population. This study is still underway and specific findings will not be known until further research is completed. However, there are a number of possible explanations: (1) the background investigations lacked accuracy by not identifying unfavorable behavior patterns for the individuals concerned; (2) unfavorable behavioral patterns were identified but the adjudicative process did not make effective use of the information; and (3) the early behavior patterns for this group were favorable--their problems arose after background investigations were completed. All three factors are likely to be involved. The real question is to what degree.

Another major research project being conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School is to evaluate the effectiveness of prescreening programs now used by the Services in selecting recruits for high-risk jobs, and to determine the

potential of psychological tests for assessment purposes. These studies have become increasingly more feasible with the ability to use investigative and personnel data bases for analysis purposes. Findings from a number of the studies are expected within the next six months.

In addition to the Naval Postgraduate School research program, a large-scale research effort is now being conducted by the Navy Personnel Research and Development Center to develop a special test for DOD-wide use in enlisted selection. This test is based on biographic and related information known to predict military attrition, and will be used to screen out those applicants for service most likely to be discharged for unsuitability. Since individuals who score high on this measure are least likely to be behavioral problems in service, the test should also be useful in evaluating recruits for high-risk jobs. The full implications of using measures of this type will be discussed later on.

While the Naval Postgraduate School has been focusing its research effort primarily on prescreening measures, a far more extensive research effort is required. The problem is that relatively little is known about the quality of all components of the personnel investigation process, and even less, perhaps, about how to apply the information it provides.

While large investments have been made by the Military Services in behavioral science research to evaluate and improve personnel selection, assignment, training, and utilization procedures, there has been little involvement by Defense scientists in the research needed to evaluate and improve personnel security investigations. This is particularly unfortunate since the application of behavioral science and operations research methodologies are particularly relevant here.

There is so much to be done that it is hard to know where to start. There are, however, a number of readily identifiable areas where personnel security research should be particularly productive. These are largely in respect to personnel investigation procedures, and include the following problem areas:

- 1) Requirements — It is important that Defense and Service policies and practices be evaluated that determine who receives a background investigation. There are large Service differences in the number of military personnel requiring background investigations. While this may represent differences in mission, the disparities may also be showing differences in Service policies and practices. Use of Defense-wide surveys, task analysis, and evaluation of available personnel and investigative data should furnish the information needed to evaluate the legitimacy and adequacy of Service requirements for background investigations.

- 2) Timing — We need to know whether or not personnel security investigations are being initiated at a point in time consistent with good personnel management practices. Should background investigations be initiated before, during, or after training for various types of high-risk jobs? And when should reinvestigations be accomplished? While the issues here are complex, the application of systems analysis techniques should lead to more effective use of investigative resources, reduce nonproductive time spent waiting for clearances, and identify the best points in time for "bring-up" investigations.

3) Coverage — It is important to identify the types of information needed for an effective behavioral evaluation and to determine if the investigative process provides, or could provide, this information. A panel of behavioral scientists should evaluate the completeness of the current background investigation procedure, and recommend additional coverage where needed.

4) Procedures — We need to know the cost-effectiveness of using various information sources and collection techniques in obtaining the data required for personnel assessment purposes. There are experimental techniques available to tell us the relative yield and accuracy of using specific reference and records sources, as well as the most cost-effective media for data collection.

5) Accuracy — Though reliable and accurate data are crucial to the assessment process, very little information is available concerning the quality of background investigation procedures. The use of sampling techniques and product evaluation procedures of the type applied in industrial settings should have particular applicability for personnel security investigations.

6) Validity — Assessment information has value to the extent that it predicts later behavior. Adjudicators need to know the relationships between background investigation information and subsequent behavior to make effective clearance decisions. Powerful statistical procedures are available for analyzing the validity of background investigation data in predicting important behavioral criteria and in developing composite scores maximally predictive of these criteria.

7) Utility — The question to be addressed here is how best to use the products of personnel security investigation procedures. Little is known of the impact of adjudicative decisions on personnel assignment, training, performance, and utilization actions. Operations analysis procedures could help evaluate these impacts and suggest ways to reduce their negative effects.

Research and analysis performed in these areas should lead to a more effective personnel security program by reducing the number of unnecessary investigations now being performed, increasing their quality, and improving the utilization of the information they provide.

I would now like to make some general observations and recommendations concerning the personnel security program. First, it is important to recognize that most of the adverse information developed through background investigations relates to behavioral problems, rather than loyalty. Second, in collecting and adjudicating adverse information, the assumption is being made that individuals with very unfavorable background histories are poor security risks—people likely to continue having behavioral problems. It is important to note here that, through the application of current adjudicative guidelines and practices, about five percent of those receiving background investigations are denied clearance.

Unfortunately, what the current personnel security process does not take into account is that there are still wide differences in behavioral adjustment history and expected behavior among the ninety-five percent of those cleared for sensitive duties. All too frequently, recruits with history of preservice adjustment problems receive clearances indistinguishable from those of fellow

recruits with exemplary preservice records--although much more likely to be discharged for unsuitability later on. It is hardly likely that a process which identifies the bottom five percent of those receiving background investigations as behavior risks, and everyone else as equally acceptable, is providing the best candidates available for assignment to high-risk jobs.

I think we should look very carefully at the possibility of selecting people into high-risk jobs rather than selecting them out. For the enlisted population the situation may be analogous in some respects to the use of aptitude scores for recruit assignment purposes. An aptitude battery is now administered to all applicants for military service, and only those with the highest scores are considered for assignment to highly technical positions. We should use the same approach by obtaining personnel assessment information from all recruits, and identifying those with the highest adjustment potential for assignment to high-risk jobs.

I believe that this can be done. Although we would be unable to have background investigations completed for all recruits to identify the most promising among them, there are less costly procedures that could be used for initial selection purposes. The suitability test being developed by the Navy Personnel Research and Development Center and additional self-report behavioral history measures should provide much of the information now obtained through background investigations. Further, the use of automated scoring procedures for these data would provide "adjustment potential" scores predictive of later military behavior. Background investigations could then be accomplished for the most highly qualified recruits to check on the accuracy and completeness of the information obtained through the self-report procedures.

There are many advantages to using this approach. Most important, it would reduce the number of enlistees assigned to high-risk jobs who are later discharged for unsuitability. It would also reduce the number of enlistees denied clearance. Further, for those recruits not initially assigned to high-risk jobs, "adjustment potential" scores would be a matter of record and still usable for later screening purposes. This approach would be quite similar to the current use of aptitude scores for later assignments, and allow for overriding at a later date after individuals have proved themselves.

Even though it is possible to improve the personnel security investigation process by taking actions of the type described above, there are still serious limitations to the selection approach. We are faced with the fact that we cannot predict the behavior of individuals with the degree of precision needed. The best that can be done is to identify groups of individuals with somewhat different probabilities of satisfactory behavior. To illustrate this point, based on current screening procedures, groups of recruits can be identified at service entry whose first-term unsuitability discharge rates will vary from about eight percent to over fifty percent. This is a level of accuracy roughly comparable to that of aptitude scores in predicting training success. While the accuracy of suitability screening would be further improved through use of the measures previously described, there would still be significant numbers of later "failures", even in the most highly selected groups. We can reduce the odds of later misbehavior significantly with the use of valid selection procedures—but in no case can we reduce the odds close to zero.

It is essential, therefore, to have a personnel security system that takes into account the need for continuing observation and periodic evaluation of the people assigned to high-risk jobs. A standardized monitoring and assessment program is needed, with military and civilian supervisors and managers fully responsible for its effective administration. In some respects, the Defense Personnel Reliability Program already uses this type of approach.

To conclude, it is apparent that relatively little is known about the effectiveness of the Defense Department's Personnel Security Program. The large number of unsuitability discharges among those cleared for Top Secret and related duties indicates that there is ample room for improvement of the current program. It is essential that behavioral science and operations analysis techniques be applied in a large-scale research effort to evaluate and refine the personnel security program. The effort is long over due.



# WITNESS SHEET

ELI S. FLYER

Consultant, Manpower Research Center  
Department of Administrative Sciences  
Naval Postgraduate School  
Monterey, California

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Q. What were the circumstances surrounding your initial involvement with evaluating the Air Force's personnel security program?

- Air Force meeting in 1959 on destructive acts involving nuclear weapons
- Incident at Sculthorp Air Base in England
- Development of research program to improve screening procedures for high risk jobs

Q. In your statement that you provided for the hearing record you mention that the DOD study, published in April 1982 regarding personnel security, noted a lack of information available for program evaluation purposes and the need for reserach studies and analyses in several areas. Has there been an improvement? In your opinion, what is needed in this area?

- Better data available for evaluation purposes
- Major studies remain to be done
- Need for management to formalize needs
- Need to develop and carry-out a DOD-wide program

Q. Background investigations and adjudications use criteria to screen out potential suitability and security risks. Are we doing an effective job of this? If not, what do you consider to be some major shortcomings?

- Effectiveness of BIs and adjudication procedures unknown
- Large number of unsuitable discharges from high risk jobs indicates problems with current process
- Probable need to improve BI procedures
- Evidence that more people should be denied clearance

Q. Is the government's personnel security program placing too much emphasis and too many resources on the initial background investigation?

- Military personnel exposed to highly sensitive information in first few years of service
- Advantages of early screening before training investments are made
- May be possible to reduce the resource levels for initial BIs and increase resources for periodic reinvestigations

Q. What can we do to more insure that those very young people who assume highly sensitive positions are sufficiently mature to cope with the security needs of these positions?

- Improved screening for maturity
- Improved monitoring on the job

Q. What is your assessment as to the effectiveness and efficiency of the PRP? Can the PRP program be essentially the basis of an overall personnel security program for government and contractor employees?

- Effectiveness and efficiency unknown
- The DOD panel believed that the monitoring function and other aspects of the PRP should be studied to determine if other security programs should follow suit

Q. Is there a need for personnel security operations to be more closely tied to personnel operations?

- Products from personnel security operations serve personnel management needs in selection, assignment and utilization of people
- Personnel assessment (other than counterintelligence activities) could be viewed as a personnel function
- ENTNAC developments involve both personnel security and personnel operations

Q. Would you describe the present status of available data bases which impact on personnel security management?

- Defense Central Index of Investigations now being coupled with D/MDC data bases
- Need to bring in Navy and Marine Corps clearance information
- Need to standardize data elements and codes

Q. From your unique experience in the area of personnel security, what is your opinion as to the most revealing techniques of information gathering used in the BI's?

- Subject interview most important component
  - Needs strengthening
- Reference and record checks essential to verify information obtained in interview

Q. How does suitability relate to security risks?

- Change in emphasis over years from indicators of disloyalty to indicators of unsuitability
- Assumption made that individuals with certain behavior problems more vulnerable and hence more likely to get in trouble in future
- Examples
  - Unstable people should not be assigned to nuclear weapons
  - Irresponsible people should not be assigned to jobs requiring responsibility
  - People with heavy indebtedness should not be assigned to jobs where they could sell secrets
- Problem of "security risk" label for those denied clearances

Q. What ideas do you have concerning the implementation of a program for the continued monitoring and assessment of persons with security clearances and access to classified information?

- DOD panel indicates that "continuing command monitorship of cleared personnel is given lip-service but lacks substance"
  - Points to Personnel Reliability Program as an example of a continuing evaluation system that may be more effective
- Should evaluate the possibility of annual recertifications based on subject interview and records check by commander

Q. Can your studies apply to non-military personnel security programs?

- Most studies will have direct applicability
  - BI coverage
  - BI procedures
  - Validity of information

Q. Please discuss in more detail your concept that a personnel security program should focus on persons most likely to adhere to security precautions.

- Current standards for clearance too low
- Opportunity available to screen from top down rather than from bottom up (example: selection for highly technical jobs)
- Instruments available for enlisted screening for adaptability

Q. What is your assessment of the effectiveness of a NAC, ENTINAC, etc.?

- NAC and ENTINAC primarily furnish offense information
  - Completeness of information not known
  - Validity of information not known
  - Often provides unique data, but effectiveness of the procedure has not been established

Q. What is your assessment as to the value and present effectiveness of periodic reinvestigations?

- Value could be very high
- Present effectiveness unknown

SENATOR NUNN. (Presiding) Thank you, Senator Gore. Our next witness is Mr. Eli Flyer, who is a consultant to the Manpower Research Center, Department of Administrative Sciences, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.

Mr. Flyer, we are delighted to have you this morning. I understand you are prepared to give us your oral testimony, and then we will ask questions of you.

MR. FLYER. Yes, and I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today. Yesterday we heard there may be too many classified documents. We also heard yesterday that there may be too many people with clearances. Today you are going to hear that there may be too many unreliable people assigned to sensitive jobs.

I have been a personnel researcher for Defense for over 30 years. In the early 1960s, I became involved in selection research involving assignments to high-risk jobs, positions involving nuclear weapons and intelligence duties, where espionage activities and destructive acts would have the most serious consequences.

Let me tell you what led to that involvement. In 1959, an Air Force enlistee assigned to an overseas base in Great Britain pointed a .45 weapon at a nuclear warhead. He was talked out of discharging his pistol, and it was later discovered that he had been receiving psychiatric therapy for deep depression for quite a period of time without his psychiatrist knowing about the nature of his work.

This led, of course, to quite a bit of attention being devoted by the Air Force to improving their screening for nuclear sensitive jobs. It led to the Human Reliability Program for the Air Force which later on became the Personnel Reliability Program for Defense.

After a 20-year interval, I am again involved in personnel security research. In looking over the program, I find many serious problems. Most important would be the high rate of first-term attrition of enlisted personnel due

to unsuitability that is found among those placed in high-risk jobs. About 20 percent of new recruits considered for assignment to either nuclear-related or intelligence specialties who receive background investigations are discharged within the first four years of service for cause, largely for reasons of unsuitability. Most will have been cleared for assignment to these duties.

SENATOR NUNN. Does that mean unsuitability for those high-clearance jobs or unsuitability for the service?

MR. FLYER. Let me just move into that with the next statement. Some of the people discharged for unsuitability are separated from service during early training. At the time of their discharge, many have been cleared for top secret and SCI duties. Over the last five years, 27,500 enlisted personnel considered for assignment to sensitive duties were later discharged for unsuitability. Most had received clearances for high-risk jobs.

You asked about the nature of the discharges. Let me read you some of the numbers here. Drug-related reasons, 4,000; character and behavior disorders, 1,900; homosexuality, 1,100; alcoholism, 600; discreditable incidents, 2,800; misconduct, disciplinary infractions, 1,600; court martials 1,100, and so on.

(At this point in the hearing, Senator Gore withdrew from the hearing room.)

SENATOR NUNN. What period of time is that over?

MR. FLYER. Over the last five years, 27,500. And almost all cleared for high-risk jobs. What is going on?

I think it's important to recognize here that most of the adverse information obtained through background investigation relates to behavior problems rather than to loyalty issues. That point was mentioned yesterday and has to be stressed again. In selecting and adjudicating this information, it is assumed that individuals with very unfavorable background histories are poor security risks. People likely to continue having behavioral problems are more likely to be compromised.

About 5 percent of those receiving background investigations are denied clearance for high-risk jobs, and primarily for behavioral reasons -- only 5 percent! Unfortunately, what the current personnel security process does not take into account is there are still wide differences in behavioral adjustment history and expected behavior among the 95 percent who are cleared.

The recruit who had been fired from a number of jobs prior to service entry is likely to receive a clearance indistinguishable from that of a fellow-recruit with an exemplary pre-service record, although much more likely to be discharged for unsuitability later on.

It is hardly likely that a process which identifies the bottom 5 percent of those receiving background investigations as behavior risks and everyone else as equally acceptable is providing the best candidates available for high-risk jobs.

Let me give you an example. We may have an applicant for military service who has been fired from four jobs prior to recruitment. Once because he didn't show up on time; another one because he was lazy; another one because he was suspected of theft; and another one because he was found smoking pot in the washroom. He goes to the 5th employer. The likelihood is that the 5th employer, if he does any employment checks, will turn him down, but not the Department of Defense. The Department of Defense will accept him and he will be enlisted.

If it happens that he gets into a track identified for a high-risk job and a background investigation is run, and, further, if the background investigation is accurate enough to identify these problems in his prior employment, he will probably still be cleared for top secret and for SCI duties.

I ask you, what kind of a system do we have here where an individual who is unlikely to get good employment outside Defense because of a lousy employment history will still pass muster for our highly sensitive jobs?

SENATOR NUNN. Are you saying the Department of Defense doesn't look into past employment records, or are you saying

they disregard it --

MR. FLYER. (Interposing) I say if there is an accurate investigation and they identify the information, the likelihood is excellent that this individual would be adjudicated favorably.

I think we should look very carefully into the possibility of selecting people into high-risk jobs rather than selecting them out. For the enlisted population, the situation may be analagous in some respects to aptitude scores for recruit selection. Aptitude batteries are applied to all applications for military service, and only those recruits with the highest scores are considered for assignment to highly-technical positions.

Why can't we use the same approach in the personnel security screening process by obtaining assessment information from all recruits and then identifying those with the highest adjustment potential for assignment to high-risk jobs? Well, how do you do that? I believe it can be done.

Although it would be much too expensive to give background investigations to all recruits to identify those with the highest adjustment potential, we have other techniques that are less costly that provide much of the same information. Good self-report biographical history measures can provide a fair amount of the information now obtained through background investigations. For those who pass



this screen, the background investigation, of course, would still be needed. This would be accomplished for the most highly-qualified recruits and its purpose would be largely to check on the accuracy and completeness of the information obtained through the self-report procedures. This approach would clearly reduce the number of enlistees assigned to high-risk jobs who are later discharged for unsuitability, without question.

We are faced with the fact that there is very little information now available for evaluating and improving the effectiveness of Defense's personnel security program. Dollar costs per investigation and time to complete an investigation, while important, are not sufficient. There are other important components of the personnel security process that could and should be evaluated to improve the program. Such as the following:

Requirements: We heard some of this yesterday; how effective are Defense policies and practices in determining who receives a background investigation?

Timing: Are pre-screening procedures and background investigations being initiated at the right time? For some recruits, background investigations are run before they are actually in service, while in the delayed entry program. Some are run while in basic training; for some while in technical training pipelines. The problem is a certain amount of fallout. Some

of these people will never be assigned to a sensitive position and this can create a fair amount of waste. One has to balance the cost of unnecessary investigations against the time spent waiting for clearances to be processed after completion of training, but this is the type of job that operations analysts do all the time in evaluating cost-effectiveness.

Coverage: Is there additional background information that could be collected for evaluation purposes? I was struck hearing this morning about the comparison of 12 references versus 24 references in evaluating the quality of background investigations, and kept on saying to myself, are they the right references? Did they ask the right questions? I think it takes more than just body count to determine the quality of a background investigation.

There are lots of other factors which I think should be included in a personnel security investigation that are not now included. Indicators of emotional stability, for example, are very important. I don't believe the current assessment system gets at that.

Procedures: How effective are our background investigation procedures in identifying important information in a person's background? Very little has been done to evaluate whether or not these investigations are quality investigations, whether they can actually find what's out there.

I am struck when I read background investigation records, and I have read plenty of them, that if the investigators just didn't get to

John Jones, they never would have found that the subject had this or that in his background. Twelve references recommend the subject unqualifiedly, and a 13th reference all of a sudden comes up with all kinds of negative information which is later confirmed. It makes you wonder about the quality of the investigative process.

Accuracy: How reliable is the information obtained through personnel security investigations? It is along the same lines which I have been discussing.

Validity: Once you have accurate background information, what is it worth? I didn't hear anybody talk about validity in the last day or two. If you find out that an individual has committed certain kinds of offenses, had certain kinds of employment history, what does it all mean? Where are the data, where are the actuarial data that tell us the probability of later behavior associated with these things if you find them in a good investigation? We are all on very, very thin ice in terms of what we are doing from an adjudication standpoint.

Adjudicators are flying blind. They don't know the relationship between certain classes of behavior and later behaviors. And then ultimately, you have "utility." How best can personnel security information be used in making personnel security decisions? This is the reason why investigations are run. How do you take advantage of the information obtained in making

effective personnel decisions? There are behavioral science and operations research techniques that would help answer these questions, questions applicable not only to Defense's personnel security programs but programs of other agencies as well. We need to learn a lot more about the personnel security process if our aim is to improve it and make it more effective.

We must also find ways to make up for the limitations of personnel security investigation procedures. We are faced with the fact that we cannot predict the behavior of individuals assigned to high-risk jobs with the degree of precision needed. The best that can be done is identify groups of individuals with different probabilities of behavior. Based on current screening procedures, groups of recruits can be identified at service entry whose first-term unsuitability discharge rates will vary from about 8 percent to over 50 percent.

While these rates could be improved to some extent, there would still be significant numbers of later failures even in the most highly-selected groups. It appears, therefore, that although we can reduce the incidence of unsuitability in high-risk jobs through the use of valid selection procedures, in no case can we bring it down to zero. Incidentally, there would still be many attractive jobs left for those not assigned to high-risk jobs. That point came

up earlier in terms of suitability versus security.

It's essential, therefore, to have a personnel security system that takes into account the need for continuing observation and periodic evaluation of the people assigned to high-risk jobs. A standardized monitoring and assessment program is needed with military and civilian supervisors and managers fully responsible for its effective administration.

In some respects, Defense's Personnel Reliability program already uses this approach. The monitoring programs need strengthening in the opinion of many defense experts.

I believe we should look very, very carefully at a recertification process on an annual basis, not necessarily a re-investigation, but involving the supervisor or the manager, to review, perhaps, with the individual in the high-risk job how things have gone within the last year, checking personnel records, checking medical records, looking for indicators that perhaps the individual today is a bit different than he was earlier.

To conclude, it's apparent that relatively little is known about the effectiveness of Defense's personnel security program, or that of other agencies. The large number of unsuitable discharges among those with high-level clearances indicates that all is not well.

I believe it essential that behavioral science and operations analysis techniques be applied to the personnel security

program to evaluate and improve current policies and procedures, and, I believe, the effort is long overdue. Thank you.

SENATOR NUNN. Thank you very much, Mr. Flyer. You told me some things I did not know about the military procedures and personnel. I am particularly interested in pursuing for just a moment the analysis that these various factors, previous job problems, so forth, even if known, would not prevent those people from not only becoming members of the service, but also adjudicated to be cleared for classified information.

Is that a policy or is that just the way it works?

MR. FLYER. There are a set of standards that are supposed to be applied. If an adjudicator sees a consistent history of irresponsibility among other factors, then a clearance could be denied, but the illustration I gave you is a correct one, and there are probably others even more serious where clearances are given. It just would not be considered serious enough, really, for an adjudicator to turn down such an individual. I know, I have been looking at a large number of background investigations.

SENATOR NUNN. Does DOD do much personnel security research? You indicated you don't believe enough is being done. They do a lot of studies on personnel but do they do personnel security types studies?

MR. FLYER. I'm not sure how much money is going into personnel research in terms of selection, utilization, promotion, retention, these types of things. Probably about \$60 million a year. Large amounts are going into it. Surprisingly, relatively little in personnel security research. I think it stems from a number of reasons:

One, I don't think the managers of the personnel security programs have in the past laid out the requirements for their behavioral scientists to work on. In the last few years, there has been, I think, quite a bit of recognition, not only within Defense, but among other federal agencies as well that there is a role for behavioral scientists to play in personnel security research.

(At this point in the hearing, Senator Gore entered the hearing room.)

I think looking at the history, it's the investigators who have been running the personnel security program for a very, very long time, and I think they have done a very good job; I think they have done an excellent job, but I think there are tools available now, the tools that are common to personnel researchers, to operations analysts, to operations researchers, that would strengthen the program immeasurably.

## APPENDIX C



**Statement of Personal History  
and  
Personnel Security Questionnaire**

## STATEMENT OF PERSONAL HISTORY

**INSTRUCTIONS:** Read the certification at the end of this questionnaire before entering the required data. Print or type all answers. All questions and statements must be completed. If the answer is "None," so state. Do not misstate or omit material fact since the statements made herein are subject to verification. If more space is needed, use the Remarks section, item 20, and attach additional sheets if necessary. The information entered hereon is for official use only and will be maintained in confidence.

<b>1. (Print) FIRST NAME—MIDDLE NAME--MAIDEN NAME (If any)—LAST NAME</b> <input type="checkbox"/> MR. <input type="checkbox"/> MRS. <input type="checkbox"/> MISS					<b>2. STATUS</b> <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 50%; padding: 2px;">CIVILIAN</td> <td style="width: 50%; padding: 2px;">MILITARY OR ACTIVE DUTY</td> </tr> </table>		CIVILIAN	MILITARY OR ACTIVE DUTY
CIVILIAN	MILITARY OR ACTIVE DUTY							
<b>3. ALIAS(ES), NICKNAME(S), OR CHANGES IN NAME (Other than by marriage)</b>				<b>4. PERMANENT MAILING ADDRESS</b>				
<b>5. DATE OF BIRTH (Day, month, year)</b>		<b>PLACE OF BIRTH (City, County, State, and Country)</b>		<b>PLACE CERTIFICATE RECORDED</b>				
<b>HEIGHT</b>		<b>WEIGHT</b>		<b>COLOR OF EYES</b>				
<b>COLOR OF HAIR</b>		<b>SCARS, PHYSICAL DEFECTS, DISTINGUISHING MARKS</b>		<b>6. DO YOU HAVE A HISTORY OF MENTAL OR NERVOUS DISORDERS?</b> <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <b>ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ADDICTED TO THE USE OF HABIT FORMING DRUGS SUCH AS NARCOTICS OR BARBITURATES?</b> <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <b>ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A CHRONIC USER TO EXCESS OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES?</b> <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <b>IF THE ANSWER TO ANY OF THE ABOVE IS "YES," EXPLAIN IN ITEM 2B</b>				
<b>7. U. S. CITIZEN</b> <input type="checkbox"/>		<b>NATIVE</b> <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		<b>IF NATURALIZED, CERTIFICATE NO.</b>				
<b>IF DERIVED, PARENTS' CERTIFICATE NO(S)</b>		<b>DATE, PLACE, AND COURT</b>		<b>8. DO YOU INTEND TO BECOME A U. S. CITIZEN?</b> <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO				
<b>ALIEN</b> <input type="checkbox"/>		<b>REGISTRATION NO</b>		<b>NATIVE COUNTRY</b>				
<b>DATE AND PORT OF ENTRY</b>		<b>9. MILITARY SERVICE</b>		<b>ARE YOU PRESENTLY ON ACTIVE DUTY IN THE U. S. ARMED FORCES DRAWING FULL PAY?</b> <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <b>IF "YES," COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING:</b>				
<b>GRADE AND SERVICE NO.</b>		<b>SERVICE AND COMPONENT</b>		<b>ORGANIZATION AND STATION</b>				
<b>DATE CURRENT ACTIVE SERVICE STARTED</b>		<b>ARE YOU PRESENTLY A MEMBER OF A U. S. RESERVE OR NATIONAL GUARD ORGANIZATION?</b> <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <b>IF "YES," COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING:</b>		<b>10. HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY SERVED TOURS OF EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY, DRAWING FULL PAY, FROM WHICH YOU WERE DISCHARGED OR SEPARATED TO CIVILIAN STATUS?</b> <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <b>IF "YES," COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING:</b>				
<b>GRADE AND SERVICE NO</b>		<b>SERVICE AND COMPONENT</b>		<b>ORGANIZATION AND STATION OR UNIT AND LOCATION</b>				
<b>COUNTRY</b>		<b>SERVICE</b>		<b>COMPONENT</b>				
<b>FROM (Date)</b>		<b>TO (Date)</b>		<b>TYPE DISCHARGES OR SEPARATIONS—GRADE AND SERVICE NO</b>				
<b>EDUCATION (Account for all civilian schools and military academies. Do not include service schools)</b>		<b>MONTH AND YEAR</b>		<b>NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL</b>				
<b>FROM—</b>		<b>TO—</b>		<b>GRADUATE</b> <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO				
<b>DEGREE</b>		<b>11. FAMILY (List in order given, parents, spouse, guardians, stepparents, foster parents, parents-in-law, former spouse(s) (if divorced give date and place), children, brothers and sisters, even though deceased. Include any others you resided with or with whom a close relationship existed or exists. If the person is not a U. S. citizen by birth, give date and port of entry, alien registration number, naturalization certificate number and place of issuance.)</b>		<b>RELATION AND NAME</b>				
<b>FATHER</b>		<b>DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH</b>		<b>PRESENT ADDRESS, IF LIVING</b>				
<b>MOTHER (Maiden name)</b>		<b>U. S. CITIZEN</b> <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		<b>12. OTHER (Specify)</b>				
<b>SPOUSE (Maiden name)</b>		<b>13. (Leave blank)</b>		<b>14. (Leave blank)</b>				
<b>OTHER (Specify)</b>		<b>15. (Leave blank)</b>		<b>16. (Leave blank)</b>				
<b>17. (Leave blank)</b>		<b>18. (Leave blank)</b>		<b>19. (Leave blank)</b>				
<b>20. (Leave blank)</b>		<b>21. (Leave blank)</b>		<b>22. (Leave blank)</b>				
<b>23. (Leave blank)</b>		<b>24. (Leave blank)</b>		<b>25. (Leave blank)</b>				
<b>26. (Leave blank)</b>		<b>27. (Leave blank)</b>		<b>28. (Leave blank)</b>				
<b>29. (Leave blank)</b>		<b>30. (Leave blank)</b>		<b>31. (Leave blank)</b>				
<b>32. (Leave blank)</b>		<b>33. (Leave blank)</b>		<b>34. (Leave blank)</b>				
<b>35. (Leave blank)</b>		<b>36. (Leave blank)</b>		<b>37. (Leave blank)</b>				
<b>38. (Leave blank)</b>		<b>39. (Leave blank)</b>		<b>40. (Leave blank)</b>				
<b>41. (Leave blank)</b>		<b>42. (Leave blank)</b>		<b>43. (Leave blank)</b>				
<b>44. (Leave blank)</b>		<b>45. (Leave blank)</b>		<b>46. (Leave blank)</b>				
<b>47. (Leave blank)</b>		<b>48. (Leave blank)</b>		<b>49. (Leave blank)</b>				
<b>50. (Leave blank)</b>		<b>51. (Leave blank)</b>		<b>52. (Leave blank)</b>				
<b>53. (Leave blank)</b>		<b>54. (Leave blank)</b>		<b>55. (Leave blank)</b>				
<b>56. (Leave blank)</b>		<b>57. (Leave blank)</b>		<b>58. (Leave blank)</b>				
<b>59. (Leave blank)</b>		<b>60. (Leave blank)</b>		<b>61. (Leave blank)</b>				





19. ARE THERE ANY INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED HEREIN WHICH MAY REFLECT UPON YOUR LOYALTY TO THE UNITED STATES OR UPON YOUR SUITABILITY TO PERFORM THE DUTIES WHICH YOU MAY BE CALLED UPON TO TAKE OR WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE FURTHER EXPLANATION? ☐ YES ☐ NO IF "YES," GIVE DETAILS

20. REMARKS

I CERTIFY THAT THE ENTRIES MADE BY ME ABOVE ARE TRUE, COMPLETE, AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF AND ARE MADE IN GOOD FAITH. I UNDERSTAND THAT A KNOWING AND WILLFUL FALSE STATEMENT ON THIS FORM CAN BE PUNISHED BY FINE OR IMPRISONMENT OR BOTH (See U. S. Code, title 18, section 1001)

DATE	SIGNATURE OF PERSON COMPLETING FORM	
	TYPED NAME AND ADDRESS OF WITNESS	SIGNATURE OF WITNESS

21. THIS SECTION TO BE COMPLETED BY AUTHORITY REQUESTING INVESTIGATION

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DUTY ASSIGNMENT AND DEGREE OF CLASSIFIED MATTER (top secret, secret, etc.) TO WHICH APPLICANT WILL REQUIRE ACCESS

RECORD OF PRIOR CLEARANCES

DATE OF CLEARANCE	TYPE OF CLEARANCE	AGENCY THAT COMPLETED INVESTIGATION

REMARKS

**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT:** AUTH: EO 10466, 10886 and 12086; Public Law 90-260; 5 U.S.C. 552a; Federal Security Act; info will be used (Principal): Making security clearances for access to classified information under NSA/CSS (includes indirectly): 1. Determination of the scope and coverage of a personnel security investigation. 2. Conduct of the conduct of investigation leads to more completeness of the investigation. 3. Provide answers or explanations to the basic personnel history information relating to security clearance. 4. To determine if there is any information that is relevant to the security clearance that can be shared with meeting the foregoing determinations. Information relating to the detection or prevention of a possible violation of law may be reported to the appropriate law enforcement authority. Each for reporting (SAR) EO 10887; Class: Unclassified; Used as individual identifier: One of info: Voluntary: Effect on individual if info not provided: They result in loss of security clearance. If you do not want to provide information, you may file a request with the NSA/CSS and information. Your signature below indicates you have read and understand the above.

**NOTE: SIGNATURES ARE REQUIRED ON BOTH THIS FORM AND DD FORM 398**

[illegible][illegible]

EMPLOYER OF FATHER	OF MOTHER	OF SPOUSE
EMPLOYER'S ADDRESS		
DATE & PLACE OF MARRIAGE(S)		

HAVE YOU EVER MADE OR DO YOU PRESENTLY HAVE APPLICATION FOR EMPLOYMENT PENDING WITH ANY GOVERNMENT AGENCY OTHER THAN THOSE SHOWN IN ITEM 13? IF SO, GIVE AGENCY, DATE OF APPLICATION AND WHETHER ACCEPTED.

ARE YOU ABLE TO MEET CURRENT FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS?

DATE	SIGNATURE OF PERSON COMPLETING FORM	
	TYPED NAME AND ADDRESS OF WITNESS	SIGNATURE

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
PERSONNEL SECURITY QUESTIONNAIRE (BI/SBI)**

**FOR DIS USE ONLY**

1. a. LAST NAME—FIRST NAME—MIDDLE NAME				b. MAIDEN NAME (If any)											
2. ALIASES						3. SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER									
4. DATE OF BIRTH (Year-Month-Day)				5. PLACE OF BIRTH											
a. CITY		b. COUNTY		c. STATE		d. COUNTRY									
6. a. CIVILIAN		c. GRADE		d. IF MILITARY:		ARMY						AIR FORCE			
b. MILITARY						NAVY		MARINE CORPS							
7. IDENTIFYING DATA															
a. SEX		b. RACE			c. HEIGHT		d. WEIGHT		e. COLOR OF HAIR		f. COLOR OF EYES				
8a. U.S. CITIZEN		c. NATIVE		d. IF NATURALIZED, CERTIFICATE NO.(S)			e. IF DERIVED, PARENT(S) CERTIFICATE NO.(S)			f. DATE		g. PLACE		h. COURT	
b. ALIEN		i. REGISTRATION NO.			j. CURRENT CITIZENSHIP			k. DATE OF ENTRY		l. PORT OF ENTRY		m. FORM 1-151 NO.			
9. FORMER MILITARY SERVICE															
a. FROM		b. TO		c. BRANCH			d. RANK		e. SERVICE NO.(S)			f. TYPE OF DISCHARGE			
10. FAMILY ASSOCIATES (List father, mother, spouse, and children.) (See DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS for others to be listed.)															
a. RELATIONSHIP AND NAME				b. DATE OF BIRTH		c. PLACE OF BIRTH			d. ADDRESS				e. CITIZENSHIP		
FATHER															
MOTHER (Maiden Name)															
SPOUSE (Maiden Name)															
11. RESIDENCES (List in chronological order beginning with the current address. Give the inclusive dates for each period of residence.) (See DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS.)															
a. DATES		b. NUMBER AND STREET				c. CITY				d. STATE		e. COUNTRY		f. ZIP CODE	
FROM		TO													
		Present													
12. DUTY OR EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION (List in chronological order beginning with the present, each period of employment, self-employment, part-time employment, and/or unemployment. List inclusive dates for each period. If discharged for cause from any employment, so state. See DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS.)															
a. DATES		b. NAME OF EMPLOYER				c. ADDRESS				d. NAME OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR					
FROM		TO													
		Present													
13. FEDERAL SERVICE, FOREIGN TRAVEL/CONNECTION ("Yes" answers must be explained in Item 18 in accordance with DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS.)															
Yes		No													
				a. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE?											
				b. HAVE YOU TRAVELED OR RESIDED ABROAD FOR OTHER THAN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT?											
				c. DO YOU HAVE ANY FOREIGN PROPERTY OR BUSINESS CONNECTIONS, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN EMPLOYED BY OR ACTED AS A CONSULTANT FOR A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT, FIRM, OR AGENCY?											

**FOR DIS USE ONLY**

RETURN  
RESULTS  
TO:

PERSONNEL INVESTIGATIONS CENTER  
DEFENSE INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE  
P.O. BOX 454  
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21203

14. a. MARITAL STATUS		b. NAME(S) OF FORMER SPOUSE(S)		c. DATE(S) OF PRIOR MARRIAGE(S)		d. PLACE	
MARRIED		UNMARRIED					
LEGALLY SEPARATED		DIVORCED		e. DATE OF DIVORCE		f. COURT	
						g. LOCATION	

15. EDUCATION (List in chronological order, beginning with the last school attended.) (See DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS.)

a. DATES		b. NAME OF SCHOOL	c. ADDRESS	d. MAJOR	e. DEGREE
FROM	TO				

16. CREDIT REFERENCES (Complete this item only if you lived overseas within the past 5 years. List 3 individuals and/or firms who have extended credit to you during that time period.) (See DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS.)

a. NAME	b. ACCOUNT NUMBER	c. NUMBER AND STREET	d. CITY	e. STATE	f. ZIP CODE

17. CHARACTER REFERENCES (List 5 good friends, co-workers, colleagues, classmates, etc.) (See DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS.)

a. NAME	b. FROM	c. TO	d. NUMBER AND STREET	e. CITY	f. STATE	g. ZIP CODE

18. REMARKS (Attach additional sheets, if necessary.)



**19. ORGANIZATIONS****a. (List all organizations, except those referred to in b. below, in which you hold or have held membership.)**

i. NAME	ii. ADDRESS	iii. TYPE	iv. FROM	v. TO

**b. ("Yes" answers must be explained in accordance with the DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS.)**

Yes	No	
		i. Are you now or have you ever been a member of the Communist Party or any Communist organization?
		ii. Are you now or have you ever been affiliated with any organization, association, movement, group, or combination of persons which advocates the overthrow of our constitutional form of government or which has adopted the policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States or which seeks to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means?

**20. MEDICAL/FINANCIAL ("Yes" answers must be explained in accordance with the DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS.)**

Yes	No	
		a. Have you ever used any narcotic, depressant, stimulant, hallucinogen (to include LSD or PCP), or cannabis (to include marijuana or hashish), except as prescribed by a licensed physician?
		b. Have you ever been involved in the illegal purchase, possession, or sale of any narcotic, depressant, stimulant, hallucinogen, or cannabis?
		c. Has your use of alcoholic beverages (such as liquor, beer, wine) ever resulted in the loss of a job, arrest by police, or treatment for alcoholism?
		d. Have you ever been a patient (whether or not formally committed) in any institution primarily devoted to the treatment of mental, emotional, psychological, or personality disorders?
		e. Have you ever petitioned to be declared bankrupt?

**21. ARRESTS ("Yes" answers must be explained in accordance with the DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS.)**

Yes	No	
		a. Have you ever been arrested, charged, cited, or held by Federal, State, or other law enforcement or juvenile authorities, regardless of whether the citation was dropped or dismissed or you were found not guilty? Include all court martial or non-judicial punishment while in military service. (You may exclude minor traffic violations for which a fine or forfeiture of \$100 or less was imposed.)
		b. As a result of being arrested, charged, cited, or held by law enforcement or juvenile authorities, have you ever been convicted, fined by or forfeited bond to a Federal, State, or other judicial authority or adjudicated a youthful offender or juvenile delinquent (regardless of whether the record in your case has been "sealed" or otherwise stricken from the court record)?
		c. Have you ever been detained, held in, or served time in any jail or prison, or reform or industrial school or any juvenile facility or institution under the jurisdiction of any city, state, federal, or foreign country?
		d. Have you ever been awarded, or are you now under suspended sentence, parole or probation, or awaiting any action on charges against you?

i. DATE	ii. NATURE OF OFFENSE OR VIOLATION	iii. NAME AND LOCATION OF POLICE AGENCY	iv. NAME AND LOCATION OF COURT	v. PENALTY IMPOSED OR OTHER DISPOSITION IN EACH CASE

I CERTIFY THAT THE ENTRIES MADE BY ME ARE TRUE, COMPLETE, AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF AND ARE MADE IN GOOD FAITH. I UNDERSTAND THAT A KNOWING AND WILLFUL FALSE STATEMENT ON THIS FORM CAN BE PUNISHED BY FINE OR IMPRISONMENT OR BOTH. (See U.S. Code, Title 18, Section 1001.)

DATE	SIGNATURE OF PERSON COMPLETING FORM (Each copy MUST be individually signed)

# **PERSONNEL SECURITY QUESTIONNAIRE (BI/SBI) DD FORM 398**

**DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 (5 U.S.C. 552a)**

**AUTHORITY:** Internal Security Act of 1950 and Executive Orders 10450, 12036, and 12065

**PRINCIPAL PURPOSES:** To obtain background information for personnel security investigative and evaluative purposes in connection with the making of security determinations with respect to (1) employment or retention in employment in sensitive Department of Defense civilian positions or for other positions that have been designated as requiring a determination as to whether employment in or assignment to such positions is clearly consistent with the interests of national security, (2) membership in the Armed Forces of the United States, or (3) access to classified information.

**ROUTINE USES:** (1) Determine the scope of a personnel security investigation.  
(2) Provide evaluators or adjudicators with personal history information relevant to personnel security determinations.

The information may be disclosed to other Federal agencies that are authorized under specific statutory or Executive authority to make personnel security determinations.

A copy of the report of personnel security investigation will be maintained by the Personnel Investigators Center of the Defense Investigative Service Headquarters and may be used in future employment or security clearance determinations. You have the right to obtain a copy of the report of investigation and/or to request amendment to the file.

## **MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE AND EFFECT ON INDIVIDUAL OF NOT PROVIDING INFORMATION:**

Voluntary. Failure, however, to furnish all or part of the information requested may result in (1) nonselection for employment, membership in the Armed Forces, or certain other duties requiring a determination as to whether employment in or assignment to such duties is clearly consistent with the interests of national security, (2) denial of access to classified information, or (3) reassignment to nonsensitive duties. Disclosure of your social security number is necessary to fulfill requirements of the above cited authorities. It is intended that this notice be retained for personal records.

## **GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING DD FORM 398**

THE PERSONNEL SECURITY QUESTIONNAIRE (PSQ) IS AN IMPORTANT DOCUMENT AND MUST BE COMPLETED WITHOUT MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION OF IMPORTANT FACTS. ALL ENTRIES ARE SUBJECT TO VERIFICATION BY INVESTIGATION.

- FORMS MUST BE TYPED OR PRINTED. ALL COPIES MUST BE LEGIBLE.
- IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED FOR ANY ITEM, USE ITEM 18, "REMARKS." IF SPACE PROVIDED IN ITEM 18 IS INSUFFICIENT, USE SEPARATE SHEET(S) OF PLAIN WHITE PAPER.
- ALL QUESTIONS MUST BE ANSWERED, IF AN ITEM IS NOT APPLICABLE INDICATE "NOT APPLICABLE" OR "N/A." DO NOT USE THE TERM "UNKNOWN" FOR DATES OF EMPLOYMENT OR RESIDENCE. IF THIS INFORMATION IS NOT KNOWN PRECISELY, GIVE THE DATE AS BEST YOU CAN RECALL FOLLOWED BY APPROPRIATE QUALIFYING LANGUAGE, E.G. "DATE ESTIMATED" OR "APPROX."
- UNLESS OTHERWISE SPECIFIED:
  - ALL DATES SHOULD BE ENTERED IN TERMS OF YEAR AND MONTH USING THE LAST TWO DIGITS OF THE YEAR AND A TWO DIGIT NUMBER REPRESENTING THE MONTH. E.G., JANUARY 1979 WOULD BE ENTERED AS 79-01 AND DECEMBER 1979 WOULD BE ENTERED AS 79-12.
  - NAMES OF PERSONS SHOULD BE ENTERED IN THE FOLLOWING ORDER: LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, AND MIDDLE INITIAL.
  - ADDRESSES SHOULD INCLUDE THE NUMBER AND STREET, CITY, STATE OR COUNTRY, AND ZIP CODE.
- BEFORE ENTERING ANY INFORMATION ON THE FORM, **READ CAREFULLY**, THE DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS PROVIDED WITH THE FORM. IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT YOU PROVIDE INFORMATION IN RESPONSE TO ITEMS 11, 12, 13.b., 15 and 17 THAT COVER THE REQUIRED TIME PERIOD; I.E., MOST RECENT 5 YEARS FOR BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS AND MOST RECENT 15 YEARS FOR SPECIAL BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS EXCEPT THAT IN BOTH INSTANCES IF YOU ARE UNDER THE AGE OF 21, THE TIME PERIOD IS THE LAST 3 YEARS OR THE PERIOD SINCE YOUR 16th BIRTHDAY, WHICHEVER IS SHORTER. IF AT ANY TIME DURING COMPLETION OF THE FORM A QUESTION ARISES THAT DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE COVERED BY THE DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS, CONTACT THE INDIVIDUAL OR OFFICE THAT PROVIDED YOU WITH THE FORM.
- BEFORE SIGNING THE FORM, READ IT CAREFULLY AND CHECK EACH ITEM AGAINST THE DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS.

GPO : 1984 O - 435-095

MEPS  
Army Pre-Screening Questionnaires



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
US ARMY MILITARY PERSONNEL CENTER  
PERSONNEL SECURITY SCREENING DETACHMENT  
FORT LEONARD WOOD, MISSOURI 65473

SECURITY SCREENING QUESTIONNAIRE

PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 (ADVISEMENT STATEMENT): The authority for requesting the following information is Executive Orders 10450, 11652, and 9397. The requested information is to be used in making security determinations for membership in the Armed Forces of the United States, access to classified information, or for making personnel management decisions. The routine uses are for the determination of the scope and coverage of a personnel security investigation, checking the conduct of investigative leads to assure completeness of the investigations, and provide evaluators or adjudicators with basic personal history information relevant to security and suitability determinations. The information may be disclosed to other Federal agencies and administrative personnel involved in processing action that evolve during the course of these determinations. COMPLETION OF THIS FORM IS VOLUNTARY. Failure on your part, however, to furnish all or part of the information requested may result in your not being accepted for your chosen MOS or enlistment option.

GENERAL INFORMATION CONCERNING THIS FORM: Completion of this processing questionnaire represents an initial security screening by representatives of the US Army. If reviewed favorably, additional security screening will follow, to include a detailed background investigation conducted by the Defense Investigative Service. This investigation may encompass extensive checks with appropriate law enforcement agencies, credit and financial institutions, school teachers and administrators, friends, neighbors, employers and other persons who may know and be willing to provide information concerning you. Upon completion of all screening and investigations, a determination will be made concerning your eligibility for access to sensitive intelligence information, and/or the MOS or option for which you are applying. You are advised that falsification of this questionnaire may result in the loss of your MOS/enlistment option, denial of a security clearance or access to sensitive information, reassignment or possible separation from the military service. ANY ADVICE YOU MAY HAVE RECEIVED CONCERNING THE WITHHOLDING OF APPLICABLE INFORMATION SHOULD BE DISREGARDED. It will be in your best interest to complete honestly and accurately all questions below by circling the appropriate "YES" or "NO" response. If you answer "YES" to any question, fully explain your answer in the REMARKS section of this form, or on a separate piece of paper.

QUESTIONS

1. Do you or any member of your family:
  - a. Hold citizenship in any country, other than the US? YES NO
  - b. Hold US Citizenship by other than birth (been naturalized)? YES NO
  - c. Have relatives residing outside the United States? YES NO

d. Maintain any ties of affection, obligation or kinship to any individual of foreign birth or who is not a US citizen? (If so, give complete identifying data, to include full name, occupation, age, address, citizenship, extent of contact and correspondence in the REMARKS section).

YES NO

e. Have any financial interests, holdings or dealing with a foreign based business; own property or bank accounts in a foreign country?

YES NO

2. Have you ever travelled outside of the United States, excluding short duration (less than one month) visits to CANADA or MEXICO? (Exclude travel under US Government orders/direction).

YES NO

3. Have you EVER experimented with, EVEN ONE TIME, used on an infrequent or regular basis, possessed, grown/produced, or sold any of the following type drugs or substances?

YES NO

Marijuana YES NO Amphetamines (Speed) YES NO Cocaine YES NO

Hashish YES NO Hallucinogens YES NO Opium YES NO  
(LSD, STP, PCP)

THC YES NO Barbiturates YES NO Heroin YES NO

Any synthetic or cure-type drugs, such as Methadone, or any other habit forming, dangerous or illegal drug/substance?

YES NO

Any narcotic, sedative, stimulant, tranquilizer, anti-depressant, glue/solvent/gas sniffing, etc?

YES NO

IF YOUR ANSWER TO ANY OF THE ABOVE QUESTIONS WAS "YES" ENTER THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION AND COMPLETE THE STATEMENT AT INCL 1 OF THIS FORM.

Type(s) drug/substance used \_\_\_\_\_

Date of first use \_\_\_\_\_

Date of last use \_\_\_\_\_

Frequency of use (daily, weekly, etc) \_\_\_\_\_

Approx total times used \_\_\_\_\_

4. Have you ever:

a. Required medical treatment or counselling, had employment problems, or been questioned/detained by law enforcement officials as a result of the use of alcoholic beverages, cannabis, narcotic substances or dangerous drugs?

YES NO

b. Purchased for or sold alcoholic beverages, cannabis, narcotic substances or dangerous drugs to minors? YES NO

c. Illegally transported, manufactured or sold alcoholic beverages, cannabis, narcotic substances or dangerous drugs? YES NO

5. Have you ever:

a. Been referred, visited, consulted, examined by any medical authority, psychiatrist, psychologist, social worker, professional or school counselor for any nervous, mental, emotional, behavior, personal or stability problems? (If so, give dates, places, addresses, names of counselors/facilities and reasons in REMARKS). YES NO

b. Attempted suicide whether as a gesture or on purpose? YES NO

c. Been involved in or accused of child molesting, statutory rape, window peeping, streaking, mooning, indecent exposure, etc? YES NO

d. Been involved in any homosexual act since age 15? YES NO

e. Been involved in or accused of adultery, cohabitation, etc? YES NO

f. Experienced financial problems (Bankruptcy, repossessions, garnishments, collections, judgements, bad checks, delinquent payments or been refused credit, etc)? LIST ALL CURRENT FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS (to include car payments and student loans): YES NO

BALANCE DUE	MONTHLY PAYMENTS	NAME & ADDRESS OF CREDITOR	REASON FOR DEBT	DATE LAST PAYMENT DUE	DATE OF FINAL PAYMENT

g. Left any employment under less than favorable conditions, while under investigation or suspicion? (Fired, quit without notice, quit while under investigation/suspicion etc). YES NO

h. Had problems with employers or co-workers? YES NO

i. Been suspended or expelled from school for any reason? YES NO

j. Been denied enlistment in, rejected by or discharged from any branch of the Armed Forces?

YES NO

k. Participated in illegal or violent demonstrations?

YES NO

l. Been a member of a street or other type gang?

YES NO

m. Received disciplinary action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, to include Article 15, Captain's Mast or Courts-Martial?

YES NO

n. Been processed for employment with or investigated by a Federal Government Agency for any reason?

YES NO

o. Been a member of the Peace Corps?

YES NO

p. Held a security clearance with the Federal Government or Civilian contractor?

YES NO

q. Been denied or had a security clearance revoked/suspended?

YES NO

r. Advocated the use of force or violence to overthrow the Government of the United States or alter the form of Government of the United States by unconstitutional means; or been a member of any group or closely associated with any individual(s) whose aims are in opposition to those of the United States?

YES NO

s. Been pregnant or caused someone to become pregnant out of wedlock?

YES NO

6. List ALL instances in which you have been detained, arrested, cited, held, questioned, or convicted of law violations, INCLUDING JUVENILE AND TRAFFIC OFFENSES, whether guilty or not, and the amount of any fines or confinement. Include civil court appearances.

MONTH/YEAR

CITY/STATE

OFFENSE/REASON

DISPOSITION

_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

7. Are there any other instances in your life which you feel would adversely reflect upon your responsibility, reliability, or maturity, or which you feel should be brought out at this time?

YES NO

REMARKS SECTION

Fully explain any "YES" answers, by citing the question number then your explanation. If you continue this section on a plain sheet of paper, indicate the following information on the top of the continuation sheet: FULL NAME, SSAN, DATE & PLACE OF BIRTH (DPOB).



\*\*\*\*\*

I certify that I have read and understand the Privacy Act of 1974  
Advisement statement on Page 1 of this form, and that the answers  
above are true, and complete and correct, to the best of my knowledge,  
memory and belief. I understand that knowing and willful false  
statements or omissions of pertinent information may result in  
my dismissal from my MOS and/or enlistment option and/or unit and/or  
the US Army. I further certify that I have not received any advice,  
implied or otherwise, to omit information requested by this form.

FULL NAME \_\_\_\_\_ SSN \_\_\_\_\_

DATE OF BIRTH \_\_\_\_\_ PLACE OF BIRTH \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
SIGNATURE OF INTERVIEWEE

\*\*\*\*\*

I certify that I have discussed each aspect of this form with the above  
named individual and have informed the applicant of the consequences of  
providing incomplete or erroneous information.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature of Interviewer/ SI # \_\_\_\_\_ Date and Place of Interview

\*\*\*\*\*

FOR INTERVIEWER USE:

_____ ORIGINAL INTERVIEW FORM	Security Determination Information
_____ UPDATE INTERVIEW FORM	APPROVED BY _____ DET _____ PCCP
(Date of Original	ON: _____ Control # _____
Form _____)	

SCI Access Eligibility Drug Waiver Application

FROM:

TO: Commander, US Army Central Personnel Security Clearance Facility

1. I understand that the possession, use, sale or transfer of marijuana, narcotics, dangerous drugs or other controlled substances is against Army policy and may constitute unlawful conduct and may result in my being declared ineligible for access to SCI (Sensitive Compartmented Information).
2. I understand that a request for waiver of prior drug involvement will be considered only one time and, if granted, will be limited to and apply only to such involvement as I specifically describe in this request.
3. I understand that my statements regarding prior drug involvement are subject to further investigation and that any deliberate misrepresentation, falsification or omission of material fact may be a basis for a determination of SCI access ineligibility.
4. I understand that the information I furnish regarding prior drug involvement will be used only in connection with the determination of my eligibility for access to SCI and the waiver, if granted, shall not be applicable for any other purpose.
5. I will refrain from any future personal possession, use, sale or transfer of any and all types of marijuana, narcotics, dangerous drugs or other controlled substances unless prescribed by competent medical authority. I will also avoid attendance at any activity where such substances may be present or in use.
6. This request is made freely, voluntarily, and of my own will because of my desire to be granted eligibility for access to SCI.

DATE \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature of requester

DATE \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature and title of witness



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
U.S. ARMY MILITARY PERSONNEL CENTER  
2461 EISENHOWER AVENUE  
ALEXANDRIA, VA 22331

PERSONNEL RELIABILITY PROGRAM  
SCREENING QUESTIONNAIRE

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT: The authority for requesting the following information is Army Regulation 50-5. The principal purpose is to determine if you are eligible to enlist for training in a nuclear-related Military Occupational Speciality. The routine use of data obtained is used to determine acceptability for the Personnel Reliability Program. DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION REQUESTED IS VOLUNTARY. However, if you do not provide the desired information, you may be denied the nuclear-related Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) training-of-choice option.

STANDARDS FOR NUCLEAR DUTY: Due to the destructive power of nuclear weapons and the grave implications of either accidental or deliberate detonation of these weapons, only those persons who have demonstrated unswerving loyalty, integrity, trustworthiness, and discretion of the highest order will be assigned to nuclear duties. All persons performing this duty will be continually evaluated, are obligated to report any factors or conditions which may adversely affect their performance, and will be promptly removed from nuclear weapons duty if there is any question about their judgment or reliability.

\*\*\*\*\*

PART I (TO BE COMPLETED BY SECURITY INTERVIEWER)

NAME \_\_\_\_\_ SSN \_\_\_\_\_  
Last First MI

has been interviewed using criteria listed below to evaluate his/her acceptability under the Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) for training leading to an assignment to perform duties of a Critical or Controlled position. (Circle applicable answer - YES or NO)

- |  |     |    |
|--|-----|----|
| 1a. Objects to handling, participation in the firing, or military use of nuclear weapons.  | YES | NO |
| 1b. <u>FOR USE BY 95B MOS APPLICANTS ONLY:</u> Objects to performing security duties in the vicinity of nuclear weapons stored, fired, or staged for military use.   | YES | NO |
| 2. Required (or has an approved) waiver for a moral or administrative disqualification contained in AR 601-210, Table 4-1, line C, D, E, F, G, H, I, (K-USAR ONLY), M, N, O, Q, W, X, Y, AA, AB, AC, AE, AG, AH, or AI; preservice alcohol or preservice drug abuse (If yes, circle applicable items).                     | YES | NO |
| 3. Has experimented with cannabis or a derivative (Marijuana, Hashish), within the last 90 days, but did not continue to use it, even on an infrequent basis. (Isolated, experimental cannabis use may be waived to authorize an enlistment commitment for training in a nuclear-related (PRP) MOS). (See Part II, Item 4) | YES | NO |
| 4. Has illegally used or experimented (even once) with any other drugs or controlled substances, whether or not charged or convicted of same. (Includes, Cocaine, Heroin, Speed, Morphine, LSD, FCP, Mescaline, Benzadrine, Valium, and similar substances) (Use as prescribed by a physician is not illegal).             | YES | NO |

\*\*\*\*\*

PART II (TO BE COMPLETED BY APPLICANT WITH ASSISTANCE OF SECURITY INTERVIEWER)

1. I have read and understand the Privacy Act Statement and Standards for NUCLEAR DUTY shown on page 1.
2. I have not received any advice, implied or otherwise, to omit information during this interview.
3. To the best of my knowledge, memory, and belief, the above eligibility determination is accurate and valid.
4. I request that my isolated experimental use of cannabis be waived, and that I be authorized training in a nuclear-related MOS as an enlistment commitment.  
(Cross out if not applicable)
5. I understand that cannabis use in the Service is illegal and always disqualifying and will result in my removal from duty with nuclear weapons and reclassification to another skill. I will not use drugs of any kind while in the Delayed Entry Program and/or after reporting for active duty, (unless prescribed by medical authority) if permitted to enlist in MOS \_\_\_\_\_.

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Signature)

\*\*\*\*\*

PART III (TO BE COMPLETED BY SECURITY INTERVIEWER)

Based upon evaluation of the above factors, waiver for cannabis use is (approved) (disapproved) (not applicable) and: (Name) \_\_\_\_\_ meets the initial screening criteria for the PRP. If the remaining specific MOS requirements are met, (he) (she) is eligible for nuclear-related MOS training.

(Name) \_\_\_\_\_ does not meet PRP requirements as noted and is therefore ineligible to enlist for nuclear-related MOS training.

\*\*\*\*\*

I certify that I have discussed each aspect of this form with the above-named individual and have informed the applicant of the consequences of providing incomplete or erroneous information.

\*\*\*\*\*

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature of Interviewer

\_\_\_\_\_  
DATE

\_\_\_\_\_  
Place of Interview

\_\_\_\_\_  
REMARKS

MEPS

Navy Pre-Screening Questionnaires

SUGGESTED QUESTIONS TO BE ASKED OF POTENTIAL CRYPTOLOGIC TECHNICIAN  
AND INTELLIGENCE SPECIALIST CANDIDATES:

Have you ever been arrested, held, cited, detained or questioned by any law enforcement agency? (Include any juvenile offenses, or charges that were ultimately dismissed, withdrawn or you were not found guilty).

For NAVET and OSVET include: Have you ever been court-martialed or received non-judicial punishment (Captain's Mast, Article 15, office hours) while in the military service?

Have you ever used or experimented with drugs, narcotics or marijuana? (This includes even one use).

Have you ever bought or sold illegal drugs, narcotics or marijuana?

Are any members of your immediate family involved in any way in use or trafficking in marijuana, illegal drugs or narcotics? Do any of your family members have any arrest record pertinent to illegal drugs?

Do you or any member of your immediate family have a history of excessive use of alcohol? (For candidate ask about arrests for minor in possession and DWI/DUI).

Have you ever declared bankruptcy or had any item of goods repossessed?

Have you ever had a check returned for insufficient funds? Explain.

What are your current financial obligations? (Provide total amount owed to each account and monthly payments against the account).

Are any accounts in arrears?

Have you ever been fired from a job or quit to avoid being fired? Yes.

Are you eligible to be rehired at each and every place you have been employed?

Have you ever been treated for any nervous, emotional or mental disorders?

Is there a history of epilepsy in your immediate family?

Have you ever been expelled or suspended from any educational institution (junior high through college) for cause?

Are any members of your immediate family citizens of a country other than the United States?

Do you have any close friends or relatives who are residing in a foreign country?

Do you have any friends or relatives who are not U.S. citizens?

Have you ever travelled outside the United States? To what country(ies)?

Have you ever been associated with any group or individual that advocates the use of force or violence to alter the Government of the United States?

Have you ever participated, either actively or passively, in a sexual relation with someone of your own sex?

Have you ever been involved in sexual activity that you consider to have been unusual, abnormal or perverted?

Are there any questions previously asked that would be answered "yes" by your current or ex-spouse?

Are there any incidents or situations in your background which might reflect on your loyalty or suitability for access to sensitive information?

Is there any individual such as a former employer, school official, co-worker, neighbor, landlord, girl friend, school friend or creditor who might provide adverse or negative information about you or your family during the course of a full-field background investigation?

\* \* \* \*

Don't be reluctant to go further into any of the above questions to explore questionable or unusual circumstance. If a "yes" answer is given to any question ask for full details of the matter.

Adjudicate the information you obtain objectively. Ask yourself a question. Is this individual the type with whom we can trust our nation's secrets? If you were the official solely responsible for security of the highly sensitive defense information at your duty station would you feel secure in certifying this person for full access knowing any compromise would be your responsibility?

USN ALCOHOL AND DRUG ABUSE SCREENING CERTIFICATE

NAVCRRUIT 1133/7 (Rev. 12/82) (Replaces items 35a-35c of DD Form 1966)

This form is affected by the Privacy Act of 1974. See Section VIII of this form for Privacy Act statement.

I. INTRODUCTION

Drug abuse by Navy personnel is prohibited. The purpose of this certificate is to obtain information which will help you and the Navy determine your enlistment and program eligibility. You should be completely honest in completing this certificate. If you are truthful now, no action can or will be taken against you as the result of any information you may reveal. Your statement will be used only by the Navy and will not be released to any outside agency or person not authorized by you. You are cautioned that should you conceal alcohol or drug abuse information at this time and it is discovered after your enlistment, punitive action may be taken against you based upon the false statements you have made.

II. DEFINITIONS

Alcohol Abuse. The use of alcohol to an extent that it has an adverse effect on the user's health or behavior, family, community, or the Navy, or leads to unacceptable behavior as evidenced by an alcohol-related incident (or incidents).

Alcohol/Drug Dependent. Having a psychological and/or physiological reliance on alcohol or drugs resulting from use on a periodic or continuing basis. (See also "Physical/Psychological Dependence.")

Alcohol-related Incident. Any incident in which alcohol is a factor. Examples include driving while intoxicated (DWI), driving under the influence (DUI), drunk-in-public and other types of alcohol-related incidents, particularly those requiring medical care, or involving a public or domestic disturbance.

Alcoholic. An individual who is alcohol dependent.

Depressants. Sedative-hypnotic drugs of diverse chemical structure, all capable of inducing varying degrees of behavioral depression. Depending on dose, can cause sedative, tranquilizing, hypnotic (sleep) or anesthetizing effect. Most common categories of depressants include: barbiturates (e.g., phenobarbital, secobarbital), tranquilizers or the benzodiazepines and methaqualone.

Drug Abuse. Any illicit use or possession of drugs.

Drug Abuser. One who has illicitly used, or possessed, any narcotic substance, marijuana, or other drug.

Drugs. Marijuana, narcotics and all other controlled substances as listed in Schedules I-V established by Section 202 of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Title 21, U.S.C, Section 812 as updated and republished under the provisions of that Act.

Drug Trafficking or Supplying. The wrongful distribution (includes sales or transfer) of a controlled substance, and/or the wrongful possession or introduction into a military unit, base, station, ship, or aircraft of a controlled substance with the intent to distribute.

Hallucinogens/Psychedelics. A group of diverse, heterogenous compounds all with the ability to induce visual, auditory, or other hallucinations and to separate the individual from reality. Depending on substance and dose, can cause disturbances in cognition and perception. Most common categories are: LSD; mescaline and peyote; psilocybin; and psychedelic amphetamine variants (STP, MDA). Although a unique drug, for purposes of this certificate phencyclidine (PCP) will be labeled in this general drug class.



MEPS

Air Force Pre-Screening Questionnaires

# SENSITIVE JOBS CHECKLIST

(This form is subject to the Privacy Act of 1974 - See AF Form 893)

1. Some jobs which you may consider require an extensive investigation into your background before the Air Force can confirm your assignment. This is necessary because the job requires access to secret, sensitive information and/or involves high risk assignments where human reliability and security are major prerequisites.
2. The questions below are provided to assist Air Force representatives in deciding whether or not you are eligible for one of the sensitive skills. Any information you fail to reveal will most certainly be discovered in the formal investigation which will be conducted and cause some personal embarrassment and result in your assignment to another skill or possible discharge.
3. This information is for OFFICIAL USE ONLY and will be maintained and used in strict confidence in accordance with federal law and regulations.
4. Completion of Sections I, II, III and IV of this form is mandatory for all applicants for enlistment regardless of whether they are volunteers for sensitive jobs.

SECTION I TO BE COMPLETED BY APPLICANT		YES	NO
1. DO YOU USE ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES EXCESSIVELY ?			
2. DO YOU EXPRESS ANY OBJECTIONS TO THE AIR FORCE MISSION IN SUPPORT OF THE NATIONAL OBJECTIVES ?			
3. DO YOU HAVE EXCESSIVE DEBTS ? HAVE YOU EVER FILED FOR BANKRUPTCY ? HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED OR CHARGED FOR WRITING ANY BAD CHECKS ? IS THERE ANY EVIDENCE THAT YOU ARE NOT MAKING PAYMENTS ON EXISTING DEBTS ?			
4. HAVE YOU EVER FAILED TO PAY CHILD SUPPORT OR ALIMONY OR SHOWN ANY OTHER EVIDENCE OF FAMILY IRRESPONSIBILITY ?			
5. DO YOU DISPLAY EVIDENCE OF EXCESSIVE WORRY, NERVOUS DISORDER OR ANXIETY REACTION WHICH CAN BE CONFIRMED BY MEDICAL AUTHORITY ?			
6. ARE YOU CURRENTLY SEEING A PSYCHIATRIST OR PSYCHOLOGIST FOR PERSONAL PROBLEMS OR BEEN UNDER THE CARE OF ONE OF THE ABOVE DURING THE LAST FOUR YEARS ?			
7. IS THERE ANY HISTORY OF MISCONDUCT AT SCHOOL WHICH WOULD INDICATE YOU ARE NOT QUALIFIED FOR DUTY INVOLVING HIGH RISK SECURITY JOBS ? (EXAMPLE: EXCESSIVE TRUANCY, SUSPENSION, EXPULSION, ETC.)			
8. DO YOU THINK YOUR TEACHERS, COUNSELLORS, PRINCIPALS OR DEAN, WHEN CONTACTED, WILL RECOMMEND YOU FOR A JOB INVOLVING THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES ?			
9. IS THERE ANY HISTORY OF DIFFICULTIES AT WORK WHICH WOULD INDICATE YOU ARE NOT QUALIFIED FOR DUTY INVOLVING HIGH RISK SECURITY JOBS ? (EXAMPLE: THEFT, PROBLEMS WITH OTHER EMPLOYEES, MISCONDUCT, ETC.)			
10. DO YOU THINK PREVIOUS EMPLOYERS, WHEN CONTACTED, WILL RECOMMEND YOU FOR A JOB INVOLVING THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES ?			
11. IS THERE A HISTORY OF MISCONDUCT IN YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD, TOWN, SCHOOL, ETC., WHICH WOULD INDICATE YOU ARE NOT QUALIFIED FOR DUTY INVOLVING HIGH RISK SECURITY JOBS ? (EXAMPLE: DELINQUENT ACTS, DISTURBING THE PEACE, DISORDERLY CONDUCT, DESTRUCTION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY, BREAKING AND ENTERING, ETC.)			
12. THE NEXT THREE QUESTIONS CONCERN POSSESSION, SUPPLY, USE WITHOUT A PRESCRIPTION OF MARIJUANA, NARCOTICS, LSD OR OTHER DANGEROUS DRUGS. A "YES" ANSWER TO "C" HAS NO BEARING ON YOUR ELIGIBILITY TO ENLIST OR BE COMMISSIONED BUT IS ESSENTIAL TO ACCURATE JOB CLASSIFICATION. ADDITIONAL SCREENING WILL OCCUR DURING BASIC TRAINING OR OTS.			
A. HAVE YOU EVER USED NARCOTICS, LSD OR OTHER DANGEROUS DRUGS ?			
B. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A SUPPLIER OF NARCOTICS, LSD OR OTHER DANGEROUS DRUGS OR MARIJUANA ?			
C. HAVE YOU EVER USED MARIJUANA ANYTIME IN THE PAST SIX MONTHS ?			
I certify the above responses are true to the best of my knowledge. I fully understand that certain skill areas in the Air Force cannot be performed by persons who have used marijuana or other drugs. If it is established after enlistment, commission or appointment that I have used drugs or marijuana and that usage disqualifies me for the skill area for which I enlist, am appointed or classified into, I may be reclassified into another skill area or discharged from the Air Force. Air Force officials will decide reclassification or discharge, if required.			
DATE	NAME AND SSAN OF APPLICANT	SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT	

SECTION II TO BE COMPLETED BY USAF RECRUITING REPRESENTATIVE		YES	NO
1. IS THE APPLICANT OR ANY OF THE APPLICANT'S FAMILY (SPOUSE, CHILDREN, BROTHERS, SISTERS, PARENTS OR PARENTS-IN-LAW) NOT U.S. CITIZENS ? (REF. DD FORM 1966, ITEMS 9, 23, 30 AND 31) IF YES, COMPLETE SECTION IV.			
2. DO ANY OF THE APPLICANT'S RELATIVES (SPOUSE, CHILDREN, BROTHERS, SISTERS, PARENTS, PARENTS-IN-LAW OR ANYONE WHOM THEY HAD A CLOSE CONTINUOUS RELATIONSHIP) RESIDE IN A COMMUNIST DOMINATED COUNTRY ? (REF. DD FORM 1966, ITEM 30 AND 31)			
3. HAS THE APPLICANT TRAVELED OR RESIDED IN A COMMUNIST OR COMMUNIST ORIENTATED COUNTRY FOR ANY PERIOD OF TIME IN EXCESS OF THIRTY CONTINUOUS DAYS, NOT UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ? (REF. DD FORM 1966, ITEMS 27, 28, 33a AND 33c)			
4. HAS THE APPLICANT EVER SERVED OUTSIDE THE U.S. AS A MEMBER OF THE PEACE CORPS ? (REF. DD FORM 1966, ITEMS 27, 28 AND 33c)			
5. HAS THE APPLICANT EVER BEEN CONVICTED BY A CIVIL COURT WITHIN THE PAST FIVE YEARS FOR ANYTHING OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC OFFENSE(S) OR A MINOR NON-TRAFFIC OFFENSE AS LISTED IN ATRC 33-2 (FIGURES 1-1 AND 1-2, RESPECTIVELY) ? (REF. DD FORM 1966, ITEM 36). IF A MORAL WAIVER WAS APPROVED FOR ANY OFFENSE(S) ATRC 33-2, TABLE 1-2, THE ANSWER MUST BE "YES".			
I certify that I have reviewed all information contained in this document and verified all possible entries.			
DATE	NAME AND GRADE OF RECRUITER	SIGNATURE OF RECRUITER	

**SECTION III CREDIT AND CHARACTER REFERENCES**

(Do not include relatives, former employers or persons living outside the United States or its territories). (A checking or savings account with a bank or credit union is credit). (Include only one character reference from any family).

	NAME (List 3 credit and 3 character)	YEARS KNOWN	STREET AND NUMBER (Business address preferred)	CITY, STATE AND ZIP CODE
CREDIT				
CHARACTER				

**SECTION IV RELATIVES WHO ARE NOT NATIVE BORN U.S. CITIZENS**

NAME AND RELATION	DATE AND PORT OF ENTRY	ALIEN REG NO.	NATURALIZATION CERT. NO. AND PLACE OF ISSUE

**SECTION V REMARKS**

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**SECTION VI PRP DETERMINATION BY LNCO (Use ATCR 33-2 Table 2-4)**

Review this form with the applicant and compare with other documents (DD Form 1966, AF Form 24 or 56, etc.) for accuracy and completeness. Apply responses on this form to ATCR 33-2, table 2-4 and enter appropriate code on ATC Form 1371 and in PROMIS in accordance with attachment 6. This PRP code is for initial classification and does not correspond to AFR 35-99.

PRP CODE	DATE REVIEWED	NAME, RANK AND SIGNATURE OF LNCO DETERMINING PRP CODE

## USAF DRUG ABUSE CERTIFICATE

(THIS FORM IS SUBJECT TO THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 - Use Blanket PAS - AF Form 883)

### INTRODUCTION

Drug abuse by Air Force personnel is prohibited. The purpose of this certificate is to obtain information which will help you and the Air Force determine your eligibility for enlistment or appointment. You must be completely honest in completing this certificate - if you are truthful now, no action can or will be taken against you as the result of any information you may reveal - your statement will be used only by the Air Force and will not be released to any outside agency. **YOU ARE CAUTIONED THAT SHOULD YOU CONCEAL DRUG ABUSE INFORMATION AT THIS TIME AND IT IS DISCOVERED AFTER YOUR ENLISTMENT OR APPOINTMENT PUNITIVE ACTION MAY BE TAKEN AGAINST YOU BASED UPON THE FALSE STATEMENTS YOU HAVE MADE.** MOST AIR FORCE PERSONNEL REQUIRE A SECURITY CLEARANCE AT SOME POINT IN THEIR CAREER.

IN ORDER TO OBTAIN A SECURITY CLEARANCE, A NATIONAL CHECK OF POLICE AND SECURITY AGENCIES AND/OR A COMPREHENSIVE BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION INVOLVING PERSONAL INTERVIEWS WITH PREVIOUS EMPLOYERS, SCHOOL OFFICIALS, ACQUAINTANCES, AND OTHER INDIVIDUALS HAVING KNOWLEDGE OF YOUR PAST ACTIVITIES AND MORAL CHARACTER IS CONDUCTED. SHOULD THESE INVESTIGATIONS REVEAL PREVIOUS DRUG INVOLVEMENT WHICH YOU WITHHELD WHEN COMPLETING THIS FORM, YOU MAY BE ELIMINATED FROM TRAINING AND POSSIBLY DISCHARGED FROM THE SERVICE UNDER LESS THAN HONORABLE CONDITIONS.

### EXPLANATION OF TERMS

**NARCOTICS** - any opiates or cocaine or their synthetic equivalents (*including opium, morphine, heroin, codine, demeral, dilaudid, methadone, and percodan*).

**MARIJUANA** - the intoxicating products of the hemp plant, cannabis sativa (*including hashish*) or any synthesis thereof.

**LSD** - Lysergic acid diethylamid; a dangerous drug.

**DANGEROUS DRUGS** - those non-narcotic drugs that are habit forming or have a potential for abuse because of their stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect.

**DRUG ABUSE** - the illegal, wrongful, or improper use of any narcotic substances or dangerous drugs or the illegal or wrongful possession, or sale, transfer, or supply of these, or marijuana. When such drugs have been prescribed by competent medical personnel for medical purposes, their proper use by the patient prescribed for is not drug abuse.

**SUPPLIER** - one who furnishes illegally, wrongfully, or improperly to another person any of the drugs defined above.

**ADVERSE ADJUDICATION** - unfavorable action leading to final disposition, (*i.e., drug diversionary program, community work, etc.*)

### CRITERIA

Applicants are ineligible if they have ever been arrested for marijuana usage/possession which resulted in conviction or adverse adjudication.

Applicants are ineligible if they have ever been arrested for dangerous drug usage/possession which resulted in conviction or adverse adjudication or have used dangerous drugs, narcotics, or LSD.

Applicants are ineligible if they have been a supplier as defined above.

### WAIVER AUTHORITY

WAIVER CONSIDERATION MAY BE REQUESTED PROVIDED THE DRUG ABUSE DID NOT INVOLVE NARCOTICS, LSD, OR THE HALLUCINOGENS. THE DEGREE OF DRUG INVOLVEMENT WILL DETERMINE ELIGIBILITY BASED UPON EVALUATION OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

I certify I have never been arrested for marijuana usage or possession which resulted in conviction or adverse adjudication.

INITIALS

I certify I have never illegally used or possessed dangerous drugs, narcotics, LSD or any hallucinogens and that I have never been arrested for possession or use of these substances which resulted in conviction or adverse adjudication.

I certify I have never been a supplier of marijuana, narcotics, dangerous drugs or LSD.

I request an individual evaluation.

KNOWING AND UNDERSTANDING ALL THE INFORMATION CONTAINED ABOVE, AND REALIZING THAT THIS DOCUMENT WILL BE USED ONLY TO DETERMINE MY ELIGIBILITY, I HEREBY STATE THAT THE ABOVE INFORMATION AS TO MY PREVIOUS DRUG INVOLVEMENT IS TRUE AND COMPLETE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE.

TYPED NAME OF APPLICANT AND SSAN

SIGNATURE

DATE

### WITNESS

I certify that the above individual signed this certificate of his/her own free will.

TYPED NAME OF WITNESS

SIGNATURE

DATE

**STATEMENT OF UNDERSTANDING**

The Air Force is responsible for preventing drug abuse by its members; for controlling duty assignments; and for disciplining those who use or promote the illegal or improper use of drugs.

I, \_\_\_\_\_, SSAN \_\_\_\_\_, UNDERSTAND THAT:  
service in the United States Air Force places me in a position of special trust and responsibility.

**INITIALS**

Any drug abuse by members of the United States Air Force is against the law and violates Air Force standards of behavior and duty performance and will not be tolerated.

The illegal or improper use of narcotics, dangerous drugs or marijuana can seriously harm my health and safety and the health and safety of other Air Force men and women.

The illegal or improper use of narcotics, dangerous drugs or marijuana by Air Force members can lead to criminal prosecution and discharge under other than honorable conditions.

If I am identified for drug abuse, including the use and possession of marijuana while on active duty, appropriate disciplinary and/or administrative action may be taken against me. This may include trial by court martial or administrative separation from the Air Force.

I understand that certain skill areas in the Air Force cannot be performed by persons who have used marijuana or other drugs. If it is established that I have used drugs or marijuana and that usage disqualifies me for the skill area for which I am appointed, I enlisted for, or I am classified into, I may be reclassified into another skill area or discharged from the Air Force at the option of the Air Force.

**RECERTIFICATION**

☐ I HAVE READ AND FULLY UNDERSTAND ALL THE INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS FORM.

☐ I HEREBY STATE THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE IN MY STATUS SINCE I PROVIDED THE ORIGINAL INFORMATION.

**DATE OF ORIGINAL INFORMATION**

☐ I REQUEST AN INDIVIDUAL EVALUATION.

**TYPED NAME OF APPLICANT AND SSAN****SIGNATURE****DATE****WITNESS**

I certify that the above individual signed this certificate of his/her own free will.

**TYPED NAME OF WITNESS****SIGNATURE****DATE****REMARKS**

I understand that the illegal or improper use or possession of drugs is not condoned by the Air Force and that any drug involvement, including use of marijuana, after job reservation, receipt of OTS/Medical/Nurse class assignment notification, or delayed enlistment program entry, will render me ineligible for enlistment, commissioning, or waiver consideration.

**SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT AND DATE**

MEPS

Marine Corps Pre-Screening Questionnaires

PRELIMINARY QUESTIONNAIRE FOR ENLISTMENT FOR THE  
INTELLIGENCE/SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE/COMBINED ELECTRONIC  
WARFARE OPTION AND THE SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE OPTION UNDER THE ENLISTMENT OPTIONS PROGRAM

1. Background

a. Executive Order 11905, Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, and National Security Council Directives have established minimum personnel security standards for all United States Government military personnel who require access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI).

b. Assignment to Occupational Fields 26 and 02 requires both a Top Secret Clearance and a Certification of Eligibility for Access to SCI.

3A/BK

c. Assignment to these Codes (2600 and 0200) (program UNUS) therefore falls within this requirement. Consequently, the applicant will undergo a rigorous background investigation to determine access eligibility. The formal investigation process will begin at the recruit depot. Unsatisfactory completion of the following questionnaire will eliminate those persons who clearly do not meet the basic eligibility requirements. Reasonable assurances will be given to those personnel satisfactorily completing this questionnaire that they should meet the overall requirements. They may be recruited into this program contingent upon a final, favorable eligibility determination. However, it must be emphasized that satisfactory completion of the following questionnaire does not guarantee that the determination of eligibility will be favorable. If the determination is unfavorable, the conditions as specified in the basic SOU apply. In general, the candidate shall be of excellent character and discretion and of unquestioned loyalty to the U.S., and members of the candidate's immediate family and persons to whom the individual is bound by affection or obligation should not be subject to duress by a foreign power. Below is a listing and explanation of the areas which comprise the criteria for determining the security clearance level and the eligibility for SCI.

(1) Citizenship. Applicants and members of their immediate family (spouse, parents, brothers, sisters and children) must be U.S. citizens. If naturalized, proof of naturalization must be furnished. Security clearance waivers may be granted even if immediate family members (spouse, parents, sisters, and children) are not U.S. citizens, providing such family members reside in the U.S. as immigrant aliens and providing their citizenship is not in a communist or communist-controlled country.

(2) Foreign Relatives. No applicants will be selected who have relatives or close friends with whom close contact is maintained who are residing in or who are citizens of a communist or communist-controlled country.

(3) Drugs. No applicant will be selected who is addicted to or physically or psychologically dependent on any illegal drug, who has trafficked in drugs, has illegally used narcotics within the past year, or who has used any dangerous drug within the past 3 months.

(4) Mental Illness. Any applicant who has been treated for mental illness must produce medical evidence of successful treatment.

(5) Financial Responsibility. No applicant will be selected who has a history of bad checks (unless through bank error), repossessions, arrested or suspended charge accounts, or indebtedness exceeding one-half of the annual salary of the pay grade at which the person is being recruited.

(6) Criminal Record. No applicant will be selected who has an adult conviction of a felony, or who has an established record of repeated misdemeanors or traffic violations, including parking tickets, vandalism, abusive behavior toward law enforcement officials or shoplifting.

(7) School Record. No applicant will be selected who has established a pattern of truancy, repeated difficulties with school officials, periodic suspensions, vandalism and abusive behavior, or who has been permanently expelled as a result of such activity.

(8) Sexual Offenses. No applicant will be selected who has engaged in homosexual activity, exhibitionism, voyeurism, transvestite or corruptive sexual behavior of any kind.

(9) Employment. No applicant will be selected who has established a "job-hopping" record where there is a demonstrated pattern of leaving, irresponsibility, unexplained absenteeism, theft or inability to get along with superiors or fellow employees. No applicant who is a former member of the Peace Corps will be selected.

d. The ultimate determination of whether the granting of SCI access is clearly consistent with the interests of national security shall be an overall, common-sense determination based on all available information. However, persons who fail to satisfactorily complete the following questionnaire, probably will not meet the requirements, and should not be considered.

2. Instructions

a. A "No" answer to question "a" automatically disqualifies an applicant.

b. A "Yes" answer to questions "1", "2", or "3" automatically disqualifies an applicant.

c. Three or more unfavorable replies should disqualify an applicant. All unfavorable replies should be fully explained to expedite the clearance process.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

Under the authority of 5 U.S.C. 551, Department Regulations, and Executive Orders 10450, as amended, and 19532, information concerning your personnel history is requested in order to evaluate your eligibility for access to sensitive information. The information provided by you will become a permanent part of your security file in the Naval Security Group Personnel Security/Access File System. The information provided by you will not be divulged, without your written authorization, to anyone other than Personnel, Security, Investigative, or Intelligence Agencies of the Department of Defense. You are not required to provide the information; however, failure to do so will result in the inability of the Commander, Naval Security Group Command to evaluate your eligibility for access to Sensitive Compartmented Information, therefore making you ineligible for assignment to duties requiring access to Sensitive Compartmented Information, and thereby disqualifying you for enlistment under this program.

QUESTIONNAIRE

(The applicant will answer the questions below by placing initials in the appropriate block. Crosses and check-marks are not permitted.)

	<u>YES</u>	<u>NO</u>
1. Are you a United States citizen?	___	___
2. Are any members of your immediate family citizens of a country other than the United States?	___	___
3. Do you have any close friends or relatives who are residing in a foreign country?	___	___
4. Have you ever traveled outside the United States?	___	___
5. Have you ever been associated with any groups or individuals who advocate the use of force or violence to alter the Government of the United States?	___	___
6. Do you advocate the use of force or violence to alter the Government of the United States?	___	___
7. Have you ever used any narcotic, depressant, stimulant, hallucinogen (to include LSD or PCP) or cannabis (to include marijuana or hashish) except as prescribed by a licensed physician? (Some cannabis use is allowable.)	___	___
8. Have you or any member of your immediate family ever been involved in the illegal purchase, possession or sale of any narcotic, depressant, stimulant, hallucinogen or cannabis?	___	___
9. Have you or any member of your immediate family's use of alcoholic beverages (such as liquor, beer, wine) ever resulted in the loss of a job, arrest by police or treatment at alcoholism?	___	___
10. Have you ever been a patient (whether or not formally admitted) in any institution primarily devoted to the treatment of mental, emotional, psychological or personality disorders?	___	___
11. Besides clear traffic violations and misdemeanors, have you ever been arrested, held, cited, detained or questioned by any law enforcement agency (including juvenile offenses or charges that were ultimately dismissed, withdrawn or of which you were found "not guilty")?	___	___
12. Have you ever declared bankruptcy?	___	___
13. Have you ever had any item repossessed?	___	___
14. Have you ever had a check returned for insufficient funds?	___	___
15. Do you have any accounts that are in arrears?	___	___
16. Have you ever been expelled or suspended from any educational institution for abuse?	___	___
17. Are you eligible to be retired at cash and every place you have been employed?	___	___
18. Have you ever participated, either actively or passively, in a sexual relation with someone of your own sex, in exhibitionism, in transvestism or in any other sexual activity that you consider to be perverted (bizarre)?	___	___
19. Are there any incidents or situations in your background which might reflect on your loyalty or suitability for access to sensitive information?	___	___
20. Have you ever failed or refused to sign a loyalty oath, or pleaded protection of the Fifth Amendment or Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice?	___	___
21. If age 18 years or older did you register for the draft as required?	___	___
22. Is there any individual such as a former employer, school official, co-worker, neighbor, landlord or creditor who might provide negative information about you during the course of a social background investigation?	___	___

Appendix A to  
ENCLOSURE (2)



NO 1120,33J  
19 Apr 1984

FOR PRIOR SERVICE PERSONNEL:

	<u>YES</u>	<u>NO</u>
u. Have you ever been in violation of any security regulations of the United States Government?	—	—
v. Have you ever been court-martialed or received nonjudicial punishment (Captains' Mast, Article 15, Officer's Court, etc.) while in the military service?	—	—
w. Have you ever been a member of the Peace Corps?	—	—

FOR (MLISTEE):

<u>Day/Month/Year</u>	<u>SSN</u>	<u>Printed Name</u>	<u>Signature</u>
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FOR MEPS LIAISON NCO:

<u>Day/Month/Year</u>	<u>SSN</u>	<u>Printed Name</u>	<u>Signature</u>
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Appendix A to  
ENCLOSURE (2)



# UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

U.S. MARINE CORPS RECRUITING STATION  
1825 BELL ST. SUITE #104  
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 95825

## DRUG ABUSE SCREENING FORM

Purpose: The purpose of this form is to make sure that you completely tell us the extent of any illegal drug involvement before you are processed for further enlistment. (Refusal to complete the requested information will result in termination of enlistment processing.)

Initial the appropriate block under "No" or "Yes" for each item.

NAME	RS/RSS	DATE				
DRUG TAKEN	NO	YES	HOW OFTEN	DATE START	DATE STOP	REASON
Amphetamines (Speed)						
Barbituates (Downers)						
Cocaine						
Heroin						
LSD						
Marijuana/Hashish (THC)						
Mescaline						
Mushrooms (Psilocybin)						
Opium						
PCP						
Peyote						
Quaaludes						
Valium						
Other						

Certification: I certify that I have completely told you the extent of my illegal drug use as indicated.

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Signature)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Date)

Recertification (Members of the DEP and SMCR Awaiting IADT): I certify that the information I have previously given about my illegal involvement with drugs remains/is no longer true and complete. I have \_\_\_\_/have not \_\_\_\_ (circle one and initial) used marijuana or illegally used or been illegally involved with other drugs since I enlisted in the Marine Corps as an inactive reservist.

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Enlistee's Printed Name)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Enlistee's Signature and Date)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Social Security Number)

**Basic Military Training  
Air Force Prescreening Forms**



WITH ANY OF THE FOLLOWING?	Yes	No
Curfew violations		
Malevolent mischief		
Disturbing the peace or disorderly conduct		
Bad checks		
Failure to pay alimony or child support		
Moving traffic violations		
Traffic accidents while driving		
Injuring someone while driving		
Hit and run accidents		
Running away from home		
Trespassing		
Illegal possession of weapon		
Vandalism		
Theft		
Shoplifting		
Breaking and entering		
Assault		
Hunting or fishing violations		
Possession, use or sale of marijuana or illegal drugs (includes experimentation)		
Auto insurance cancelled for cause		
Drinking under age or excessive drinking		
DUI of alcohol or other drugs		
Contributing to delinquency of minor		
Misuse of driver's license or other ID		
Homosexual acts		
Sex offense		
Indecent exposure		
Driver's license suspended		
Summoned to appear in court or expect to be		
Other law violations or police contacts		
Problems with creditors		
Do you have a valid driver's license?		
Do you have any debts? AMOUNT \$		

#### FAMILY HISTORY

Indicate YOUR AGE at the time when the following event(s) happened to you: (Leave blank if not applicable)

Father Died \_\_\_\_\_ Parents Separated \_\_\_\_\_ Father Remarried \_\_\_\_\_ I Was Adopted \_\_\_\_\_ I Was Married \_\_\_\_\_ I Was Divorced \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mother Died \_\_\_\_\_ Parents Divorced \_\_\_\_\_ Mother Remarried \_\_\_\_\_ I Was Engaged \_\_\_\_\_ I Was Separated \_\_\_\_\_

RELATION	AGE	HEALTH	EDUCATION	OCCUPATION	(For Interviewer Use Only)
FATHER					
STEP FATHER					
MOTHER					
STEP MOTHER					
WIFE, HUSBAND OR FIANCE					
EX-WIFE OR EX-HUSBAND					

#### MILITARY DATA

DO ANY OF THE FOLLOWING APPLY TO YOU?

Yes No

Drum Chief		
Squad Leader		
Personal visits to Chaplain		
Visits to Mental Hygiene		
Unsatisfactory Ratings		
Set Back		

#### INTERVIEWER'S COMMENTS

MOST DIFFICULT THING IN BASIC FOR YOU:

WHY DID YOU JOIN THE AIR FORCE?

DO YOU FEEL THAT YOU WILL BE ABLE TO COMPLETE BASIC TRAINING ON SCHEDULE?

☐ YES ☐ NO ☐ NOT SURE

WHICH AIR FORCE JOB WOULD YOU LIKE TO HAVE?

Academic Program in HS or Far in College			Algebra I			Mechanical Drawing		
Overall Letter Grade average Grade Point average			Algebra II			Shop courses AUTO REPAIR WELDING AFLT MAINT ELECTRIC WOOD METAL OTHER		
Graduated	<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/> GED	<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	Geometry					
Courses Completed or Degree			Trigonometry					
Courses Failed			College Math			English (Senior year, or College)		
Have you have disciplinary action taken against you in school (suspensions, etc.?)			Calculus			Foreign Languages SPANISH FRENCH GERMAN RUSSIAN LATIN, OTHER		
Extracurricular activities in or out of school (clubs, sports, offices held, community groups, fraternities, etc.)			Analytic Geometry					
Number of hours per week worked while attending school			Physics			Typing (WPM)		
Reasons for leaving school if not graduated?			Chemistry			Business Courses BOOKKEEPING BUS MACHINE SHORTHAND GEN BUSINESS COMPUTER PROGRAM OTHER		
			Political Science					
			Electronics					

INTERVIEWER'S COMMENTS

I ACKNOWLEDGE THAT I HAVE BEEN ADVISED OF MY RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE 31, UCMJ AND UNDERSTAND MY RIGHTS.

Signature

COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING SENTENCES TO EXPRESS YOUR TRUE FEELINGS WITH WHATEVER COMES TO MIND. DO EVERY ONE. BE SURE TO MAKE A COMPLETE SENTENCE.

1. I like	11. My greatest weakness	21. I need
2. I secretly	12. My teachers	22. In high school
3. Rules are	13. The worst thing I ever did	23. I feel that my M.T.I.
4. My father	14. When I was a child	24. My mother
5. My family	15. When I got angry	25. What annoys me
6. Most women	16. A man	26. My friends
7. A husband	17. My greatest fear	27. I regret
8. A wife	18. I	28. I worry
9. I feel	19. The members of my flight	29. Compared with others, I
10. My nerves	20. My strongest point	30. I feel the Air Force

NAME OF SUPERVISOR										SIGNATURE AND DATE	
NAME OF COMPANY										HAVE YOU EVER	
ADDRESS (Street)										HAD TROUBLE WITH SUPERVISORS?	
CITY, STATE, ZIP CODE										HAD TROUBLE WITH CO-WORKERS?	
DATE OF EMPLOYMENT		From		To		From		To		QUIT A JOB WITHOUT NOTICE?	
REASON FOR LEAVING										BEEN FIRED OR DISMISSED FROM ANY JOB?	
REVIEWER'S COMMENTS										QUIT A JOB TO AVOID BEING FIRED?	

PERSONAL DATA												DO YOU HAVE	
Have you ever undergone any type of counseling or treatment (physical, emotional, mental, etc.)?		Have you had any serious illness, accident or nervous condition that may affect your performance in the Air Force?		Are there any Air Force duties you could not perform because of religious or moral beliefs?		Do you consider yourself physically and emotionally fit for a responsible Air Force job?		20/20 Vision Without Glasses?		Normal Color Vision?		Normal Hearing?	
YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/>		YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/>		YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/>		YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/>		YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/>		YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/>		YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/>	
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THE FOLLOWING ITEMS TYPICAL OF YOU? (Indicate by checking the appropriate box under each question)													
USUALLY TRUE <input type="checkbox"/> FREQUENTLY TRUE <input type="checkbox"/> OCCASIONALLY TRUE <input type="checkbox"/> RARELY TRUE <input type="checkbox"/> NEVER TRUE <input type="checkbox"/>													
31. SLEEP TALK													
32. PROBLEMS FINDING GIRLS (BOYS) YOU WOULD LIKE TO DATE													
33. LIKE TO GAMBLE													
34. ALLERGIES (HIVES, RASHES, HAY FEVER, ASTHMA, ETC.)													
35. ANEMIA													
36. CARELESSNESS													
37. WORRY OR FEEL NERVOUS AROUND GUNS													
38. FEEL DISTANT FROM OTHERS													
39. AVOID COMPETITION													
40. FEEL BLUE AND MOODY													
41. RECURRENT OR FRIGHTENING DREAMS													
42. HAD ASSOCIATION WITH HOMOSEXUALS													
43. HEARTBURN, STOMACH PAINS, INDIGESTION, WHEN NERVOUS													
44. BACKACHES													
45. HAD CONVULSIONS OR PARALYSIS													
46. FEEL NERVOUSNESS PREVENTS YOU FROM PERFORMING WELL													
47. NERVOUS WHEN IN CLOSED OR TIGHT PLACES													
48. FEEL LONELY													
49. FEEL BLUE AND MOODY													

Academic Program in HS or Major in College			Algebra I			Mechanical Drawing		
Overall Letter Grade average or Grade Point average			Algebra II			Shop courses AUTO REPAIR WELDING ACFT MAINT ELECTRIC WOOD METAL OTHER:		
Graduated	<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/> GED	<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	Geometry					
Years Completed or Degree			Trigonometry					
Courses Failed			College Math			English (Senior year, or College)		
Did you have disciplinary action taken against you in school (suspensions, etc.?)			Calculus			Foreign Languages SPANISH FRENCH GERMAN RUSSIAN LATIN, OTHER		
List hobbies and extra curricular activities in or out of school (Clubs, sports, offices held, community groups, fraternalism, etc.)			Analytic Geometry					
Number of hours per week worked while attending school			Physics			Typing (WPM)		
Reasons for leaving school if not graduated?			Chemistry			Business Courses BOOKKEEPING BUS. MACHINE SHORTHAND GEN. BUSINESS COMPUTER PRGM OTHER:		
			Political Science					
			Electronics					

#### INTERVIEWER'S COMMENTS

I ACKNOWLEDGE THAT I HAVE BEEN ADVISED OF MY RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE 31, UCMJ AND UNDERSTAND MY RIGHTS.

Signature

COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING SENTENCES TO EXPRESS YOUR TRUE FEELINGS WITH WHATEVER COMES TO MIND. DO EVERY ONE. BE SURE TO MAKE A COMPLETE SENTENCE.

1. I like	11. My greatest weakness	21. I need
2. I secretly	12. My teachers	22. In high school
3. Rules are	13. The worst thing I ever did	23. I feel that my M.T.I.
4. My father	14. When I was a child	24. My mother
5. My family	15. When I got angry	25. What annoys me
6. Most women	16. A man	26. My friends
7. A husband	17. My greatest fear	27. I regret
8. A wife	18. I	28. I worry
9. I feel	19. The members of my flight	29. Compared with others, I
10. My nerves	20. My strongest point	30. I feel the Air Force





# DRUGS AND REASON FOR USE

☐ DENIES ANY DRUG INVOLVEMENT

OR

☐ HAS USED THE FOLLOWING DRUGS

TYPE	FIRST USED	LAST USED	FREQUENCY	TOTAL USE	REMARKS

## EMOTIONAL OR MENTAL PROBLEMS (*Psychiatric or psychological*)

## IMMORAL OR INFAMOUS CONDUCT

## REMARKS

NOTE: \* - INDICATES INFORMATION DEVELOPED SUBSEQUENT TO INITIAL INTERVIEW.

☐ APPROVED

☐ DISAPPROVED

NAME OF INTERVIEWER

SIGNATURE OF INTERVIEWER

I acknowledge that prior to this interview I was advised of my rights under provisions of Art 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice, and that I understand those rights.

SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
3507TH AIRMAN CLASSIFICATION SQUADRON (ATC)  
LACKLAND AIR FORCE BASE, TEXAS 78236



REPLY TO  
ATTN OF DPKA

SUBJECT: Credit Inquiry

TO:

1. The individual identified above, a recent enlistee in the US Air Force, is being considered for an assignment important to the security of the United States. We feel that a good credit rating is one indication of personal integrity.
2. The airman has listed you as a source of credit. Your assistance in providing the information requested on the reverse of this letter will be a valuable aid in determining his (her) suitability for a sensitive military assignment.
3. The Privacy Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-579), requires that information obtained by Federal Agencies about an individual be released to that individual upon their request. The identity of the person providing the information must also be released to the individual. The information you provide in this questionnaire conforms to the provisions of the Privacy Act.
4. Time limitations require that initial selections for these positions be completed within the next ten days. Your early reply in the envelope provided will be appreciated.
5. I authorize the person/business listed herein to furnish any and all information concerning my credit rating to the United States Air Force and release such persons from any liability arising from this action.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature

*Gerald Elam*  
GERALD ELAM, GS-9, USAF  
Chief, Assessment Section

# CREDIT INQUIRY

HOW LONG HAVE YOU HAD CREDIT DEALINGS WITH THIS INDIVIDUAL?

## TYPE OF CREDIT EXTENDED

☐ RETAIL CHARGE ACCOUNT

☐ SECURED LOAN (Includes co-signed loans)

☐ UNSECURED LOAN

☐ OTHER (Please specify)

APPROXIMATE HIGH CREDIT

\$

AMOUNT OF MONTHLY PAYMENTS

\$

CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE

\$

AMOUNT CURRENTLY PAST DUE

\$

IF ACCOUNT HAS NOT BEEN HANDLED TO YOUR SATISFACTION, PLEASE EXPLAIN BELOW

SIGNATURE

TITLE

DATE

ATC HQ

FORM  
APR 80

702

(DPKA)

REPLACES 3507 ACS FORM 4, FEB 76, WHICH IS OBSOLETE

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
3507TH AIRMAN CLASSIFICATION SQUADRON (ATC)  
LACKLAND AIR FORCE BASE, TEXAS 78236



REPLY TO  
ATTN OF:

DPKA

SUBJECT:

Employment Inquiry

TO:

1. The above named individual, a recent USAF enlistee, is being considered for an Air Force assignment to a position that requires the most stable and reliable person available. These duties involve handling classified information, access to nuclear weapons and other equally responsible positions. These positions may be physically or emotionally stressful. Airmen not selected for these sensitive positions will be considered for other interesting and worthwhile assignments.
2. To assist us in making a decision as to who could best fulfill these duties, we would appreciate your evaluation of this individual. Please complete the questionnaire on the reverse side of this letter.
3. If the airman is selected for this assignment, a Defense Department representative may contact you for additional information in the near future. Should this occur, your further cooperation is solicited.
4. Since final selections for these positions must be completed within the next ten days, we would appreciate an early return of your evaluation. A postage-free envelope is provided for your convenience.
5. Please return this letter as it contains information which will insure proper identification of the individual concerned.
6. The Privacy Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-579), requires that information obtained by Federal Agencies about an individual be released to that individual upon their formal written request. The identity of the person providing the information must also be released to the individual. The information you provide in this questionnaire conforms to the provisions of the Privacy Act.

*Gerald Elam*

GERALD ELAM, GS-9, USAF  
Chief, Assessment Section

EMPLOYMENT INQUIRY			
1. DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (From - To)		2. IF AVAILABLE FROM YOUR RECORDS - SUBJECT'S	
		JOB TITLE	
		SALARY (Per Month, Week, Etc.)	
		DATE OF BIRTH	
3. REASON FOR LEAVING			
ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS BY PLACING AN "X" IN THE PROPER BOX OR COLUMN			
4. I WOULD:		5. JOB PERFORMANCE	
a. Be glad to rehire subject.		a. Extremely competent.	
b. Prefer someone else (Explain below).		b. Very competent.	
		c. Adequate.	
		d. Incompetent.	
6. EMOTIONAL STABILITY		7. ABILITY TO WORK WITH OTHERS	
a. Exceptionally mature and stable. Functions effectively in periods of stress.		a. Excellent, effective in relationships with others; requires little supervision.	
b. Average for individual's age group.		b. Good: About average for individual's age in personal relationships.	
c. Questionable. May not stand up well under stress.		c. Poor: Cannot work effectively with others; is uncooperative or arouses antagonism needlessly. A liability in a team effort.	
8. TO THE BEST OF YOUR KNOWLEDGE, HAS THE SUBJECT:			YES NO
a. Had relatives or business interests in a foreign country?			
b. Ever belonged to or shown sympathetic interest in a communist, fascist or other subversive group?			
c. Ever associated with individuals whose moral character or loyalty to the United States of America is questionable?			
d. Ever used alcohol excessively?			
e. Ever used harmful or illegal drugs?			
f. Ever been in any difficulty with law enforcement agencies?			
g. Ever been fired from a job for cause?			
h. Any chronic ailments or physical defects?			
i. Ever received medical or psychological treatment for emotional problems?			
j. Ever exhibited any behavior or activities which would indicate that individual is not reliable, honest, trustworthy, discreet, loyal to the United States of America, financially responsible, and of good character?			
NOTE: If your answer to any of the above questions is "YES", please explain in Item 12 below.			
9. ARE YOU ASSOCIATED WITH THE SUBJECT'S FAMILY?			
a. If so, would your answers to questions 8a through 8i generally apply to them? (Please explain any questionable areas in Item 12 below).			
10. DO YOU HAVE ANY UNFAVORABLE INFORMATION YOU WOULD PREFER TO DISCUSS PERSONALLY WITH AN AIR FORCE REPRESENTATIVE?			
11. WOULD YOU RECOMMEND THE SUBJECT FOR A POSITION OF TRUST AND RESPONSIBILITY INVOLVING THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA? (If your answer is "NO", please explain in Item 12 below).			
12. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO ANY OF THE ABOVE QUESTIONS (Indicate question numbers to which answers apply).			
NAME OF COMPANY/FIRM			
DATE	NAME AND POSITION/TITLE		SIGNATURE



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
3507TH AIRMAN CLASSIFICATION SQUADRON (ATC)  
LACKLAND AIR FORCE BASE, TX 78236

REPLY TO  
ATTN OF: DPKA

SUBJECT: Law Enforcement Inquiry

TO:

1. The above-named individual (date and place of birth as shown) recently enlisted in the United States Air Force and is now being considered for a sensitive assignment related to national security matters. Your assistance in providing any pertinent information contained in your records will be a valuable aid in determining the airman's suitability for such duty. The space on the reverse of this letter and a postage-free envelope are provided for this purpose.
2. Time limitations require that selections for these positions be completed within the next 10 days. Your early reply will be greatly appreciated.
3. Please return this letter with your reply as it contains information which will insure proper identification of the individual concerned.

*Gerald Elam*

GERALD ELAM, GS-9, DAF  
Chief, Assessments Section

1 Atch  
Envelope

---

I authorize the addressee to furnish the United States Air Force any information concerning me which they have available and hereby release such authorities from any liability arising from this action.

---

(SIGNATURE)

# LAW ENFORCEMENT INQUIRY

- ☐ OUR RECORDS CONTAIN NO UNFAVORABLE INFORMATION IDENTIFIABLE WITH THE SUBJECT BY NAME.
- ☐ PERTINENT INFORMATION IS ATTACHED OR SHOWN BELOW.

DATE	TITLE	SIGNATURE
DATE	NATURE OF OFFENSE	DISPOSITION

REMARKS (Include any incidents involving the subject in which no arrest was made, e.g., suspicion; questioning, warnings)



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
3807TH AIRMAN CLASSIFICATION SQUADRON (ATC)  
LACKLAND AIR FORCE BASE, TEXAS 78238



REPLY TO  
ATTN OF: DPKA

SUBJECT: Educational Inquiry

13 Transcripts Please

TO:

1. The above-named individual, a recent enlistee in the USAF, is being considered for an assignment important to the security of the United States. These duties involve handling classified information, access to nuclear weapons and other equally responsible positions. Airmen assigned to these positions must possess a high degree of stability and reliability.
2. Please complete the items on the back of this letter. Your information will be a valuable aid in determining this airman's suitability for this sensitive military assignment. The airman is aware of this inquiry and, by signature below, concurs in release of the information. Please do not send a transcript.
3. The Privacy Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-579), requires that information obtained by Federal Agencies about an individual be released to that individual upon his/her request. The identity of the person providing the information must also be released to the individual. The information you provide in this questionnaire conforms to the provisions of the Privacy Act.
4. If this airman is selected for this assignment, an investigator may contact you for additional information. Should this occur, your further cooperation is solicited. Time limitations require that selections be completed within the next ten days. Your early reply and return of this letter will be greatly appreciated.

*Gerald Elam*  
GERALD ELAM, GS-9, DAF  
Chief, Assessment Section

R E L E A S E   A U T H O R I Z A T I O N

I am aware of this inquiry and I request that the information itemized on the reverse of this form be furnished for official Air Force use. This release includes any medical/psychological data deemed pertinent to the inquiry.

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Signature of Airman)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Last Year Attended)

## EDUCATIONAL INQUIRY

**NOTE:** Please complete the appropriate Section(s) of this form (Section I, II, or both) that apply to your knowledge of the individual, and the nature of your association. Answer all questions in the appropriate Section(s) by checking the proper box, and enter other fill-in information as applicable. **GRADE TRANSCRIPTS ARE NOT REQUIRED.**

### SECTION I - RECORDS DATA

<b>1. Educational Level Completed</b> <table style="width: 100%;"> <tr> <td style="width: 50%;">Freshman</td> <td style="width: 50%;">Senior</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Sophomore</td> <td>Graduate Student</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Junior</td> <td>None</td> </tr> </table>		Freshman	Senior	Sophomore	Graduate Student	Junior	None	<b>4. Academic Standing (Final Year)</b> Class Rank _____ of _____  Letter Grade Average _____ or Grade Point Average _____ _____ on Point System _____			
Freshman	Senior										
Sophomore	Graduate Student										
Junior	None										
<b>2. Dates Attended (Month and Year)</b> <table style="width: 100%;"> <tr> <td style="width: 50%;">FROM</td> <td style="width: 50%;">TO</td> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> <tr> <td>FROM</td> <td>TO</td> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </table>		FROM	TO			FROM	TO			<b>5. Personal Conduct</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Satisfactory Record <input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify) _____	
FROM	TO										
FROM	TO										
<b>3. Reason For Leaving School</b> <table style="width: 100%;"> <tr> <td style="width: 50%;">Graduated/Completed</td> <td style="width: 50%;">Finances</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Was Failing</td> <td>Expelled</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Suspended (Grades)</td> <td>Unknown</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Suspended (Conduct)</td> <td>Other</td> </tr> </table>		Graduated/Completed	Finances	Was Failing	Expelled	Suspended (Grades)	Unknown	Suspended (Conduct)	Other	<b>6. Emotional Stability</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Poor (Explain in Item 13) <input type="checkbox"/> Average <input type="checkbox"/> Good <input type="checkbox"/> Excellent	
Graduated/Completed	Finances										
Was Failing	Expelled										
Suspended (Grades)	Unknown										
Suspended (Conduct)	Other										

### SECTION II - PERSONAL EVALUATION

<b>7. Aptitude</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Can Learn Quickly <input type="checkbox"/> Average <input type="checkbox"/> Learns Slowly	<b>8. Achievement</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Outstanding <input type="checkbox"/> Average <input type="checkbox"/> Low	<b>9. Motivation</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Strives Consistently <input type="checkbox"/> Moderate Effort <input type="checkbox"/> Apathetic, Aimless
<b>10. Emotional Adjustment</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Adapts Well to Surroundings, Even Under Stress <input type="checkbox"/> Average <input type="checkbox"/> Unable to Cope With Problems	<b>11. Maturity</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Adult Outlook, Uses Discretion <input type="checkbox"/> Average <input type="checkbox"/> Short-Sighted Behavior	
<b>12. Was Individual a Disciplinary Problem? (For example, suspended or expelled)</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Yes (Explain) <input type="checkbox"/> No		
<b>13. If you have additional information concerning this individual's character, morals, leadership ability, or other factors bearing on suitability for a sensitive Air Force assignment, we will appreciate your comments in the space below.</b>		
<b>14. I</b> <input type="checkbox"/> DO <input type="checkbox"/> DO NOT    have unfavorable information to discuss by telephone.  I may be contacted by telephone at _____ between the hours of _____ and _____. <div style="text-align: center; font-size: small;">(Area code and number)</div>		
DATE	NAME AND POSITION/TITLE	SIGNATURE



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
369TH AIRMAN CLASSIFICATION SQUADRON (ATC)  
LACKLAND AIR FORCE BASE, TX 78236

REPLY TO  
ATTN OF: DPKA

SUBJECT: Character Reference

TO:

1. The above named individual, a recent USAF enlistee, is being considered for an Air Force assignment to a position that requires the most stable and reliable person available. These duties involve handling classified information, access to nuclear weapons and other equally responsible positions. These positions may be physically or emotionally stressful. Airman not selected for these sensitive positions will be considered for other interesting and worthwhile assignments.


2. To assist us in making a decision as to whom could best fulfill these duties, we would appreciate your evaluation of this individual. Please complete the questionnaire on the reverse side of this letter.

3. If the airman is selected for this assignment, a Defense Department representative may contact you for additional information in the near future. Should this occur, your further cooperation is solicited.

4. Since final selections for these positions must be completed within the next 10 days, we would appreciate an early return of your evaluation. A postage-free envelope is provided for your convenience.

5. Please return this letter as it contains information which will insure proper identification of the individual concerned.

6. The Privacy Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-579) requires that information obtained by Federal agencies about an individual be released to that individual upon their formal written request. The identity of the person providing the information must also be released to the individual. The information you provide in this questionnaire conforms to the provisions of the Privacy Act.

  
JOSEPH L. BROWN, 1st Lt, USAF  
Chief, Assessments Section

2 Atch

1. ATC HQ Form 706 (Reverse)
2. Envelope

U.S.

ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS BY PLACING AN "X" IN THE PROPER BLOCK OR COLUMN

2. TO THE BEST OF YOUR KNOWLEDGE, HAS THIS INDIVIDUAL:

	YES	NO
--	-----	----

3. ARE YOU AWARE OF QUESTIONABLE ACTIVITIES ON THE PART OF THE INDIVIDUAL'S FAMILY OR ASSOCIATES?		
---	--	--

<p>4. DO YOU RECOMMEND THE INDIVIDUAL FOR A POSITION OF TRUST AND RESPONSIBILITY INVOLVING THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA? (If your answer is "NO", please explain in Block 7).</p>		
---	--	--

5. IF YOU HAVE ANY UNFAVORABLE INFORMATION YOU PREFER TO DISCUSS WITH US BY TELEPHONE, CHECK THIS BLOCK AND TELL US IN BLOCK 7 HOW WE MAY CONTACT YOU BY TELEPHONE.

6. HOW WOULD YOU RATE INDIVIDUAL'S:

RATINGS: "O" - Outstanding					"E" - Excellent	"A" - Average	"P" - Poor	O	E	A	P
----------------------------	--	--	--	--	-----------------	---------------	------------	---	---	---	---

7. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO ABOVE QUESTIONS OR FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (Indicate question numbers to which answers apply).

DATE	SIGNATURE
------	-----------

**SIGNATURE**

[illegible][illegible]

TODAY'S DATE				SQ 37-	FLT NO.
Mo	Day	Year			
Jan					
Feb					
Mar	0	3	8	0	0
Apr	1	1	9	1	1
May	2	2	2	2	2
Jun	3	3	3	3	3
Jul	4	4	4	4	4
Aug	5	5	5	5	5
Sep	6	6	6	6	6
Oct	7	7	7	7	7
Nov	8	8	8	8	8
Dec	9	9	9	9	9

**MILITARY STATUS**

☐ Active

☐ Reserve

☐ ANG

**MARITAL STATUS**

☐ Single

☐ Married

<b>HS or GED</b> <b>Grad</b>
<input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No

## HISTORY OPINION INVENTORY

**Air Force Medical Evaluation Testing**  
(This form is affected by the  
Privacy Act of 1974 — see Reverse)

**ANSWER ALL 50 ITEMS MARKING  
T FOR TRUE; F FOR FALSE.**

- 1 ☐ ☐ I like mechanics magazines.
- 2 ☐ ☐ I was active in sports during high school.
- 3 ☐ ☐ I quit school because I was failing.
- 4 ☐ ☐ I plan to attend college.
- 5 ☐ ☐ Our family was always close.
- 6 ☐ ☐ I would rather work by myself than with others.
- 7 ☐ ☐ I have had more than my share of illness.
- 8 ☐ ☐ I would rather read than be with people.
- 9 ☐ ☐ I need excitement.
- 10 ☐ ☐ I often played hooky from school.
- 11 ☐ ☐ I sometimes wanted to run away from home.
- 12 ☐ ☐ I enjoyed physical education.
- 13 ☐ ☐ I often have headaches.
- 14 ☐ ☐ I have been fired from a job.
- 15 ☐ ☐ I was expelled or suspended from school.
- 16 ☐ ☐ I quit school because I lost interest.
- 17 ☐ ☐ I needed special help with my school studies.
- 18 ☐ ☐ My family treats me more like a child than an adult.
- 19 ☐ ☐ I have cried several times this past year.
- 20 ☐ ☐ I never cared much for school.
- 21 ☐ ☐ My parents thought joining the Air Force was a good idea.
- 22 ☐ ☐ I have never done any heavy drinking.
- 23 ☐ ☐ High school was boring.
- 24 ☐ ☐ I was a slow learner at school.
- 25 ☐ ☐ I have several hobbies.
- 26 ☐ ☐ I have been expelled from school more than once.
- 27 ☐ ☐ I think I will make the Air Force a career.
- 28 ☐ ☐ I usually take things hard.
- 29 ☐ ☐ I worked to help support my family.
- 30 ☐ ☐ I have been in trouble with the police.
- 31 ☐ ☐ I have been arrested more than twice.
- 32 ☐ ☐ For a long time I have had difficulty sleeping.
- 33 ☐ ☐ I joined the Air Force to get a better education.
- 34 ☐ ☐ I enjoy playing cards for money.
- 35 ☐ ☐ I have needed help for emotional problems.
- 36 ☐ ☐ I have had my share of trouble with teachers.
- 37 ☐ ☐ Our family was always close.
- 38 ☐ ☐ I do not mind orders and being told what to do.
- 39 ☐ ☐ I feel better when I drink.
- 40 ☐ ☐ As a child I was a loner.
- 41 ☐ ☐ I was suspended from school more than two times.
- 42 ☐ ☐ I was active in sports during high school.
- 43 ☐ ☐ At one time I needed medication to stay calm.
- 44 ☐ ☐ I often cuss and swear.
- 45 ☐ ☐ I entered the service (AF) because there was nothing else to do.
- 46 ☐ ☐ I worked full time through one summer during high school.
- 47 ☐ ☐ I have often gone against my parent's wishes.
- 48 ☐ ☐ My father was a nervous man.
- 49 ☐ ☐ I like hunting very much.
- 50 ☐ ☐ I would like to wear expensive clothes.

**Basic Military Training  
Army Prescreening Forms**

# PERSONNEL SECURITY SCREENING INTERVIEW (INSCOM Reg 380-1)

## PART I. PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 ADVISEMENT

The authority for requesting the information on this form and during the subsequent interview is contained in Title 10, United States Code, Section 3012, and Executive Orders 8397, 10450, and 12065. The requested information will be used for making personnel security determinations for membership in the Armed Forces of the United States and/or access to classified information, and for making personnel management decisions. The routine uses are for the determination of the scope and coverage of a personnel security investigation, assuring the completeness of investigations, and providing evaluators and adjudicators with basic personal history information relevant to security and suitability determinations. The information may be disclosed to other Federal agencies that are also charged with making the foregoing determinations and to administrative, law enforcement or investigative personnel responsible for matters that arise during these determinations. Completion of this form and the subsequent personnel interview is voluntary. However, failure on your part to furnish all or part of the information requested may result in reassignment to non-sensitive duties or denial of access to classified information. At your request, a copy of this Privacy Act Adviseement will be provided to you for your retention.

## PART II. IDENTIFYING DATA

1. Name (Last, First, Middle)	4. Unit
2. Social Security Number	5. Training Center
3. Date and Place of Birth	6. MOS

## PART III. INTERVIEW SUMMARY

(For completion by interviewer only)

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Interviewer: \_\_\_\_\_ Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

**PART IV. GENERAL**

7. Why did you join the Army?

9. Most difficult thing for you:

11. Would you like to get out of the Army now? Why?

8. Why did you select the Army job (MOS) for which you enlisted?

10. Do you feel that you will be able to complete basic training on schedule?  
☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure*Interviewers Comments***PART V. BACKGROUND DATA**

12. Have you ever been involved with any of the following?

Yes No

- ☐ ☐ a. Curfew Violation
- ☐ ☐ b. Malicious Mischief
- ☐ ☐ c. Disturbing the Peace
- ☐ ☐ d. Disorderly Conduct
- ☐ ☐ e. Vagrancy
- ☐ ☐ f. Bad Checks
- ☐ ☐ g. Failure to pay alimony or child support
- ☐ ☐ h. Hit and Run
- ☐ ☐ i. Moving Traffic Violation

Yes No

- ☐ ☐ j. Injuring someone while driving
- ☐ ☐ k. Running away from home
- ☐ ☐ l. Trespassing or hunting violation
- ☐ ☐ m. Illegal possession of weapon
- ☐ ☐ n. Vandalism
- ☐ ☐ o. Theft
- ☐ ☐ p. Shoplifting
- ☐ ☐ q. Breaking and entering
- ☐ ☐ r. Assault

Yes No

- ☐ ☐ s. Possession, sale, or use of dangerous drugs or marijuana
- ☐ ☐ t. Drinking underage
- ☐ ☐ u. Excessive drinking
- ☐ ☐ v. Contributing to delinquency of minor
- ☐ ☐ w. Misuse of identification
- ☐ ☐ x. Sex Offenses
- ☐ ☐ y. Indecent exposure
- ☐ ☐ z. Other law violations

*Interviewers Comments*

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (When filled in)



13. Have you ever?

Yes No

- ☐ ☐ a. Been jailed or taken to police station
- ☐ ☐ b. Been summoned to appear in court
- ☐ ☐ c. Been involved in a lawsuit
- ☐ ☐ d. Had problems with creditors
- ☐ ☐ e. Had drivers license suspended or revoked
- ☐ ☐ f. Had trouble with supervisors
- ☐ ☐ g. Had trouble with co-workers
- ☐ ☐ h. Quit a job without notice
- ☐ ☐ i. Been fired or dismissed from any job

Yes No

- ☐ ☐ j. Attempted or considered suicide
- ☐ ☐ k. Been mentally or physically abused
- ☐ ☐ l. Been pregnant or caused a pregnancy while not married
- ☐ ☐ m. Had a homosexual experience since sixteenth birthday
- ☐ ☐ n. Undergone treatment or counseling for problems
- ☐ ☐ o. Had tranquilizers, stimulants or depressants prescribed for you
- ☐ ☐ p. Traveled or resided outside the United States
- ☐ ☐ q. Supported the violent overthrow of the Government
- ☐ ☐ r. Support denial of rights to any group or individual

*Interviewers Comments*

14. Do you have?

Yes No

- ☐ ☐ a. Any debts
- ☐ ☐ b. Any friends or relatives who are not US citizens
- ☐ ☐ c. Any friends or relatives in foreign countries

Yes No

- ☐ ☐ d. Any correspondence with foreign nationals
- ☐ ☐ e. Any business interests or investments in a foreign country or company
- ☐ ☐ f. Any money in foreign banks

*Interviewers Comments*

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (When filled in)

**PART VI. EDUCATIONAL HISTORY**

	HIGH SCHOOL	COLLEGE OR TECH SCHOOL	20. What educational goals have you set for yourself?
15. Type of program or major			
16. Graduated	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
17. If you did not graduate, why did you leave school?			
18. Have you ever had any disciplinary action taken against you? (Suspensions, etc.)			
19. How did you finance your education?			

*Interviewers Comments***PART VII. INTERVIEWEE STATEMENT***(For signature by the interviewee at the conclusion of the personal interview.)*

In connection with my consideration for sensitive duties with the US Army, I, \_\_\_\_\_, have been informed of the authority for this interview under the Privacy Act of 1974, and the voluntary nature of my participation in the interview. If criminal activities were disclosed during the interview, I was advised of my legal rights under the Constitution of the United States and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. If I requested it, a copy of the Privacy Act Advisement for this interview has been given to me for my retention.

The information on this form is given voluntarily to be used in conjunction with my processing for possible future assignment.

I understand that any information I give may be placed in my security files, whether or not I am selected for sensitive duties, and may be used in the future, along with an appropriate investigation, for determining my eligibility for a security clearance, military assignments or continued military service.

I have examined this form and the interviewer's comments thereon. The information I provided is accurately described by the interviewer.

Date: \_\_\_\_\_ Signature: \_\_\_\_\_ SSN: \_\_\_\_\_

Interviewer: \_\_\_\_\_

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (When filled in)**

**APPENDIX D**

## SECTION D - BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION (BI)

2-11 Introduction. A BI is the minimum investigative requirement for the granting of a TOP SECRET clearance or for participation in certain programs.

The BI is an inquiry into the activities of an individual and is designed to develop information on which to base decisions regarding access authorization and sensitive program participation, which are clearly consistent with the interests of national security. Inquiry is made into pertinent facts bearing on the loyalty, trustworthiness, and suitability of the SUBJECT. A traditional BI shall be conducted when required by special programs and when investigative limitations prohibit the completion of an IBI. A BI is conducted in two formats

a. BI. The traditional BI is a combination of record checks and interviews in the public community where the SUBJECT was employed, educated or resided. The SUBJECT is normally interviewed only when an investigation raises an issue.

b. IBI.

(1) During 1981, the IBI was introduced. The IBI principally relied on developing information from an interview of the SUBJECT, and, secondarily, from local agency checks, NAC's and credit checks. Since the last three elements were common to the BI and IBI, the IBI was said to be a matter of substituting a SUBJECT INTERVIEW (SI) and selective records checks and interviews for the traditional records and interviews at the SUBJECT's places of employment and education.

(2) On July 1, 1983, the scope of the IBI was expanded or enhanced to routinely include interviews of developed character references and employment references.

(3) Generally, the IBI is the principal means of investigation when a TOP SECRET clearance is required or when DoD directives call for a "BI." However, in special cases, or when the SUBJECT is aboard a deployed ship or in a remote location and not available for interview, the traditional BI will be conducted. The IBI is further described in section E of this chapter and in chapter 5.

2-12 Minimum Investigative Requirements (BI). The period of investigation covers the last 5 years of the SUBJECT's life or from the date of the SUBJECT's 18th birthday, whichever is the shorter period, provided it covers the last 2 full years of SUBJECT's life, but does not precede the 16th birthday. In addition to a valid NAC, the following elements represent the minimum investigative requirements.

a. Birth. Requesters are required to verify date and place of birth on all U.S. native born SUBJECTS. DIS will review official birth records only on specific request or when the investigation discloses discrepant birth information.

b. Citizenship. Requesters are required to verify the U.S. citizenship status of all SUBJECTS claiming such status. DIS will verify the U.S. citizenship status only on specific request or when the investigation discloses discrepant citizenship information. For non-U.S. Citizen SUBJECTS, DIS will determine current citizenship and legal status in the U.S.

c. Education. DIS will verify all full-time education during the period of investigation to include attendance at the last secondary school. Verification of secondary schools may be done through transcript review if there was attendance at an institution of higher learning. (The determining factor for ascertaining whether any particular education is full-time is the nature of the coincidental employment, if any.) Exceptions to the above, in the absence of specific issues, are:

- (1) Primary schools
- (2) Foreign schools
- (3) Military academies (unless SUBJECT did not graduate)
- (4) Correspondence schools
- (5) Schools attended for the purpose of obtaining a general equivalency diploma (G.E.D.)
- (6) Other federal, military schools, academies (for example, Executive Seminar Center and NCO Academy), and similar centers for training in conjunction with and for employment.

d. Education References. References from places of education will only be interviewed when there is unfavorable information to resolve, or when a letter of inquiry provides insufficient information. In those instances, the special agent shall conduct a minimum of two education references interviews (EDUC-I's).

e. Employment. DIS will verify all periods of employment during the period of investigation except as indicated below:

- (1) military employment, when the requester indicates that such employment has been verified with favorable results; or
- (2) federal employment, when the requester indicates that such employment has been verified with favorable results.

DIS will also determine SUBJECT's activities and means of support for each period of unemployment in excess of 30 days.

f. Employment References. The special agent shall conduct employment reference interviews (EMP-I's) of the SUBJECT's supervisor and a co-worker at each place of employment, during the period of investigation, except as indicated below.

- (1) Temporary (4 months or less), seasonal, holiday, Christmas or part-time employment are unnecessary unless there are unfavorable issues to resolve,
- (2) Current federal and military service SUBJECTS must be located at their current duty locations for at least 6 months; otherwise, attempt to interview a supervisor and a co-worker at SUBJECT's next prior duty location which was for a period of six months or more. Do not attempt to interview

employment references if SUBJECT is aboard ship at sea, or at other places of prior federal employment verified by records.

- \* (3) In the case of SUBJECT's who are former federal employees, references will be obtained at the last place of federal employment which was for a period of 6 months or more.

g. References. DIS will interview a minimum of three developed character references whose combined association with SUBJECT covers the entire period of the investigation.

h. Credit. DIS will conduct credit bureau checks covering all areas of SUBJECT's residence, employment, and schooling for 6 months or more on a cumulative basis, subsequent to the SUBJECT's 18th birthday, during the period of investigation, in the 50 states, District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.

i. Local Agency Checks. DIS will conduct local agency checks covering all areas of SUBJECT's residence, employment, and schooling (including duty stations and homeports, in the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico) for 6 months or more on a cumulative basis during the period of investigation. Local agency checks will be conducted overseas for alien/immigrant alien SUBJECTS and on other SUBJECTS who were in such areas in a private capacity.

j. Other. When the facts of the case warrant, additional investigative elements (for example, neighborhood investigations, medical records checks, foreign travel, foreign connections, and membership in organizations) may be required.

2-13 Updating Previous Investigation to BI Standards. If the SUBJECT is a participant in one of the programs listed below, the period of investigation is the most recent 5 years (10 years for NATO cases) or since the prior investigation, whichever is the shorter period using the scope detailed for a BI or IBI, as appropriate. (Developed references who were previously interviewed will be reinterviewed only when other developed references are unavailable.)

a. NATO. Military and civil service employees whose previous investigations were completed more than 5 years prior to their appointments to NATO, and non-DoD employees whose previous investigations were completed more than 9 months before their appointments require new investigations.

b. Nuclear Weapon Personnel Reliability Program. Military, government civilian, and industrial personnel whose previous investigations were completed more than 5 years prior to their present appointments require new investigations.

2-14 Additional or Special Investigative Requirements. In certain programs, or for certain categories of personnel, the BI serves as a basic investigative requirement, but there are special or additional requirements as indicated below.

a. Immigrant Alien. The period of investigation covers the last 10 years of the SUBJECT's life or from the date of the SUBJECT's 18th birthday, whichever period is the shorter period, provided it covers at least the last five full years of SUBJECT's life (but does not precede the 16th birthday). In addition, the investigation will include (as one of the initial leads) an IBI SUBJECT INTERVIEW (IBI SI) as described in chapter 5 of this manual, which includes the specialized questions on allegiance and background described elsewhere under the section on SI's.

b. NATO. The period of investigation covers the last 10 years of the SUBJECT's life or from the date of the SUBJECT's 18th birthday, whichever is the shorter period, provided it covers at least the last 2 full years of SUBJECT's life (but does not precede the 16th birthday).

c. Presidential Support (Category 2 Personnel). The investigation must include a review of INS files or State Department checks on derivative citizenship (and in some cases DCII, FBI-HQ, and CIA) on members of the SUBJECT's immediate family (see paragraph 2-20 a.(2)) when they are 18 years of age or older and foreign born (provided their U.S. citizenship was not verified during a prior investigation).

d. Foreign Nationals. The investigation of foreign nationals, such as Filipino Nationals who are members of the U.S. Navy, includes a 3-year traditional scope, 15-year LAC coverage, and the IBI SI. This also includes foreign nationals employed overseas by the Red Cross or the United Service Organizations, Inc. (USO).

## **SECTION E - INTERVIEW ORIENTED BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION (IBI)**

2-15 General. The IBI is the principal type of investigation conducted when a person needs a TOP SECRET clearance or is to be assigned to a position requiring a background investigation. The Interview-Oriented Background Investigation SUBJECT INTERVIEW (IBI SI) is a thorough in-depth interview of the SUBJECT covering all aspects of the SUBJECT's background. The interview includes a review of the SUBJECT's SPH or PSQ, as well as several direct questions on suitability topics. The purpose of the interview is to elicit detailed pertinent personnel security information from the SUBJECT. Since no source has more knowledge of the SUBJECT, the IBI SI permits focusing on issues more quickly than the traditional BI. The IBI SI is an integral part of the IBI and the PR. In addition to an in-depth SI, the IBI includes an NAC, local agency checks (LAC's), credit checks, the interview of three developed character references (DCR's), three employment references with employment records checks, plus select scoping as required to resolve unfavorable or questionable information.

2-16 Operational Case Management. While the IBI replaces the traditional BI in most cases, PIC will specify on the ALS whether the case will be conducted under IBI criteria or traditional BI criteria. Generally, the IBI will not be scoped by PIC when one of the following conditions exists, or in other cases approved by VO100.

a. SUBJECT is a YANKEE HILL applicant, is to have access to SCI or Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) Extremely Sensitive Information (ESI), or is assigned to some other project for which an SBI is required.

b. SUBJECT is aboard a deployed ship or in some remote area which would cause the SI to be excessively delayed.

c. SUBJECT is in an overseas area handled by the State Department.

d. SUBJECT is in Canada which is handled by the FBI

e. SUBJECT is a civilian employee of the U.S. Government, in which case a traditional BI (see paragraph 2-12) is conducted.

f. SUBJECT or spouse has relatives or has resided in a designated country (Hostage Investigation).

2-17 IBI Minimum Investigative Requirements. The period of investigation for the IBI is the same as for a BI (see paragraph 2-12). Additional or special investigative requirements for Immigrant Alien, NATO, and Presidential Support cases are identified in paragraph 2-14.

a. Scope. At the outset, PIC will scope the SI, NAC's, LAC's credit, three DCR's, three employment references and records checks, and any select scoping which is immediately identifiable. The scope of leads for NAC's, LAC's and credit checks is the same as for a BI and were previously described in this chapter. The scope of the SI is not limited to a particular period of time and will be accomplished accordingly. If appropriate, PIC will furnish a copy or summary of pertinent prior file data to field elements. In some instances, PIC will direct the SI be held in abeyance until a prior file is received. However, PIC will scope NAC, credit, and other leads as appropriate, on all cases awaiting prior files.

b. SUBJECT Interview. This is the principal component of an IBI. A full description and procedures for this intensive in-depth SI are set forth in chapter 5. In some instances an issue will arise after the primary SI and a secondary interview will be conducted. Interviews in the latter category are normally "issue" interviews which are described fully in section D, chapter 5. The IBI SI will be reported in a narrative format and details are set forth in paragraph 5-29.

c. Employment Records. Employment records will be checked at all places where employment references are interviewed with the exception of current military employment when the requester indicates that such employment has been verified with favorable results. Records need be checked only when they are locally available, unless unfavorable information has been detected. It may then be necessary to generate add or lateral leads to effect employment record checks.

\* d. Employment Reference Coverage. A minimum of three references, either supervisors or co-workers, who have knowledge of SUBJECT's activities in the work environment will be interviewed. At least one employment reference at the current place of employment will always be interviewed with the exception of an individual attending military basic training, or other military training schools lasting less than 90 days. However, if SUBJECT has only been at the current employment for less than 6 months it will be necessary to go not only to his current employment, (for example, for one employment reference) but also to the preceding employment of at least 6



months for additional employment references. If SUBJECT has not had prior employment of at least 6 months, interview(s) will be conducted at the most recent short term employment in addition to the current employment. It will be the responsibility of the case controller to evaluate each case and determine at which location employment references will be obtained.

\* e. DCR and LCR's. DIS will interview a minimum of three developed character references whose combined association with SUBJECT covers the entire period of investigation. Do not obtain any DCR's at SUBJECT's place of employment, unless, these references have an association, or substantial knowledge of SUBJECT's activities, outside the work environment. Such expanded association must be included in the report of investigation (ROI). If coverage cannot be obtained through the DCR's, listed character references (LCR's) will be contacted to obtain coverage.

f. Unfavorable Information. Unfavorable information developed by the field element will be expanded. If appropriate, a lateral lead will be dispatched, unless the proposed lead is duplicative of ongoing action elsewhere. Leads which may be duplicative should be resolved through prompt coordination with the PIC case controller.

g. Select Scoping. This element is a "select" pursuit of those leads which are most likely to clarify, expand on or resolve investigative matters obtained during the conduct of other investigative elements. Select scoping is fully covered in chapter 5, paragraph 5-33.

#### 2-18 Additional or Special Investigative Requirements

a. NATO. NATO cases investigated in the IBI method will be modified by the conduct of LAC's for the last 10 years of SUBJECT's life or from the date of the SUBJECT's 18th birthday, whichever is the shorter period, provided it covers at least the last 2 full years of SUBJECT's life (but does not precede the 16th birthday).

b. Presidential Support (Category 2 Personnel). IBI's on this category must include review of INS files or State Department checks on derivative citizenship (and in some cases DCII, FBI-HQ, and CIA) on members of SUBJECT's immediate family (see paragraph 2-20a.(2)) when they are 18 years or older and foreign born (provided their U.S. citizenship was not verified during a prior investigation).

c. Foreign Nationals The investigation of foreign nationals, such as Filipino Nationals who are members of the U.S. Navy, includes a 3 year traditional scope, 15-year LAC coverage, and the IBI SI. This also includes foreign nationals employed overseas by the Red Cross or the United Service Organizations, Inc. (USO).

d. Other. Other traditional BI's with special requirements may, as conditions warrant, be scoped for an IBI SI.

#### SECTION F - SPECIAL BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION (SBI)

2-19 Introduction. A Special Background Investigation (SBI) is the minimum investigative requirement for access to SCI or for participation in certain

other sensitive programs. The SBI is an inquiry into the activities of an individual (who has been nominated for participation in a special program) which is designed to meet the investigative requirements of the Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 1/14, "Minimum Personnel Security Standards and Procedures Governing Eligibility for Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information," September 1, 1983, DoD Instruction 5220.28, "Application of Special Eligibility and Clearance Requirements in the SIOP-ESI Program for Contractor Employees," March 8, 1978, DoD Directive 5210.55, "Selection of DoD Military and Civilian Personnel and Contractor Employees for Assignment to Presidential Support Activities," July 6, 1977, DoD 5200.2-R, or similar DoD issuances. The SBI consists of all components of a traditional BI, plus specific additional investigative requirements.

2-20 Minimum Investigative Requirements. The period of investigation for SBI's covers the last 15 years of the SUBJECT's life or from the date of the 18th birthday, whichever is the shorter period, provided that the period covers at least the last 2 full years (but does not precede the 16th birthday).

a. NAC. In addition to a valid NAC on the SUBJECT, the following requirements apply.

(1) Conduct a DCII, an FBI/ID name check only, and an FBI/HQ check on SUBJECT's current spouse or cohabitant. Any arrest disclosed by these checks must be carefully evaluated in terms of how it would affect SUBJECT's suitability for a position of trust. If it may affect SUBJECT's suitability, then reasonable investigative efforts, for example, details and disposition, must be accomplished to determine the extent of influence on SUBJECT. In addition, conduct such other national agency checks as deemed appropriate based on information on SUBJECT's SPH or PSQ.

(2) Conduct a check of FBI/HQ files on members of SUBJECT's immediate family who are aliens in the U.S. or immigrant aliens when they are 18 years of age or older.

(3) Review the files of CIA on alien members of the SUBJECT's immediate family who are 18 years or older, regardless of whether or not these persons reside in the U.S.

(4) Review INS or State Department files on members of the SUBJECT's immediate family when they are 18 years of age or older and are foreign born (unless the U.S. Citizenship status of any of these individuals was verified during a prior investigation).

b. Birth. Requesters are required to verify date and place of birth on all native born SUBJECTS. DIS will review official birth records only on specific request or when the investigation discloses discrepant birth information.

c. Citizenship. Requesters are required to verify the U.S. citizenship status of all SUBJECTS claiming such status. DIS will verify the SUBJECT's U.S. citizenship only on specific request or when the investigation discloses discrepant citizenship information. DIS will also verify the citizenship status of all foreign-born members of the SUBJECT's immediate family.

Additionally, when the investigation indicates that a member of the SUBJECT's immediate family has not obtained U.S. citizenship after having been eligible for a considerable period of time, an attempt should be made to determine the reasons.

d. Education. DIS will verify all attendance at institutions of higher learning in the U.S., within the last 15 years, if such attendance was not verified during a prior investigation. Attempts will be made to review records at overseas educational institutions when the SUBJECT resided overseas in excess of 1 year. Also, DIS will verify attendance at the last secondary school attended within the past 10 years if there was no attendance at an institution of higher learning within the period of investigation. Verification of attendance at military academies is only required when the SUBJECT failed to graduate.

e. Education References. References from places of education will only be interviewed when there is unfavorable information to resolve or letter of inquiry provides insufficient information. In these instances, the special agent shall conduct a minimum of two education reference interviews.

f. Employment. DIS will verify all employments in the U.S. that occurred during the period of investigation with the exception of military and federal employment when the requester indicates such employment has been verified with favorable results. Attempts will be made to review records at overseas employments when the SUBJECT resided overseas in excess of 1 year. Additionally, DIS will determine SUBJECT's activities and means of support for each period of unemployment in excess of 30 days.

g. Employment References. DIS will interview a supervisor and a co-worker at each place of employment in the U.S. during the most recent 10 years of the period of investigation, except as indicated below.

\* (1) Current federal and military service SUBJECTS must be located at their present duty location for at least 6 months; otherwise, attempt to interview a supervisor and a co-worker at the SUBJECT's next prior duty location, which was for a period of 6 months or more. In the case of SUBJECTS who are former federal employees, references will be obtained at the last place of federal employment which was for a period of 6 months or more.

(2) The SUBJECTS assigned to ships at sea.

h. References. DIS will interview three developed character references whose combined association provides a continuity to the extent practicable, of the SUBJECT's activities and behavioral patterns over the past 15 years, or during the period of investigation, whichever is shorter.

i. Neighborhood Investigations. DIS will conduct a neighborhood investigation (NI) to verify the SUBJECT's present address and each residence in the U.S. and/or Puerto Rico, as appropriate, where SUBJECT has resided for a period of 6 months or more on a cumulative basis, during the past 5 years or during the period of investigation, whichever is shorter. An NI in a Bachelor Officers Quarters (BOQ) or Bachelor Enlisted Quarters (BEQ) need be conducted only if it is the current residence and SUBJECT has resided there

for 6 months or more. Former BOQ and BEQ residences do not require a neighborhood investigation. During each NI attempt to interview two neighbors who can verify the SUBJECT's specific period of residence at each address and who are sufficiently acquainted with the SUBJECT to comment on his or her suitability for a position of trust. Expand NI's beyond this 5 year period only when there is unfavorable information to resolve. When the investigation has disclosed that the SUBJECT made an extensive number of residential moves in a short period of time, attempt to determine the reasons therefor. In those cases when there is less than 50 percent coverage of the past 5 years, appropriate inquiries will be made to determine the significance of the frequent residential changes. NI's will not be conducted overseas and aboard ship; these residences will be verified through interview of references developed in the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and/or Puerto Rico, as appropriate, or the references listed on the PSQ as being able to verify such.

j. Credit. DIS will conduct credit bureau checks covering all areas of SUBJECT's residence, employment, and schooling for 6 months or more, on a cumulative basis, subsequent to the SUBJECT's 18th birthday, during the period of investigation or for the most recent 7 years, whichever is the shorter period, in the 50 states, District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.

k. Local Agency Checks. DIS will conduct LAC's on SUBJECTS at all places of residence, employment, and education (including duty stations and/or home ports), in the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico during the past 15 years or during the period of investigation, whichever is shorter. Additionally, when a SUBJECT has worked or lived outside the U.S. under the auspices of the U.S. government continuously for over one year, or in excess of 90 days in a private capacity, the investigation will be expanded to cover fully this period in his or her life through the use of record sources as may be available in the foreign country(ies) in which the SUBJECT resided.

1. When the facts of the case warrant, additional investigative elements (for example, investigations of foreign travel and connections, membership in organizations, divorce, military service, and medical records checks) may be required.

2-21 Updating Previous Investigation to SBI Standards. If the previous investigation does not substantially meet the minimum standards of an SBI or if it is more than 5 years old, a current investigation is required but may be limited to that necessary to bring the individual's files up-to-date, in accordance with the investigative requirements of an SBI. References previously interviewed may be reinterviewed if they still know the SUBJECT as well; if not, efforts shall be made to locate new references who can cover the period of investigation.

## SECTION G - PERIODIC REINVESTIGATION

2-22 Introduction. A periodic reinvestigation (PR) is required on individuals participating in specific programs or requiring access above the SECRET level. The period of investigation for the PR covers the last 5 years. The PR investigative requirements set forth in the next paragraph are applicable to PR's for the following special programs or access:

- (1) TOP SECRET (TS)
- (2) Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)
- (3) Single Integrated Operational Plan - Extremely Sensitive Information (SIOP-ESI)
- (4) White House/Presidential Support
- (5) Yankee Fire
- (6) Contractor COMSEC Positions
  - (a) COMSEC Custodian or Alternate Custodian
  - (b) Facility Security Officer/Supervisor (FSO)
- (7) Personnel Reliability Program (only when TS, SCI, or SIOP-ESI is involved).
- (8) NATO staff positions

2-23 Minimum Investigative Requirements. A PR includes the following minimum scope.

\* a. NAC. A valid NAC on the SUBJECT will be conducted in all cases. Additionally, for positions requiring SCI access, checks of DCII, FBI/HQ, FBI/ID name check only, and other agencies deemed appropriate, will be conducted on the SUBJECT's current spouse or cohabitant, if not previously conducted. Additionally, NACs will be conducted on immediate family members who are 18 years of age or older, and immediate family members who are aliens and/or immigrant aliens, if not previously accomplished (reference paragraph 2-20a).

b. Credit. DIS will conduct credit checks covering all places where the SUBJECT resided for 6 months or more, on a cumulative basis, during the period of investigation, in the 50 States, District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.

c. Subject Interview. DIS will conduct an IBI SI in accordance with the procedures and guidelines set forth in chapter 5 of this manual. The interview should cover the entire period of time since the last investigation, not just the last 5-year period. Significant information disclosed during the interview, which has been satisfactorily covered during a previous investigation, need not be explored again unless additional relevant information warrants further coverage. An IBI SI is not required if one of the following conditions exists.

(1) The SUBJECT is aboard a deployed ship or in some remote area which would cause the interview to be excessively delayed.

(2) The SUBJECT is in an overseas location serviced by the State Department or the FBI.

d. Employment. DIS will verify current employment. Military and federal service records will not routinely be checked, if previously checked by the requester when the PR was originally submitted. Also, employment records will be checked wherever employment interviews are conducted. Records need be checked only when they are locally available, unless unfavorable information has been detected. It may then be necessary to generate add or lateral leads to effect employment record checks.

e. Employment References. DIS will interview 2 supervisors or co-workers at the most recent place of employment or duty station of 6 months or more. If the current employment is less than 6 months, employment reference interviews will be conducted at the next prior place of employment, which was at least a 6-month duration (EMP-I's).

f. Developed Character References. DIS will interview two developed character references who are knowledgeable of the SUBJECT. Developed character references (DCR's) who were previously interviewed will only be reinterviewed when other developed references are not available.

g. Local Agency Checks. DIS will conduct local agency checks (LAC's) on the SUBJECT at all places of residence, employment, and education during the period of investigation, regardless of duration, including overseas locations.

h. Select Scoping. When the facts of the case warrant, additional select scoping will be accomplished, as necessary, to fully develop or resolve an issue.

## SECTION H - POSTADJUDICATION INVESTIGATION

2-24 Introduction. DIS has investigative jurisdiction over personnel security issues which arise after a previous personnel security investigation has been adjudicated, such as, postadjudication investigations. (These investigations are also referred to as special investigative inquiries and "complaint" cases.) DISCO postadjudicative cases are normally marked as Red Flag or Code Red. Cases marked as Red Flag are predicated on information of such a serious nature that DISCO may initiate action to suspend SUBJECT's clearance. Code Red consists of all other DISCO postadjudicative cases. Most requests for postadjudication investigations will be mailed by requesters directly to PIC. Additional or amplifying procedures for these cases are not required, since they are PSI's (albeit priority cases), and these requests will be processed at PIC with leads dispatched to the field, in accordance with existing procedures. There might, however, be instances when the requester will have an urgent need for a postadjudication investigation, in which case communication between requester and PIC by mail is impractical. In such cases, the requester may deliver the requesting document (DD Form 1879) directly to the local DIS field element, or make an oral request to the DIS field element with DD Form 1879 to follow. DIS field elements must respond immediately to these direct requests for postadjudication investigations (see paragraph 2-27).

2-25 Definition. A postadjudication investigation is a PSI predicated on new, adverse, or questionable security, suitability, or hostage information, which arises subsequent to adjudicative action and requires the application

of investigative procedures to determine a DoD-affiliated person's eligibility for access to classified information, assignment to or retention in sensitive duties, or other designated duties requiring such investigation. Note that the criteria specifies the issue occurred after the previous investigation was adjudicated, irrespective of whether the adjudication was favorable or unfavorable.

2-26 Jurisdiction. Since DIS, as set forth in DoD Directive 5105.42 (see enclosure 1), is charged with responsibility for conducting all DoD PSI's, DIS jurisdiction extends to postadjudication investigations of subversive affiliations, suitability information, and hostage situations, when such inquiries are required for personnel security purposes; when the alleged subversive affiliation, or suitability issue is a current violation of law or, in the case of a hostage situation, there is an indication that the person concerned is actually being pressured, coerced, or influenced by interests harmful to the U.S., then the jurisdiction will rest with the appropriate agency, such as the FBI, military investigative agency, or civilian authorities, as set forth in chapter 8.

2-27 Investigative Requirements. DIS will conduct only those inquiries necessary to resolve the issue(s). A request for investigation must be set forth on a DD Form 1879 and accompanied by supporting documentation, if available. On receipt of such a request by DIS, the issues and proposed investigative leads will be identified, and a determination made as to whether the proposed action is within DIS jurisdiction. If the request is received by a DIS field element, that element will telephonically notify the Chief, Investigations Division, (DO620), PIC, who will examine the request for conformity to DoD policy. The initial telephonic notification to the PIC will contain as a minimum:

- a. full identification of the requester,
- b. full identification of the SUBJECT,
- c. a discussion of the allegation and facts, and
- d. recommended leads.

Based on the information provided, PIC will review the prior file and advise the field unit if there is a reason for a change in the course of action. The latter may include the dispatch of leads telephonically (with ALS to follow) or the advising of the requester as to the reasons for declination.

## SECTION I - LIMITED ACCESS AUTHORIZATIONS

2-28 Introduction. Limited Access Authorization (LAA) is a level of access to classified defense information which may be granted to an alien outside the U.S. under certain conditions, one of which is that a BI must have been completed with satisfactory results. As with all PSI's, DIS has the responsibility for controlling the investigation. Inasmuch as the great majority of investigative effort will be accomplished overseas by the military investigative agencies, they are given wide latitude in the opening, scoping, conducting, and closing of LAA cases.

APPENDIX E



5-27 Questioning of the SUBJECT. Basically, the process consists of asking several brief, direct, questions on each topic, following by a summarizing series of questions.

a. General (see subparagraphs b. through r.). Since many areas of interest on the SPH or PSQ are not, in themselves, suitability issues (for example, employments and residences), a detailed response from the SUBJECT about them is not needed. A detailed response often drifts from security areas of interest. Thus, "tell me about your employment history" is not the best question because it does not quickly focus on issues; whereas specific questions can and do get to point, for example: "Have you ever been fired?"... Did you ever resign in lieu of being fired?" Getting to the point quickly is the philosophy behind the questions described in succeeding paragraphs. Its success relies heavily on the thorough explanation given to the SUBJECT (see paragraph 5-25). Each topical section of the interview is subdivided into direct and summarizing questions, as indicated as follows in subparagraphs b. through r.

(1) Direct Questions. Normally, all the direct questions listed will be asked. The questions are sufficiently representative of the topic, without being repetitive, and will usually cover the topics from enough angles so that the SUBJECT, if honest, will not inadvertently omit the information sought. Where the SUBJECT responds with issue information, appropriate questions are posed for the "who, what, when, where, why and how," as called for in section E of this chapter.

(2) Summarizing Questions. After the direct questions on a particular topic have been answered, the special agent may begin to ask the SUBJECT summarizing questions. The vital difference between direct and summarizing questions is that in the latter a "yes" or "no" is no longer

asked for, as this has already been done with the direct questions. This is simply a recapping with different words and asking for a "yes" answer. Summarizing questions offer the SUBJECT a chance to change his or her responses, without the questions taking on a harassing character that would develop if too many "yes" or "no" type questions were repeated. The critical point in the summarizing questions is the significant deliberate pause between questions to allow the SUBJECT an unhurried chance to think and answer. A favorable IBI SI will usually proceed from one topic to another, although the SUBJECT may begin a narrative that covers many areas of interest. If so, the agent shall let the SUBJECT talk, and interrupt only to develop an item, or to redirect the interview when the SUBJECT strays into irrelevant matters.

b. Education.

(1) Direct Questions.

Are there any places of education you have not listed?

Have you ever been suspended or expelled from school?

Were you ever charged with any disciplinary offense while in school?

Were you ever called before school authorities for misconduct?

If we were to talk to school officials or review school records, would we uncover any derogatory information regarding you?

(2) Summarizing Questions.

In other words, your behavior and conduct in a school environment was totally okay..... faculty and fellow students had no complaints about you... and your school record is totally clear?

(3) Comments.

Where educations, employments, and residences are concerned, it is important not to lose sight of why the questions are asked. None of these are of security significance by themselves. But they are places where the SUBJECT had responsibilities to conform or perform, and was observed and evaluated in a context nearly identical to security eligibility criteria.

c. Employment.

(1) Direct Questions.

Are there any employments you failed to list?

Have you ever been accused of dishonesty in connection with any of your employments?

Have you ever had difficulties in your employments that resulted in your being fired or asked to resign?

Did you ever leave an employment to avoid being fired or disciplined?

If we talk to any of your former employers, would any of them have anything bad to say about you?

Have you ever been in the military service?

What kind of discharge did you get?

(2) Summarizing Questions.

In other words, you have never had any problems at any employments... you have never had to leave any employments under adverse circumstances... your employers would not have anything bad to say about you... you have been a good employee?

d. Residence.

(1) Direct Questions.

Were you ever evicted from any residence?

Did you ever have any problems with landlords or neighbors?

Were any complaints made about you by neighbors to officials?

Have you ever been accused of failing to pay your rent or keeping up with your mortgage payments?

Did you ever leave a residence owing money for utilities, rents, damages, or any other items?

Did neighbors or landlords ever call the police because of your behavior?

(2) Summarizing Questions.

In other words, your landlords and neighbors would consider you a desirable tenant and neighbor... former neighbors would want you back... and none would complain about how you paid your rent or mortgage?

e. Refocusing the Interview. After the places of education, employment, and residence are covered, it is useful to refocus the SUBJECT's attention to the importance of truthfulness in the security clearance process, and the adjudicator's use of the whole person concept. For example:

So far we've covered a good deal of your background, but before we go on, I'd like to briefly reiterate some things I said earlier, just to be sure you understand the process. As I said, our interest is in your integrity, trustworthiness and loyalty.

Honesty in this interview is a factor also. And bear in mind, too, that anything which you may see in your background as unfavorable, whether it pertains to drinking, drugs, honesty, morals, or whatever, does not mean the clearing authorities will make an adverse decision on your clearance, since those authorities will be looking at you as a whole person. They will weigh the unfavorable information against the favorable, taking your truthfulness into consideration. Do you have any questions up to this point?... Now, let's go on to the question on the security form which pertains to your use of alcohol..."

f. Use of Alcohol.

(1) Direct Questions.

First of all, do you drink?

At worst, what happens to your behavior when you drink?

Has drinking ever caused you to lose a job?... Has it created any problems with supervisors or co-workers? At school?

Has your use of alcohol caused any financial or health problems?

Have you ever been arrested, charged, or involved in any way in any incident due to drinking?

Have you ever been charged with driving while intoxicated or driving under the influence?

Have you ever had what people call a drinking problem?

(2) Summarizing Questions.

In other words, no one has complained to you or talked to you about your use of alcohol.... no one has ever suggested you receive treatment or counseling... and your use of alcohol has never caused an embarrassing incident.... or one for which you could be blackmailed?

(3) Comments.

The questions focus on the SUBJECT's behavior or results of drinking. They do not include "describe your drinking habits," since such a question permits a self-serving answer (such as, "not much" or "not enough to affect me"). Even if the SUBJECT should say exactly how many ounces he or she drinks per day or at any one time period, it tells the interviewer nothing of whether the SUBJECT becomes significantly unreliable as a result of the drinking. If the SUBJECT's responses indicate a problem, full details such as frequency, type, and amount, as described in paragraph 5-38, must be obtained.

g. Drugs.

(1) Direct Questions.

One of the areas questioned by the SPH or PSQ has to do with drugs, narcotics, and marijuana. What is your view or how do you stand on use of these substances?

What exposure or experience have you had with these kinds of things?

Have you ever been in places or at events where illegal substances were being used?

With respect to legal substances, have you ever misused or abused drugs prescribed for you or for others by a doctor?

(2) Summarizing Questions.

In other words, you abide by laws governing the use of drugs, including marijuana.... you have never been intoxicated or under the influence of these substances.... you have never used, bought, sold, or distributed any drugs or illegal substances?.... Your associates and family have never been involved with illegal substances?

(3) Comments.

If the SUBJECT's responses indicate drug involvement, full details, as described in paragraph 5-39, must be obtained.

h. Mental Treatment.

(1) Direct Questions.

The SPH or PSQ asks about a history of mental or nervous disorders and hospitalization to which you answered "no." Apart from disorders referred to in that question, have you ever sought out psychological counseling from any others, such as teachers, clergy, and school counselors?

Has anyone recommended you seek mental health counseling?

Was psychological counseling or consultation ever a requirement following any incident at work... at school.... or after an arrest?

(2) Summarizing Questions.

In other words, there have been no periods of mental instability or anxiety which affected your job.... your family life.... your personality?.... No conditions for which you considered seeking treatment?.... You have never had what is commonly called a nervous breakdown or nervous condition?

(3) Comments.

If the questions disclose mental treatment or counseling, the remaining questions will be limited to determining when the treatment or counseling took place, where and by whom. Releases shall be sought, but no other questions shall be asked. Additional procedural guidance is in paragraph 5-12.

If the SUBJECT reports mental or psychological problems or instability, that fact becomes a PSI issue to resolve by investigation, whether or not the SUBJECT received counseling or treatment for the problem.

The questions on mental treatment may elicit "marital counseling." However, such counseling is not a proper investigative source, nor is marital disharmony a proper PSI issue. Eligibility criteria (see chapter 2) includes no reference to spouse relationships, marital disharmony, or counseling. Sometimes, however, PSI issues such as drinking or drugs may be the reason for the marital counseling. When this is the case, pursue only those issues, even if it requires interviewing a marriage counselor.

Thus, if the SUBJECT volunteers "marital counseling," or it appears on the SPH or PSQ, the agent must ask the SUBJECT if the marital counseling was sought because of a PSI issue. Simply ask the SUBJECT, "Was the marital counseling due to drinking habits, drug use, financial irresponsibility, immoral behavior, or psychiatric treatment for a mental condition?" If the SUBJECT answers "no," no more questions will be asked, and no medical releases will be requested. If the SUBJECT says "yes," then proceed with questions appropriate to the identified issue, and request medical releases to obtain the relevant information which may be held by the counselor.

\* The questions on mental treatment may also elicit "death counseling." Such counseling will not be pursued unless there is an indication that the death of the family member or loved one has caused a significant defect in the judgment or reliability of the SUBJECT. When this is the case, pursue only these issues, even if it requires interviewing the counselor.

1. Moral Behavior.

(1) Direct Questions.

What do the words "moral" and "moral behavior" mean to you?  
Would you describe yourself in that context?

Has your moral behavior always been proper?

Has your present or past behavior put you in a position of being subject to blackmail or pressure?

Has anyone ever accused you of improper behavior at any time?

(2) Summarizing Questions.

In other words, there have been no incidents in your life in which your behavior was immoral, embarrassing, or personally disgraceful.... there is nothing embarrassing or questionable that anyone could hold over you?

(3) Comments.

If the SUBJECT asks what moral behavior is, the agent must give an explanation. It would be appropriate to say:

Moral behavior is a concept pertaining to your conduct and actions. It covers ethical practices whether they be technically illegal or not, such as honesty, meeting obligations, the keeping of confidences, or conformity to the law. It also pertains to sexual conduct, including illegal acts such as voyeurism, child molesting, violation of obscenity statutes, or acts such as homosexuality or promiscuity, which may or may not be technically illegal in any given jurisdiction.

Matters pertaining to sex are not in themselves relevant to a security determination, unless they are indicative of irresponsibility, are criminal in nature, or they create a situation making the SUBJECT vulnerable to blackmail. Thus, the agent will not ask specific questions about sex unless:

(a) the SUBJECT introduces the matter or it has been developed through other sources such as LAC, NAC or prior investigation; and,

(b) questioning is necessary to determine the SUBJECT's susceptibility to pressure or blackmail, or to explore criminality or irresponsible behavior.

Apart from direct questions about sex, an agent must also avoid words or phrases which by inference improperly introduce sexual matters into the questioning. Examples of the kinds of things the agent must not ask about are: dating habits, reasons for not getting married, whether the SUBJECT has friends of the opposite sex, if the SUBJECT was ever a victim of a sexual crime, and the degree to which the SUBJECT and spouse get along.

When a SUBJECT admits sexual misconduct or sexually deviant activity, see paragraphs 4-10, 4-11, 4-12, and 5-40 for guidance.

j. Family and Associates.

(1) Direct Questions.

Who do you live with now?

Apart from your family members, have you ever resided with another with whom a close relationship exists or has existed?

Have you ever been divorced? If so, in that process were there any complaints, or was the basis of the divorce your moral behavior, drinking habits, drugs, mental stability, or personal activities which bear on your integrity?

Do any family members or close friends have any problems or involvement with drugs, alcohol, or criminal activities? If so, what impact did or does it have on you? How were you involved? Were you previously involved?

(2) Summarizing Questions.

In other words, there is nothing about your family or associates that you are ashamed of or you would like to keep secret.... and you could not possibly be blackmailed for something they have done?

(3) Comments.

Remember, even though some of these questions may disclose unfavorable information about the SUBJECT's family or associates, the PSI is solely concerned with the SUBJECT and the factors which may influence the SUBJECT's behavior or activities in a security context. If the SUBJECT's spouse, for example, was trafficking drugs, the SUBJECT could be exposed to considerable pressure over fear for the safety of the spouse. Similarly, a SUBJECT living with a foreign national affiliated with a trade office of a Communist country is more easily targeted by foreign intelligence than one who has no such contact. Relevant information about a family member may be developed at any stage of an interview; however, the agent's questions shall be carefully phrased or explained, to show that the SUBJECT is the focus of the investigation, and that DIS is not investigating family or friends.

The fact that the SUBJECT is cohabiting may be a point of embarrassment which the SUBJECT is concealing from others; therefore, if the SUBJECT is residing with another, he or she should be asked if there is a husband and wife relationship, if it is commonly known, and, in this context, if the relationship is a source of coercion. The agent should not imply that he or she is making a moral judgment on the SUBJECT's cohabitation. Also, full identification of the cohabitant, to include full name, DOB, and citizenship, should be obtained, as inquiries on the cohabitant may be necessary. If the SUBJECT questions the need for this data, he or she should be advised that interest in the cohabitant is to the same extent that data on a spouse is required.

A court record check is not routinely conducted for a divorce, annulment, or legal separation, unless references indicate the grounds for such action may include a suitability issue. Therefore, the agent shall ask the SUBJECT if he or she was divorced or legally separated. If so, the agent shall inquire if allegations were made during the proceedings about the SUBJECT's morals, use of drugs or alcohol, finances, or emotional stability.



k. Foreign Connections.

(1) Direct Questions.

With respect to matters outside the United States, do you or any of your relatives have any interests?.... Academic interests?... Correspondence?.... Financial concerns?

Has anyone from a foreign country visited you here?

Have you received any correspondence from a foreign country, either solicited or unsolicited?

Do any of the commercial firms or employers with which you may now have or have had an obligation or close association have foreign connections?

Do you deal with or know any citizens of Communist countries?

(2) Summarizing Questions.

In other words, you have had no contacts or relationships outside the United States with either persons, businesses or governments?.... You and your family members have no associations or relationships here in the United States with aliens or with persons who have close foreign personal or business ties?.... You don't have any contact with persons from other countries?.... You don't associate with any citizens of Communist countries?

(3) Comments.

A SUBJECT's foreign associations under the auspices of the U.S. Government are not, in themselves, issues for a PSI. This foreign association may, however, be expanded by the SUBJECT or the foreign national into a personal association. For this reason, the fact that the foreign association was initiated under government auspices does not eliminate it as a PSI matter to explore in the IBI SI. Once the questions have determined there is no personal aspect to the SUBJECT's foreign association, and that no personal approaches have been made to the SUBJECT from foreign nationals, the questioning should go on to other matters.

Foreign connections include organizations and businesses, and their representatives (whether people or other entities) to which the SUBJECT, spouse, or cohabitant may have responsibilities or feel a sense of obligation. Where these connections exist, the interview should develop full identification, address, relationship to the SUBJECT (or immediate family member), and the degree and purpose of the affiliation (see chapter 3). Hostage interviews, as described in paragraph 5-42, are always conducted if the SUBJECT has a family member, or associate with whom there is a close bond of affection or obligation, residing in a designated country. When the spouse of a SUBJECT has a relative or associate in a designated country, the

full line of questioning outlined in paragraph 5-42 shall be adapted to the interview, as appropriate to the facts developed as the interview progresses.

1. Foreign Travel.

(1) Direct Questions.

Have you ever been outside the United States either as a civilian or a member of the military? Have you been to any Communist-controlled countries? To other foreign countries?

Have your immediate family members traveled to foreign countries?

(2) Comments.

The dates (or approximations) of foreign travel shall be obtained, but are less important than the purpose, places visited, identities of companions, and the activities and contacts during the travel, which may be indications of investigative issues. The questions should determine if lasting contacts were made, and should encompass such items as the SUBJECT's (or spouse's) problems with police or customs, evidence of monitoring by the foreign country, embarrassing, or compromising incidents, and the like. When travel to a Communist-controlled country is under the auspices of the U.S. Government, these matters should still be explored for possible issues.

m. Financial Responsibility.

(1) Direct Questions.

What is your financial situation?

Do you have any creditors who are claiming you are overdue on any payments?

Have you ever had any accounts placed for collection? Have you ever had any purchases voluntarily or involuntarily repossessed?

Have you ever issued any bad checks?

Have you ever filed for bankruptcy, or sought assistance or counseling with respect to your financial obligations?

Do you go to places where gambling is available? If so, tell me about your gambling habits.

Are you living within your means? Might others perceive you as spending more than your income would permit?

(2) Comments.

Many questions could be asked to develop the SUBJECT's financial responsibility. Those listed above are sufficient to develop relevant information without belaboring the point with many questions that are essentially the same. These questions seek a general response rather than a balance sheet of assets and liabilities. If the SUBJECT's responses indicate that he or she is solvent, that is, the SUBJECT has no delinquent debts, bad checks, civil judgments, has not been sued, has never filed for bankruptcy, and is not behind in alimony payments, further questioning is not necessary.

If the responses indicate some financial problems, the questioning must be expanded, for example, to obtain a detailed account of all obligations and to learn whether there are any circumstances beyond the SUBJECT's control, which may account for indebtedness; if accounts are in the spouse's name and, if so, the degree of the SUBJECT's responsibility for such accounts; whether the SUBJECT has sought financial counseling or made special arrangements with creditors; whether the SUBJECT has the ability to meet current obligations; how the SUBJECT perceives this financial dilemma; and could the SUBJECT be influenced or coerced to act irresponsibly because of past or present financial difficulties. When identifying creditors in those situations where there is an issue, the agent shall obtain the SUBJECT's account number and the city where the account was opened or is managed. The procedures in chapter 3 for obtaining releases under the Right to Financial Privacy Act apply (also see paragraph 5-11). An adjudication of bankruptcy does not eliminate financial responsibility as an issue, just as serving a prison term does not negate the offense as an issue. When a SUBJECT reports a bankruptcy, the agent shall determine why it occurred and whether the causative factors remain, and expand the questioning as appropriate.

n. Organizations.

(1) Direct Questions.

Other than the organizations you listed, are there any organizations where you were a volunteer worker, aide, or participant, or to which you lend your name or devote any of your time or money?

Do you belong to any organizations that people might consider Communist or subversive? Did you ever belong to any such organization?

Do you belong, or have you ever belonged, to any organization that advocates the unlawful overthrow of the U.S. Government or denial of constitutional rights?

(2) Comments.

When the SUBJECT's remarks raise questions or issues, bear in mind that mere membership in an organization is not the issue, but rather the knowing membership and specific intent to do harm, or to aid the organization in such activity. When the nature of an organization is not evident to the agent, appropriate questions shall be asked. These, however,

should end when it is apparent that the organization has no security or suitability significance. When there is some uncertainty or questionable aspect to pursue, the substance of the questions in paragraph 5-44, tailored to fit the situation, should also be posed to the SUBJECT, and expanded on as necessary (see also chapter 3).

o. Loyalty.

(1) Direct Questions.

Where loyalty to the United States and conformity to the Constitution are concerned, where do you stand?

Have you ever deliberately refused to obey a law for ideological reasons?

Are there any laws which, if faced with a decision, you would not comply with?

Where the Department of Defense is concerned, do you have any reservations about compliance with regulations or policy?

Are you a conscientious objector? If so, would you tell me what a conscientious objector is, as far as you are concerned? How do you reconcile your views with your government work, especially with classified material?

(where applicable) Have you registered under the Selective Service System? If not, why not?

(2) Summarizing Questions.

In other words, you have no reservations about fully supporting the missions of the Department of Defense, whether the missions be defensive or offensive in nature?

(3) Comments.

As set forth in chapter 4, a person whose personal opinion differs from U.S. Government policy is not investigated. If, however, the SUBJECT qualifies his or her responses to questions, the agent must ask enough follow-up questions to distinguish between the SUBJECT's right to his or her opinion and a refusal to adhere to laws, advocacy of violence, or refusal to protect DoD interests (see paragraph 5-44).

p. Criminal History.

(1) Direct Questions.

Have you ever been investigated by the police or military investigative authorities?

Have you ever been questioned by police?

Have you ever been charged or arrested for a crime?

Have you ever engaged in criminal activity which has gone undetected?

(2) Summarizing Questions.

In other words, you have had no contact with authorities in police, law enforcement, or investigative units?.... No such contacts as a juvenile?.... You have had no record expunged or sealed?.... You have never had a law enforcement or judicial action postponed, lessened, or withdrawn on the basis of your performing some public service or your enlistment in the military service?

(3) Comments.

The facts of an arrest and whether or not there was a conviction or acquittal are sterile facts of limited value to the adjudicator. A valid security assessment is dependent on full details of the event, such as what the SUBJECT did and whether there were circumstances which mitigate or aggravate the act from a security viewpoint. The SUBJECT's age, effects of intoxicants, reparation, unusual stresses, and degree of participation, are some of the factors by which the adjudicator measures the event against security standards. A youthful SUBJECT may be asked the specific question of whether he or she has a juvenile arrest record. In addition, the SUBJECT may be asked if there has been any offenses which were expunged. If the SUBJECT responds affirmatively to the question on juvenile or expunged offenses, the agent may ask for details. However, if the SUBJECT states that he or she was advised by legal authorities that it was not necessary to report the matter, and objects to further questioning, no further questions shall be asked; the issue will be pursued by a lead, if sufficient information is available to do so, and state laws permit it.

q. Security.

(1) Direct Questions.

Have you ever been accused of improperly handling personal, private, or classified information?

Would you, as a person with access to classified information, be subjected to any pressure from family, friends, or associates to reveal such information?

Are there any factors which would make it difficult for you to hold classified information in complete trust?

(2) Summarizing Questions.

In other words, no one would assess your security reliability, or handling or protection of information as being loose?.... You would feel comfortable about your ability to hold a security clearance?

r. Trust.

Would you tell me about those positions you have held or applied for which involve trust, security clearances, bonded activities, or handling of money?

Were you ever refused such a position?

Was a trust ever taken away from you? Were you ever denied a security clearance?

5-28 Conclusion of the SUBJECT Interview.

(1) The following questions shall be asked at the end of the SI.

Considering all that has been said, do you have any mental reservations about anything bearing on a security clearance?

Would you like to add to, further explain, or change any of your responses to the questions that have been asked?

Do you feel comfortable now, and have you felt that way during the course of this interview?

Please take a moment to look again at your SPH or PSQ.

Is there anything you would like to change or discuss?

(2) These questions are, in essence, a restatement by the agent of the importance of honesty, an invitation for the SUBJECT to ask any questions, and an offer for the SUBJECT to make any final comments, corrections, or additions. Obviously, any reservations remaining in the agent's mind should be disposed of. A statement shall be solicited, if appropriate, or, if the SUBJECT declines to make a statement, the relevant information shall be read back to the SUBJECT to ensure that the agent understands what the SUBJECT said.

5-29 Reporting Requirements. The IBI SI paragraph as described in subparagraphs below, includes the date and duration of the interview, and includes favorable information as well as unfavorable or qualified information in a specified sequence. The sequence of captions in an ROI with an IBI SI will normally be the sequence shown in chapter 6.

a. Favorable Reports. Enclosure 22 is a sample of a favorable report. Each agent should adapt his or her own words to this format. Briefly, this ROI consists of the following.

(1) An Opening Paragraph. This shows whether the SUBJECT was interviewed for an IBI or PR, the date and duration of the interview. (Rarely will a variation from the sample be necessary). This paragraph should also include a military SUBJECT's rank and place of assignment.

APPENDIX F

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
MANPOWER DATA CENTER

DATA BASE PROFILE AND OVERVIEW  
AUGUST 1986



## MEPCOM EXAMINATION AND ACCESSION FILE

**File Description:** Records of all individuals examined at Military Enlistment Processing Stations since July 1970. A subset file of accessions is extracted.

**Frequency of Submission:** Submitted monthly by the Military Enlistment Processing Command.

**Key Dates & Number of Cases:** Data are stored in fiscal year files starting with FY 1971. Approximately 1.5 million cases per fiscal year are on total Transaction File. About 400,000 per year are Accessions. Examination data prior to FY 76 are not complete.

**Data Elements:**

Personal  
Social Security Number, Name, County, State, ZIP Code, Date of Birth, Citizenship, Previous Military Service, Education Level, Sex, Race, Marital Status, Number of Dependents, AFQT Scores, Test Scores, Religion.

Medical  
Physical Profile, Height, Weight, Blood Pressure, Medical Failure, Waiver Code.

Administrative  
MEPS Station, Branch of Service, Recruiter Code, Date of Accession, Category of Enlistment, Occupation, Grade, Special Program Code (i.e., Bonus, Unit of Choice, etc.).

## ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PAY FILE

**File Description:** Records of pay and allowances for all individuals on active duty on or after 1 July 1982 except Reserves on active duty less than 180 days.

**Frequency of Submission:** Submitted quarterly by the Military Service Finance Centers.

**Key Dates and Number of Cases:** Data are stored starting 30 September 1983. Each submitting period contains records on about 2.2 million enlisted and officer personnel.

**Data Elements:**

Personal  
Social Security Number, Name, Service, Sex, Marital Status, Legal State of Residence.

Military Experience  
Pay Entry Base Date, Active Duty Base Date, Pay Grade, Date of Current Pay Grade, ETS Date, Number of Days of Lost Time (current quarter), and Unit Identification Code.

Pay and Allowances  
Current Pay Status, Basic Pay, Hazardous Duty Incentive Pays, Enlistment and Selective Reenlistment Bonuses, Aviation Career Incentive Pay, special pays for Medical Officers, Basic Allowance for Quarters, Variable Housing Allowance, Overseas COLA, and Rent-Plus Allowances. Overseas Housing Allowance (OHA).

## ENLISTED/OFFICER MASTER FILE

**File Description:** The inventory of personnel on active duty (excluding those on active duty for training) at end of each calendar quarter.

**Frequency of Submission:** Submitted quarterly by the Services.

**Key Dates and Number of Cases:** Data are stored for both enlisted and officer personnel starting 30 June 1971 and every six months thereafter until 30 June 1975, when data are stored quarterly. Each submission contains records on about 1.7 to 2.3 million enlisted personnel and 270,000 to 370,000 officers.

**Data Elements:**

Personal  
Social Security Number, Education Level, AFQT Percentile Score, Date of Birth, Service, Race, Ethnic Group, Marital Status, Number of Dependents, Sex, Home of Record.

Military Experience  
Months of Service, DoD Primary and Duty Occupations, Pay Grade, Age at Entry, Service Primary Occupation, Active Duty Base Date, Pay Entry Base Date, ETS Date, Date of Rank, Date of Latest Enlistment, Time-in-Grade, Flying Status (officer), and Unit Identification Code. Also starting in July 1985, Security Classification, Foreign Language Ability, Major Command Code and GI Bill Eligibility Information.

## DoD CIVILIAN CENTRAL PERSONNEL DATA FILE

**File Description:** This file contains the personnel records of all direct-hire DoD civilian employees excluding foreign nationals overseas. There is a master file which is a picture of civilian employees at the end of each quarter as well as a transaction file which records Promotions, Accessions, Separations, Changes, etc. over a period of time.

**Frequency of Submission:** Submitted quarterly by the Services and Defense agencies since 31 December 1976 to the present.

**Number of Cases:** Master files contain approximately 1 million records. Transaction files contain approximately 1.5 million per fiscal year.

**Data Elements:**

Personal Characteristics  
Service Computation Date, Date of birth, Handicap Code, Race/National Origin Code, Sex, Education Level, Year Degree Attained, Academic Discipline, Geographic Location, Veteran Indicator, Annuitant Status Code, Vietnam Era Veteran Indicator, Creditable Military Service\*, Foreign Language Proficiency (Listening, Reading, Speaking)\*, etc.

Job Characteristics  
Work Schedule, Personnel Office Identifier\* (Submitting Office Number), Functional Classification of Scientists & Engineers, Geographic Location Code, Position Service Identifier, Agency Bureau, Supervisor Indicator, Civil Function Code, Current Appointment Authority Code, Overseas Emergency Essential Agreement Flag, Position Sensitivity\*, etc.

DoD CIVILIAN CENTRAL PERSONNEL DATA FILE (CONT'D)

Data Elements (Cont'd):

Pay and Benefit Characteristics

Salary, Pay Rate Determinant, Pay Basis Code, Tenure Code, Veteran Preference Code, Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Status, Retirement System Code, Pay Plan, Pay Grade, Step, Performance Level Identifier, PMRS Performance Budget Allocation\*, Bargaining Unit Status, Annuitant Status Code, Fair Labor Standards Act Exemption Status, Health Benefit Plan\*, Date of Last Promotion\*, Date Entered Current Grade\*, Frozen CSRS Service\*, CSRS Coverage at Appointment\*, etc.

Nature of Action Code and Legal Authority Codes

Transaction data contain effective date and codes for identification of type of change such as promotion, accession, separation, retirement. There are approximately 300 of these codes.

Accounting Type Data

Includes Program Element Code, Unit Identification, and Appropriation Resource Identification Code.

\* Asterisk variables will first be available in the December 1986 file.

## CIVILIAN CENTRAL PERSONNEL DATA FILE (CCPDF)

### File Description:

This file contains the personnel records of all direct-hire DoD civilian employees excluding foreign nationals overseas. There is a master file which is a picture of civilian employees as of the end of each quarter as well as a transaction file which records Promotions, Accessions, Separations, Changes, etc. over a period of time.

### Frequency of Submission:

Submitted quarterly by the Civil Service Commission (nee OPM) from 31 December 1972 until September 1977 and yearly thereafter (see DCPDF).

### Number of Cases:

#### Personal

Service Computation Date, Separation Date, Effective Date of Change, Salary, Occupational Code, Functional Classification, Geographic Location, SMSA, Veteran Indicator, Retired Military Code, Pay Plan, Grade and Step, etc.

#### Administrative

The file contains a number of additional elements indicating frequency of pay, participation in life insurance programs, nature of retirement plan, etc.

#### Nature of Action Code

Transaction data contains an identifier code for identification of type of change; such as Promotion, Accession, Separation, Retirement. There are approximately 300 of these codes.

## ENLISTED/OFFICER SEPARATION AND REENLISTMENT FILE

<b>File Description:</b>	Records of all individuals separating from active duty or reenlisting during the period.
<b>Frequency of Submission:</b>	Submitted monthly or weekly by the Services.
<b>Number of Cases:</b>	Data are stored on a fiscal year basis, or on a quarterly basis for the current fiscal year.
<b>Data Elements:</b>	<p><u>Personal</u> Social Security Number, Education Level, AFQT Percentile Score, Date of Birth, Service, Race, Ethnic Group, Marital Status, Number of Dependents, Sex, Home of Record.</p> <p><u>Military Experience</u> Months of Service at Separation, DoD Primary and Duty Occupation, Pay Grade at Separation, Age at Entry, Age at Separation, Service Primary Occupation, Separation Program Designator, Interservice Separation Code, Date of Separation, Active Duty Base Date, Pay Entry Base Date, ETS Date, Date of Last Pay Grade, Date of Last Reenlistment, Time-In-Grade at Separation, Character of Service (enlisted), Reenlistment Eligibility Code (enlisted), Flying Status (officer).</p>

## MILITARY RESERVE FILE

### **File Description:**

All Military Reservists including those in the selected Reserve, the IRR, Full-Time Support Retired, and other Reserve categories received from the Service Reserve Personnel Centers.

### **Frequency of Submission:**

Quarterly from Fiscal Year 1975 until Fiscal Year 1978. Monthly thereafter.

### **Data Elements:**

Social Security Number, Census Region and District, Home of Record ZIP Code, Unit ZIP Code, Reserve Category, Date of Birth, Highest Education, Sex, Race, Ethnic, Marital Status, AFQT, TAFMS, DoD Occupation Group, Prior Service, MOS, PEBD, Date of Current Grade, Unit Identification Code.

#### Personal

Social Security Number, Name, Race, Marital Status, Dependents, Home of Record, Date of Birth, Civilian Education.

#### Military

Component, Reserve Category Code, Pay Grade, Pay Entry Base Date, Unit Identification Code including state and zip, Total Months of Service, Total Years toward Retirement, Primary and Duty Occupation, ETS Date, Mandatory Removal Date, Program Element Code, Source of Entry/Commission, Date of Commission, 20 Year Letter Indicator, Branch, FTS Status, AGR Identifier, Mental Group, Obligor Status, Term of Enlistment, Date Initial Entry to Military, Date Initial Entry to Reserve Forces, Incentive Status and Date.



### UIC LOCATION FILE

**File Description:** This file contains the unit identification codes (UIC) used by the military services and their location. (Navy reserve units were added in March 1986.)

**Frequency of Submission:** Annual from December 1980 to December 1982, Semi-annual for June 1983 and December 1983 and quarterly thereafter.

**Data Elements:** Service Unit Identification Code, a Unit Name and/or Street Address, State and Zipcode/APO/FPO for March 1986 and later Congressional District, Component and a Conus/Non-Conus flag are also included.

OEAX: DMD's ON-LINE DATA FACILITY (CONT'D)

Officer Retention Data Base: Eleven years and five quarters worth of serial data for officers on active duty, with cross-section detail on any combination of up to eleven different population attributes. It includes the FY85. Series for both base (i.e. beginning year) inventory and annual rates of retention are available. Data problem areas are identified to user on-line.

Officer Management Data Base: Ten years of annual pre-formatted data on enlisted inventory by grade and length of service, with additional information on promotion, gains, and losses. The data presently covers FY76 through FY85 and is updated annually.

## DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL SECURITY CLEARANCE OFFICE (DISCO) FILES

**File Description:**

The DoD contractor clearance databases consisting of separate files for contractor organizations and employees. The organization file includes location and facility clearance information. The employee file contains personal information and clearance related data for current and recently terminated employees.

**Frequency of Submission:**

Submitted quarterly by the Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office (DISCO).

**Key Date and Number of Cases:**

Initial submission files received by DMDC for end of March 1986. Over 24 thousand facility records and about 1 million current contractor employee clearances and 1 million terminated clearances.

**Data Elements:**

Facility File

Facility Code, Facility-Division Name, Physical Address, Mailing Address, Telephone Number, Security Classification, Status

Contractor Employee File

Name, Social Security Number, Facility Code, Facility Name and Location, Type and Date of Investigation, Investigating Agency, Date and Level of Clearance Eligibility, Cryptographic Code, Termination Code and Date

## DoD SEPARATION ADDRESS FILE

### File Description:

This file contains information on military personnel separated to civilian life starting in January 1971. The population covered is similar to that covered by the Enlisted/Officer Separation File. The major additional element on this file is a mailing address for each separatee. The following personnel are omitted from the file:

- Personnel who separated due to death, retirement, or reenlistment

- Personnel who have re-joined the active or reserve military service

- Personnel who are not eligible for reenlistment

### Frequency of Submission:

Prepared quarterly from files received from the Veteran's Administration matched with DMDC Gain/Loss transactions. Files cover from 1971 through present.

### Data Elements:

#### Personal

Name, Social Security Number, Branch of Service, Sex, Date of Separation, RE code, SPD code, DD-214 and/or GI Bill Education address.

#### Military Experience

Primary and Duty Occupation, Paygrade, Education Level, Mental Category, Total Months Military Service, and Character of Service.